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Abstract 
 
 
The ethnic war in Aceh territory killed 13.000 to 50.000 of people and it remains 
problematic, especially in the 1950s, 1970s, and the end of 1990s. This thesis explores 
whether the symbolic politics theory of ethnic war, which was originally designed to 
explain conflict in the post-Communist societies of Eastern Europe, is also successful for 
explaining ethnic war and the subsequent peace in areas like Aceh where traditional 
social structures continued to exist. Facts support the hypotheses of symbolist theory.  On 
the first two cases, myths justifying hostility were strong on both sides of the Acehnese 
and the Javanese Indonesian national government, the result of decades of conflict 
between Javanese national authorities and the Acehnese societies in Aceh territory. 
Ethnic fears, opportunity reasons, hostile feelings, chauvinist mobilization by ethnic 
elites, and security dilemma dynamics were also taken into account on the Acehnese 
ethnic conflict. On the other hand, the symbolist theory is also effective for explaining 
ethnic subsequent peace in the reform period (1998-recent). Hostile myths and fears did 
present, but the violence did not emerge because both elites chose not to let the conflict 
continues. The opportunity to mobilize for both elites did not present and therefore 
hostile mass conflict did not escalate. Recognizing this unique conflict involves 
identifying the patterns of their attachment to the traditional social structures, the 
sultanates and the ulama (the Islamic scholar). 
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Abstraksi 
 
 
Konflik ethnis di wilayah Aceh telah membunuh 13.000 sampai 50.000 orang dan 
tetap problematic, terutama pada tahun 1950an, 1970an, dan pada akhir tahun 1990an. 
Tesis ini menganalisis apakah teori simbolik politik dalam konflik atau perang etnis, yang 
pada awalnya dirancang untuk menjelaskan perang etnis dalam masyarakat post-Komunis 
di Eropa Timur, juga sukses menjelaskan perang etnis dan perdamaian di daerah-daerah 
seperti Aceh yang struktur sosial tradisionalnya tetap ada. Fakta-fakta menunjukkan 
terbuktinya hipotesis teori simbolis. Dalam dua studi kasus pertama, mitos yang 
menjustifikasi permusuhan sangat kuat pada kedua belah pihak antara orang Aceh dan 
pemerintah Jawa Indonesia, hasil dari beberapa decade konflik antara otoritas nasional 
Jawa dan masyarakat Aceh di wilayah Aceh. Ketakutan etnis, alasan kesempatan, 
perasaan permusuhan, mobilisasi cauvinis oleh para elit etnis, dan dinamika dilemma 
keamanan juga turut berkontribusi dalam menjelaskan konflik etnis Aceh. Pada sisi lain, 
teori sombolis juga efektif untuk menjelaskan perdamaian sesudah perang pada periode 
reformasi (1998-sekarang). Mitos permusuhan dan ketakutan memang terlihat, tapi 
kekerasan tidak terjadi karena elit dari kedua belah pihak memilih untuk tidak 
membiarkan konflik tidak berlanjut. Kesempatan utk memobilisasi bagi elit dari kedua 
belah pihak tidak terlihat dan oleh karena itu konflik permusuhan massa tidak tereskalasi. 
Mengenali keunikan konflik ini mencakup pengidentifikasian pola-pola keterkaitan 
mereka pasa struktur social tradisional, ulama dan sultan.  
 
 
viii 
Table of Contents 
 Pages 
Title page i 
Thesis Originality page (Pernyataan Keaslian Tesis) ii 
Approval Thesis Page (Pengesahan Tesis) ii 
Acknowledgement and Dedication (Persembahan) iv 
Abstract vi 
Abstraksi vii 
List of Tables xii 
List of Figures xiii 
1. Introduction 1 
A. Introduction 1 
B. The importance of the thesis 7 
C. Arguments (Thesis statement) 7 
D. Methodology and data collection 8 
E. Hypothesis 9 
F. The plan of the thesis 14 
2. Literature review 15 
A. Introduction 15 
B. Interpretations of the ethnic conflict 17 
C. Rational choice theory 19 
a. Strengths of rational choice theory 24 
b. Weakness of rational choice theory 27 
 
ix 
c. Inapplicability of rational choice theory to the Acehnese conflicts 28 
D. Psychological approaches 30 
a. Strengths of psychological approaches 32 
b. Weakness of psychological approaches 33 
c. Inapplicability of psychological approaches to the Acehnese conflicts 35  
E. Symbolic politics theory 37 
a. Strengths of symbolic politics theory 39 
b. Weakness of symbolic politics theory 42 
c. Applicability of symbolic politics theory to the Acehnese conflicts 44 
F. Conclusion 45 
3. Indonesia and the Acehnese rebellions 48  
A. Introduction 48 
B. Geography and ethnicity in Indonesia 48 
C. The politics and ideology in Indonesia 51 
D. Ideological debate between the Islamic and secular nationalist groups 54 
E. The Origins of the Acehnese rebellions 58 
a. The Darul Islam movement under Daud Bereueh leadership 59 
b. Free Aceh Movement under Soeharto’s regime of the New Order era   
(1969-1998)  61 
c. Free Aceh Movement in reformation era (1998 - now) 67 
F. Conclusion 71 
4. The Acehnese conflicts under Soekarno’s period 74 
A. Introduction 74 
 
x 
B. Myths justifying hostility 75 
C. Fears of extinction 84 
D. Opportunity to mobilization 89 
E. Mass hostility 92 
F. Hostile mobilization (The process of mobilization for war) 96 
G. Conclusion 103 
5. The Acehnese conflicts under Soeharto’s period (The New Order era) 106 
A. Introduction 106 
B. Myths justifying hostility 107 
C. Fears of extinction 113 
D. Opportunity to mobilization 117 
E. Mass hostility 119 
F. Hostile mobilization (The process of mobilization for war) 122 
G. Conclusion 129 
6. The Acehnese subsequent peace after 1998 reform period 132 
A. Introduction 132 
B. Myths justifying hostility 134 
C. Fears of extinction 137 
D. Opportunity to mobilization 142 
E. Chauvinist mobilization and the clashes  146 
F. Conclusion 150 
 
 
xi 
7. Conclusion  153 
A. Introduction 153 
B. Assessment of the symbolic politics theory on the Acehnese conflicts 153 
a. Assessment of the theory on the Acehnese conflict under  
Soekarno period 153 
b. Assessment of the theory on the Acehnese conflict under  
Soeharto period 156 
c. The Acehnese subsequent peace after the 1998 reform period 159 
C. Strengths and weaknesses of the symbolic politics theory 162 
a. Strengths of the symbolic politics theory 162 
b. Weaknesses of the symbolic politics theory 164 
D. Implications 166 
8. References    168 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xii 
List of tables 
 
Table 3.1 Major Parties in Indonesian and Recent Parliamentary Elections Result 
(Percent of Vote) 56 
  
  
  
  
   
  
 
   
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xiii 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1.1 The GAM’s flag as the fighters’ symbol of freedom and independent 6 
Figure 2.1 A fighter risking his life securing the GAM’s flag  35 
Figure 2.2 The GAM’s supporter provoke the emotions of the Indonesian military 36 
Figure 3.1 The map of Indonesia 50 
Figure 3.2 The Political map in Indonesia in 1955 55 
Figure 5.1 The flag of GAM 109 
Figure 5.2 The flag of the Aceh government Kingdom (1511-1530) 110 
Figure 5.3 The flag of Ottoman Empire 111
 
1 
CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A. Introduction 
After the Indonesian independence in 1945, Acehnese experienced an ethnic 
conflict whose savagery replayed some of the worst horrors of the Dutch colonial era. 
The Javanese Indonesian government and their military forces swept the Acehnese 
rebellions under the Daud Bereueh leadership in 1953 and the Free Aceh Movement 
(GAM, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) under Hasan di Tiro leadership from 1976 to the 1998 
reform period. More than four thousands Acehnese died during the Daud Bereueh 
rebellion in 1953, and more than fifty thousands Acehnese were killed between 1976 and 
1998 - reform period.1 KontraS (Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Tindak Kekerasan, 
Commission for Missing People and Violent Actions), an Indonesian Non-Governmental 
Organization (NGO), reported that since 1953 to the 1998 reform era, the Indonesian 
government and their military have murdered, tortured and victimized the Acehnese in 
order to terrorize the Acehnese population.2 
These horrible events cry out for an explanation. What motivated both the 
Acehnese and the Javanese Indonesian leaders or the politicians of nations to organize 
torture, rape, terror, and even murder a large portion of their country’s inhabitants? What 
                                                             
1 Michael Runnner and Zoe Chafe, “Beyond Disasters: Creating Opportunities for Peace,” edited by Lisa 
Mastny, World Watch Report (Worldwatch Institute, 2007), 21. 
2 KontraS, Aceh, Damai dengan Keadilan? Mengungkap Kekerasan Masa Lalu (Aceh, Peace with Justice? 
Revealing the Past Violent) (Jakarta: KontraS, 2006). 
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motivated their followers to sink to such brutality aimed against their near neighbors 
ethnic group? One could explain these events as the result of hatreds, manipulative 
leaders, economic rivalry and so on. These arguments should be combined to explain 
why ethnic conflict or war occurred and to explain why ethnic conflict does not happen. 
In this case, I would combine the rational choice and the psychological approaches, as 
noted above, by using the symbolic politics theory on the Acehnese ethnic conflicts and 
the subsequent peace.  
This research draws on the symbolic politics theory to examine three case studies 
of the Acehnese ethnic conflicts that include: the Aceh rebellion in 1953, Aceh rebellion 
under the Soeharto’s New Order period from 1969 to 1998, and the Aceh rebellion 
in1998 reform period. I will focus on these three case studies because the Acehnese 
separatist group’s existence continued under several different regimes in Indonesia. This 
research specifically analyzes the myths, fears, opportunities, mass hostility, and the 
hostile mobilization in determining ethnic conflict or war between the Acehnese and the 
Javanese Indonesian central government under several different regimes.  
In 1953, Aceh’ leaders, especially Daud Beureuh, was disappointed with the 
national Indonesian government, and thus they revolted as a part of the Darul Islam 
(Abode of Islam) movement in a struggle to create an Indonesian Islamic state.3 In 1976, 
Hasan di Tiro returned from the United States to form Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free 
Aceh Movement or well known as GAM) and for the second time the Acehnese declared 
                                                             
3 C. Van Dijk, Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia (Leiden, Netherland: 
The Hague-Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), 269. 
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its intention to have their independence. Thus in 1989, this rebellion resulted in a cruel 
counterinsurgency operation that caused thousands of civilian casualties.4  
The last event, but not least significant, was in late 1998, in which the student 
movement protested and called for a referendum on independence similar to the 1999 
referendum in East Timor. Negotiation between national Indonesian government and 
GAM continued and gave the special autonomy status. On May 2003, the peace process 
broke down because the military emergency status was affirmed and the Indonesian 
military launched large-scale offensives actions and so the war continues.5 However, the 
sudden tsunamis that came into Aceh territory and destroyed most of the area formed a 
new situation on Aceh. GAM and the Indonesian government produced a new negotiation 
pace of with the assistance of Marti Ahtisaari, the peace noble prizewinner in 2008. 
Negotiation in 2006 resulted in an ethnic peace by giving the Acehnese a “self-
government” position within Indonesia. Therefore, the three case studies above related to 
the nations and nationalism of a group or a creation of nations and the nationalism 
emotions.  
Anderson put forward the concept of the “imagined political community” that 
refers to the creation of nations and nationality.6 His work derived from the Marxist 
tradition; yet, Anderson, goes beyond political economic view and moves toward a 
cultural view in a way that nation and nationalism are constructed as cultural heritage. He 
                                                             
4 Kirsten E. Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization, Policy 
Studies 2 (Washington: East-West Center, 2004), 2. 
5 Edward Aspinall and Harold Crouch, The Aceh Peace Process: Why it Failed Policy Studies 
1(Washington: East-West Center, 2003), 45. 
6 Bennedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 
revised edition, (London, UK: Verso, 1991). 
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argues that a nation is a modern cultural artifact that arose in the eighteenth century.7 
Furthermore, he gives his definition for nation that is “an imagined political community – 
and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.” Anderson continues to explain 
that the nation is imagined in a way that members will never know, meet, or even hear 
each other, but he said that “in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”8 
Anderson then recognizes that a nation is limited and has flexible boundaries.  
On the Aceh conflicts case, the effort to re-emerge as an Aceh nation was 
constructed by the Aceh leaders. In this sense, Daud Bereueh imagined an Indonesian 
Islamic Community or nation-state and Hasan di Tiro imagined a pure Aceh nation like 
the glory of an Acehnese Kingdom in the 16th and the 17th centuries.  
Daud Bereueh uses Islam as the chosen symbol that could unite Aceh, even a 
whole ex-East Indies territory and its community. His motivation to create an Islamic 
nation is due to his own cultural roots as a strong believer of Islam and because most of 
the ex-East Indies people were Muslim. It makes sense that Bereueh imagined a unity of 
an Islamic community (ummah) under a nation. Therefore, he convinced his group and 
justified any attempt to defend the idea of Aceh nation based on Islamic value as a holy 
purpose in the name of God. However, Soekarno, the first Indonesian president and a 
Javanese, challenged this effort by creating a more secular-nationalist nation of 
“Indonesia” that covers all the territory of ex-East Indies based on Pancasila regardless 
of religion, original region, or ethnicity. Both leaders had manipulated their followers to 
defend their personal and cultural feeling of belonging to their own nation. The Clash of 
                                                             
7 Ibid. 13. 
8 Ibid. 15. 
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imagined communities between the Acehnese and the Indonesian government was 
unavoidable. The Acehnese attachment to Islam and Islamic nation was taken for granted, 
and thus they were willing to hate, kill and even die for the idea of the imagined Islamic 
nation.  
In line with Daud Brereueh, Hasan di Tiro also manipulated the Acehnese 
personal and cultural feeling for an independent Aceh. His imagined community was an 
independent Aceh separated from Indonesia that was dominated by the Javanese ethnic 
group. He glorifies the Aceh Kingdom before the Aceh War in 1873. He convinced the 
Acehnese because he was the heir of the Acehnese hero and Islamic scholar (the ulama), 
Cik di Tiro. He combined the idea of an independent Aceh nation based on ethnicity and 
Islam values. This idea was also taken for granted by the Acehnese because the Acehnese 
followed their traditional leader (the Sultan and the ulama) of Hasan di Tiro as their loyal 
client to the patron (the Sultan and Ulama). The formation of GAM by Hasan di Tiro, as 
an heir of Acehnese Sultan and ulama, is a fact that the Acehnese have taken for granted 
the idea of an Aceh nation to set them free from the neo-colonial Indonesia. Another 
example is the GAM’s flag as a symbol of the Acehnese pride as a nation who pursued 
freedom and independent from Indonesia state, as shown above: 
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Figures 1.1 The GAM’s flag as the fighters’ symbol of freedom and independent 
 
Source: http://www.achehtimes.com/photos/gam/gam01/widowsdefend.htm (retrieved at March 20, 2008). 
 
Soeharto, the Indonesian second president, who was a Javanese, crushed the idea 
of Aceh separation as an independent Aceh. He used Pancasila (a secular state 
foundation) as a symbol of Indonesian state to justify his action to crush Hasan Tiro and 
GAM. The leaders from both sides manipulated their intra-group and provoked them to 
take for granted the idea of nation or the creation of new nation. Hence, the followers 
who were attached and devoted themselves to the cultural myth and symbols like the flag 
or contending flag were willing to die for their nation’s flag. In this sense, conflict was 
unavoidable.  
In sum, the Acehnese ethnic conflict is about the politics of myth of a nation and 
ideological symbol of ethnic movement. The Acehnese rebellion from 1953 to the 1998 
reform period in Indonesia is based on the dynamic of the myth and symbol of nation and 
triggered the Acehnese ethnic conflicts. The elite actors from both ethnic groups evoked 
the myth and symbols to start and end the conflict or war. In other words, the leaders 
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from both sides played key role in triggering and ending the ethnic conflicts in Aceh. 
B. The Importance of the thesis 
It is important to analyze the pattern of the Acehnese conflict using the symbolic 
politics theory because this theory can explain most of the ethnic conflicts and peace 
cases. In this context, this research contributes towards filling in the rational choice and 
the psychological approach’s gaps by providing three case studies of the ethnic conflicts 
and peace. The focus is on the symbolic politics framework applied to Aceh, rather than 
on a comprehensive analysis of Aceh. Thus, this research’s analysis is different from 
previous work in its framing of the Aceh situation as a symbolic politics issue to 
determine how well this case studies, based on literature review, shows the effectiveness 
of the symbolic politics theory on the Acehnese ethnic rebellion in Indonesia.   
 
C. Arguments (Thesis statement) 
The Acehnese ethnic war in Indonesia broadens the explanation of power of the 
symbolic politics theory in Southeast Asian counties as applied in Eastern Europe and 
Africa. Symbolic politics theory was designed to analyze the ethnic wars in Eastern 
Europe. Stuart J. Kaufman9 popularizes the theory in this area to give explanation of the 
roots of the ethnic wars. He began to develop his theory in Africa to explain the ethnic 
wars in Rwanda and Sudan. His theory negated the rational choice theorists that explain 
the ethnic wars in Africa. Furthermore, he picked Philippines as a case study of the 
Southeast Asian countries. Symbolic politics theory is successful as an explanation for 
the ethnic wars even when the traditional social structure is still kept by the ethnic 
                                                             
9 See Stuart J. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2001). 
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groups. Therefore, the Acehnese ethnic war in Indonesia is a valuable case study that can 
be explained by explain symbolic politics theory in the sense that Acehnese ethnic war 
has similarities with ethnic wars in the southern Philippines, which still keep their 
traditional social structures, the sultanate and the Islamic scholars (the ulama). 
 
D. Methodology and data collection 
The results of this research are based on literature studies. The literature used 
consists of books, articles and internet sites. All references are secondary sources. Hence, 
I use triangulation data to give an unbiased and balanced approached to certain issues. A 
literature study is a form of qualitative method that has been criticized for being less 
representative and atypical.10 Furthermore, it has been argued that qualitative methods 
produce un-replicable results and thus no generalization can be made from the findings.11 
Naturally the interpretations drawn from the literature studies are subjective and another 
person confronted the same material may not draw the same conclusions. However, the 
main usage of qualitative studies is to provide a foundation for future studies using a 
quantitative method of research from which generalizations can be made and any findings 
are possible to be validated.  
The aim of this research is to test symbolic politics theory on the three cases of 
the Acehnese ethnic conflicts and peace process under different regimes in Indonesia. As 
noted above, the three cases are the Darul Islam movement in 1953, the GAM movement 
in 1976, and the GAM on the reform 1998 period. I focus on the dynamic of the symbolic 
                                                             
10 David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, Theory and Methods in Political Science (Hampshire Palgrave, 
Houndmills, Basingstoke, 1995), 141. 
 
11 Ibid. 141. 
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politics theory by examining myths, fears, opportunities, hostile feelings, and hostile 
mobilization (hypotheses) on these three cases. These particular indicators are the matters 
that I will focus on the literature studies. 
 
E. Hypothesis  
I focus on the essential conditions for ethnic conflict or war of the symbolic 
politics theory through myths, fears, opportunity, hostile feelings, and hostile 
mobilization on the three cases as mentioned above. The first indicator is the myth 
justifying hostility (S1). The myth-symbols complex becomes one of the key aspects that 
are aggravating hostility through chauvinism or warrior (leader) ethos, which they believe 
that their own group is greater and better than others. The myths can be re-portrayed by 
elites to create such hostile conditions. Using the myth-symbol complex that is already 
familiar, the elite uses and propagates these myths as a way to gain justification. For 
instance, a myth of Perang Sabil (Holy War) was used as a means to fight in the name of 
Islamic religion against the colonialists. This myth has been exaggerated to justify the 
hostile situation and mobilize the ethnic war. The myths should present the perspective 
from one group that justifies the interest of ethnic domination and the other ethnic group 
who opposes it. 
The next condition is the existence of ethnic fear (S2), where the ethnic group 
fears their existence is at risk. This condition creates an unfriendly environment for the 
other groups. These fears are inflated by emotions and feelings concerning who are 
members of the groups and who are not. These psychological developments justify the 
strength of ethnic fear to provoke ethnic mobilization and violence.  Here, the myth-
symbol complex plays an important role in exposing that one group is a victim or 
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offended by the other groups. Stuart Kaufman argues that historically, one of the groups 
has been dominated and been the victim of the other group’s domination, and thus this 
condition trigger fears of ethnic group extinction. At the same time, it creates the feelings 
of revenge.12  Furthermore, he argues that the myth of domination plays important role in 
creating the fears of the dominated group. Once fears exist in a group, it justifies any 
violence in the name of self-defense. Such fears and threats facilitate ethnic group 
mobilization and defense of themselves, even though they are the ones who aggressively 
create the war.   
Another condition is the opportunity to mobilize the ethnic group (S3). Ethnic war 
will occur if freedom for the ethnic group to mobilize is present with no state’s 
repression. State policies and political suppression is the strategy that can control the 
ethnic elites to mobilize the group and prevent the ethnic wars.  Thus, if the policies and 
political repression are weakened then it will open a political freedom for the ethnic elites 
and such space can intensify ethnic violence. On the other hand, the leaders of the state 
who wanted to begin ethnic conflict have more opportunity to mobilize the apparatuses 
because they control the power. Here, ethnic war will happen if both sides gain the 
opportunity to manage and supply the groups with weapons and thus they need the area 
as the control center.  
The symbolic politics theory holds that if the three preconditions—hostile myths, 
ethnic fears, and opportunity to mobilization—are present ethnic conflicts results if they 
lead to rising mass hostility by leaders making extreme symbolic appeals between 
                                                             
12 Stuart J. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2001), 31-32. 
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groups. Mass hostility (S4) arises because of the hostile emotions. Roger Peterson 
identified the hostile emotions—fear, hatred (ancient hatred), and resentment—that play 
important role in conflict.13  
Fear arises when one group considers the rivalry group as a threat for them. 
Hence the collapse of the political center eliminates institutional constraints and will 
produce an anarchy situation. Under this condition, fear would be increased as well as the 
desire for security. Fear also arises when political elite manipulates fear for their own 
ends. On the political competition situations between elite’s ethnic groups, one group 
creates fear, and possibly a security dilemma, as an effective mobilization strategy 
against the other. Peterson point out “Fear assumes that when the perception of threat 
becomes the primary concern, then the most threatening ethnic group becomes the most 
likely target of attack.”14 The next hostile emotion is hatred. Hatred or hate also plays a 
significant role in creating mass emotions like hostility. Ethnic hatred is a rivalry between 
conflicting ethnic groups; the antagonism is focused on purported innate characteristics 
of the opposing group.15 The third hostile emotion is resentment. Resentment is the 
intense feeling that status relations are unjust combined with the belief that something 
can be done about it.16 Resentment is also instrumental in that it alerts and compels the 
individual to take action toward a pressing concern. Resentment is a political sense of 
subordination. For example, a transmigration program from the Javanese Indonesian 
                                                             
13 Roger D. Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred and Resentment in Twentieth-Century 
Eastern Europe (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
14 Ibid. 75.  
15 Ibid. 63. 
16 Ibid. 51. 
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government that sends Javanese people to Aceh is considered an act of political 
subordination of the Acehnese minority ethnic group. The transmigration creates such 
resentment from the Acehnese toward the Javanese side as land grabbers. Therefore, 
these three indicators of mass hostility will lead to hostile mobilization of ethnic conflict.  
There are two processes of hostile mobilization (S5) for ethnic conflict or war, 
which are the mass-led conflict and the elite-led conflict.17 Mass-led conflict occurs 
initially beginning with the existence of opportunity and some galvanizing events. In 
these cases, myth hostile and fears are already significant, and a large numbers of fanatics 
are present or in other words, nationalism is the central value of dissident politics. There 
is no single path of mass-led conflict follow to ethnic war. It could be a popular 
chauvinism, when the group mobilizing first is the majority. While for the other cases, 
the masses involved on the unorganized violence that create security dilemma and the 
leader create such chauvinist policies toward the minority. This pattern is a typical for 
repressed minorities.  
The elite-led conflict process begins with the leaders motivated by ideological 
issues and the opportunism to mobilize their group for ethnic war in pursuit of their own 
goals. The elite actors use mass media as a propaganda device to manipulate ethnic 
symbols and provoke ethnic hostility, identifying the rivalry groups with enemies from 
group mythology and highlighting the threats they pose. Ancient disasters can be recast 
as current threats and violent methods can be promoted as the only alternative to group 
tragedy. The power of the elite actors is the key element to determine the existence of 
                                                             
17 Stuart J. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2001), 36-38. 
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war or negotiations. And if war is the chosen one, then usually the leaders put their blame 
on the rival group. The leaders usually demonize the rivalry groups for their own goals. 
Violent provocations by the extremist group begin with the cycle of violence by 
radicalizing opinion and creating symbols for future use. If the rival group responds in 
kind, a security dilemma spiral fed by violent propaganda takes off.  
At this view, I argue that symbolic politics theory should be tested to explain 
broader cases, especially in Southeast Asia because it will give broader explanatory 
power of the theory. Thus, based on this research background, symbolic politics theory 
becomes the model to be tested in the Acehnese ethnic war and the subsequent peace.  
Seeing these required conditions of ethnic war, I will test the symbolic politics 
hypothesis based on the following issues: 
a. Myths justifying hostility must be present on at least one side in Indonesia, and 
probably on both (S1). 
b. Fears of group extinction must be present on at least one side in Indonesia, and 
possibly on both (S2). 
c. The opportunity to mobilize and fight must be present for both sides in Indonesia 
(S3). 
d. There must be evidence of hostile attitudes between the Acehnese and Indonesian 
government (S4). 
e. The Acehnese and Indonesian government must have mobilized around mutually 
incompatible political programs aimed at political dominance, at least in Aceh 
territory, as a result of the manipulation by leaders or counter-elites of ethnic 
myths and symbols (S5). 
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F. The plan of the thesis 
 
For this research, I begin with chapter two by laying out the contending theories 
of the ethnic conflicts such as the rational choice and the psychological approach, the 
strengths and weaknesses, and the inapplicability of these theories to the Acehnese 
conflicts. Furthermore, I explain the details of the symbolic politics theory of ethnic 
conflict or war, explaining how the passionate politics of ethnic symbolism can lead to 
war and why it so often does not, the strengths and weaknesses, and the applicability of 
this theory to the Acehnese conflicts.  
The main parts of this thesis research that follows is a series of case studies that 
explain how these ideas illuminate the causes of ethnic wars in Aceh in several different 
regimes. In the chapter three, I explain the political dynamic in Indonesia since 1945. In 
this chapter, I explain the contexts of the politics in Indonesia and how these political 
situations related to the Acehnese rebellions. I begin with the elite-led conflicts of the 
Acehnese rebellion in 1953 under Daud Bereueh leadership and in 1976 to 1998 period 
under Hasan di Tiro leadership in chapter four and chapter five, respectively. Chapter six 
considers the peace subsequent after the 1998 reform period a peace process that is also 
an elite-led process. Chapter seven sums up the lessons learned, especially the assessment 
of the symbolic politics theory on the Acehnese conflicts. After the assessment, I 
continue to explain about the theoretical and policy implications. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A. Introduction 
This chapter focuses on theoretical tracking of the motivation, process, and the 
result of the ethnic conflict. This theoretical tracking is significance in order to get a 
better understanding of why and how ethnic conflict is happening in Aceh. The 
mainstream theory in explaining ethnic conflict is rational choice theory and another 
theory is the psychological approach. However, these theory could not explain 
comprehensively the ethnic conflict and thus, a more comprehensive conceptual theory in 
understanding the motivation of ethnic conflict or war is that the symbolic politics theory.  
The symbolic politics theory is more comprehensive in analyzing ethnic conflict 
or war because the symbolic politics theory is a combination of the adequate explanation 
of the rational choice and the psychological theory. If we only utilize the rational choice 
theory, which means that the explanation for Aceh was that, the violence was a product 
of the security dilemma. However, that would, in turn, mean that we’d see the political 
agenda and choices of the elites or politicians that involved in this conflicts, and we don’t 
see any political action based on the emotional or ideological expressions. For example, 
on the Acehnese ethnic conflicts, we would see the self-interest of the Javanese 
Indonesian government such as the transmigration program for the Javanese to Aceh 
territory, and at the same time we would not recognize that transmigration program is a 
symbol of the Javanese domination over the Acehnese demographically. Hence, the 
rationalist theory could not account an emotional based political agenda or programs.  
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On the other hand, if we adopt Psychological approach on the Acehnese ethnic 
conflicts then we would see the tools or devices that could trigger conflict. For example, 
flag or contending flag signed a superiority from a nation over the other nation and even 
negative feelings toward the other ethnic group. The GAM’s flag aimed to shows their 
existence and superiority over the Javanese Indonesian government and even more the 
GAM’s flag as a justification of their hostile feelings toward the neo-colonial Javanese 
Indonesian people.  However, we could not see the myths and symbols that produce 
hatred lead to conflict because the recent leaders or elites to lead to ethnic conflict should 
activate those myths and symbols.  
While, if we use the symbolic politics theory on the Acehnese ethnic conflict then 
we would see the elites’ political agenda and choices that involved in this conflicts and 
myths or symbols as devices for the elites that produce hostile situations and thus, the 
elite actors activates the myths and symbols as their devices to create hatred that certainly 
lead to ethnic conflict. It means that the symbolic politics theory combines both theory of 
rationalist and psychological approach on the ethnic conflicts. For example, the Hasan di 
Tiro had a political agenda to break away Aceh from Indonesia and thus, he use the 
GAM’s flag as his device to create a symbol of the Acehnese freedom or nationalism 
ideology that lead to ethnic conflict with the Javanese Indonesian government.   
I will discuss the three contending theories of ethnic conflict or war, which are the 
rational choice, the psychological, and the symbolic politics theory by explaining the 
main arguments, the strong and weaknesses, and the inapplicability or the applicability of 
these theories to the Acehnese conflicts. In this research, I will use the symbolic politics 
theory in analyzing the Acehnese conflicts because this theory has more power ability 
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than the rational choice and the psychological approaches. The symbolic politics theory 
succeeds in examining the ethnic conflict in Aceh by explaining the political agenda and 
choices of the elites or politicians that involved in this conflicts, which is the main 
arguments of the rational choice theory, and the actors’ strategy and devices to trigger 
conflicts, which is the argument of the psychological approach. It implies that is the 
symbolic politics theory succeeds to recognize the motivations, the strategy, and the 
devices of the actors to activate an ethnic conflict or war because without recognizing 
these aspects, the ethnic conflict or war will never been occur.  
 
B. Interpretations of the ethnic conflict 
Three major different views have dominated the interpretation of ethnic war or 
conflict. One is the rational choice theory, which focuses on the self-interest foundation 
for ethnic group formations. The elites gain power through mobilization of certain ethnic 
groups to pursue the elites’ goals.  Thus, ethnic war is the result of the competing 
economic group interests. As shown in works by Ted Robert Gurr (1970), Robert H. 
Bates (1983; 1998; 2000), Ernest Gellner (1997), Benedict Anderson (1983; in 
Hutchinson, J. & Smith, A. (Eds.), 1994; 1998), Dennis Chong (2000), Ravi Bhavnani 
(2006), James Fearon and David Laitin (1996), Barbara F. Walter (2004), and David 
Lake and Donald Rothchild (1996). 
The second major view is the psychological approach, which emphasizes 
superiority, prejudice, and negative feelings toward the other ethnic groups. Stuart J. 
Kaufman acknowledges three main theories of psychological approach, which are 
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primordialists, constructivists, and symbolist’s theories.18 A prominent constructivist 
theorist of ethnicity is Anthony D. Smith, who focuses on the importance of a “myth-
symbol complex”.19 The next theorist is Roger Peterson, who emphasizes that emotions 
can effectively motivate ethnic violence.20 George. E. Marcus, who analyzes the role of 
emotion in politics, supports this view.21 In the same sense, Daniel Bar-Tal, et al., argue 
that collective emotional elements are constructed, preserved and moreover, they 
resolved conflicts.22  
The third type of interpretation is the symbolic politics theory, which originally 
derived from Murray Edelman’s conception of myths and symbols.23 Stuart J. Kaufman, 
who explains that ethnic wars are the result of politics of myths and symbols, 
prominently represents the theory. The assumption is that ethnic myths and symbols exist 
and bound their ethnic group. An ethnic war will occur when ethnic myths mitigate 
hostility toward the other group, create fears of group extinction, and present the 
                                                             
18 Stuart J. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2001), 23-27. 
19 See Anthony D. Smith, “The Origins of Nations.” In Nationalism, edited by Hutchinson, J. & Smith, A. 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1994). Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism (New York: 
Routledge, 1998). Anthony D. Smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1999). See also Anthony D. Smith, The Antiquity of Nations (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2004). 
 
20 See Roger D. Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred and Resentment in Twentieth-
Century Eastern Europe (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
21 See G. E. Marcus, “Emotion in Politics.” Annual Review of Political Science 3 (2000): 221–250. 
22 Daniel Bar-Tal, Eran Halperin, and Joseph D.  De Rivera. “Collective Emotions in Conflict Situations: 
Societal Implications.” Journal of Social Issues 63, no. 2 (2007): 441-460. 
23 Murray Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence (Chicago, IL: Markham 
Publishing Company, 1971). 
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opportunity to mobilize. Thus, if both groups use politics that intend to dominate other 
ethnic group, then ethnic war will come up as a consequence.24  
 
C. Rational choice theory 
The origins of the rational choice theory are derived from the instrumentalist 
approach. A classical theorist of the rational choice on ethnic conflicts is Ted Robert 
Gurr.25 In general explanation, he explains that his book describes political violence, a 
phenomenon that includes all collective violence within a political society against the 
political system that involves competing political groups and the incumbent with their 
policies. 
For Gurr, the fundamental and prior rebellion problem has to do with the social 
and psychological forces that cause men to rebel. The central idea of psychology is that if 
an individual senses a large gap between what he gets and what he deserves, he will 
become angry. Given the opportunity, he will rebel. When many people sense such a gap 
simultaneously, rebellions occur. Such a starting point leads quickly to consideration of 
relative deprivation, justifications for political violence, dissident coercive control, and 
regime coercive control as determinants of the likelihood and magnitude of political 
violence.  In his book, Gurr stated that the concept of relative deprivation is the key to 
                                                             
24 Stuart J. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2001). Stuart J. Kaufman, “Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? Testing Theories of 
Extreme Ethnic Violence.” International Security 30, no. 4 (2006a): 45-86. Stuart J. Kaufman, Satoshi 
Machida, and Yu Wang. “Symbolic Politics and Ethnic Conflict in Malaysia and the Philippines.” 
International Studies Association Annual Meeting, San Diego, California, 2006b. See also Stuart J. 
Kaufman, “Symbolic Politics and Ethnic War in the Philippines.” International Studies Association Annual 
Meeting, Chicago, IL, 2007. 
25 See Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970). 
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explaining why men rebel. Gurr suggests that, “Relative deprivation, defined as perceived 
discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities is sufficiently general to 
comprise or be related to most of the general ‘preconditions of revolution’ identified in 
order theoretical analyses.”26 
In addition, Gurr suggests that the tactical use and threatened use of political 
violence are characteristic of participants and leaders who perceive a potential for 
alleviating deprivation within the existing political system. “But if dissidents believe their 
objectives can be obtained only by transforming the system, they are likely to use 
terroristic tactics to publicize their existence and objectives, and to widen popular support 
by providing symbolic models for aggression and by demonstrating the regime’s 
incapacity to provide protection, hoping ultimately to overthrow it.” 27  
Another classical work of the rationalist is Robert Bates, who argues that 
modernization motivates development and social change in a way that ethnic groups 
integrate because there is a rational calculation in competing with each other to gain 
limited goods that benefit them.28  In fact, in his first work, Bates concludes that the 
ethnic conflict in Africa was fundamentally caused by the state that distributed economic 
                                                             
26 Ibid. 37. 
27 Ibid. 212. 
28 See Robert Bates, “Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary 
Africa.” In State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas, edited by Rothchild, D., & Olorunsola 
V. A. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1983). Robert Bates, Rui J. P. de Figueiredo, Jr., and 
Barry R. Weingast. “The Politics of Interpretation: Rationality, Culture, and Transition.” Politics & Society 
26, no. 4 (1998): 603-642. See also Robert Bates, “Ethnicity and Development in Africa: A Reappraisal.” 
The American Economic Review 90, no. 2 (2000): 131-134. 
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goods in a frame of patron-client networks.29 The elites take their privileges in an ethnic 
group in relation to the other ethnic groups to mobilize the members of the group to 
pursue the elites’ self-interests. The elites acknowledge that ethnic groups, as an 
institution, are effective instrument for them to pursue their self-interests. Moreover, the 
elites use ethnic groups because they know that it is easier for them to mobilize the intra-
ethnic group because the elites can use a common language.  
Furthermore, in his second work, Bates argues that ethnic groups could alter the 
formation of human capital, and thus variety of the ethnic group does not always mean 
political violence. Nevertheless, he acknowledges that it could be on the opposite side, 
where ethnic diversity could motivate political violence in a sense that members of 
certain ethnic groups are keen to take risks to make conflicts with the other groups with 
the expectation to gain more benefits, even though they realize that it could only gain 
losses.30 Here, Ernest Gellner claims that industrialization and its high degree of mobility 
could create a high culture. Thus, a nation of an ethnic group is a creation of man as the 
result of industrialization. Furthermore, he explains that socioeconomic conditions, 
organization traditions, and ideological features can motivate ethnic groups or conflicts 
among nations.31 Therefore, the conflicts won’t happen if socioeconomic conditions, 
                                                             
29 Robert Bates, “Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary 
Africa.” In State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas, edited by Rothchild, D., & Olorunsola 
V. A. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1983), 163-165. 
30 Robert Bates, “Ethnicity and Development in Africa: A Reappraisal.” The American Economic Review 
90, no. 2 (2000): 131-134. 
31 See Ernest Gellner, Nationalism (New York: New York University, 1997), 60-62. 
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organization traditions, and ideological features are modernized. For example, he point 
out that Islamic fundamentalism is a condition that could lead to conflicts.  
Another Rationalist is Dennis Chong, who argues that rational choice theory 
exists in every individual’s decision-making, and he also calculates that “individual 
calculations of self-interest weigh social pressures and incentives alongside more tangible 
material factors.” He also states “current interests are contingent on past decisions.” 32 
Chong explains how rational choice incentives and social influences connect and 
influence each other. He intends to combine the sociological and rational choice analyses, 
values, norms, and symbols in politics. His main argument is that norms and values are 
very crucial to understanding political choice; however, the norms and values have to 
develop. However, he does not explain the interests of an individual or a community. 
Interests don’t always mean material interests, and at this point, he cannot explain why a 
group of people had conflict with another group. An ethnic group could have a war 
because of non-material interests. Another scholar of rational choice theory is Ravi 
Bhavnani. He used an agent-based model of within-group interaction to explain an ethnic 
war in Rwanda. This model grasp the phenomena of Hutu ethnic group mobilize coercive 
behavior through the formation of Hutu ethnic group norms to trigger ethnic wars with 
other ethnic groups. In this sense, the Hutu used their norms to evoke ethnic wars.33   
                                                             
32 See Dennis Chong, Rational Lives: Norms and Values in Politics and Society (Chicago, IL: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2000), 12-14. 
33 See Ravi Bhavnani, “Ethnic norms and Interethnic Violence: Accounting for Mass Participation in the 
Rwandan Genocide.” Journal of Peace Research 43, no. 6 (2006): 651-669. 
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Norms as collective decision of group become a self-interest rationale. The self-
interest can be consistent with group identification and action in the name of a group. 
Therefore logically, norms are ethnic identity. Identities are about how individuals relate 
to one another. The relationship is between individuals through norms as members of 
groups, for example family or ethnic kin. Material interests, for instance basic survival 
and economic benefits, dominate these structures. Then, norm as institution create 
constraints and opportunities for certain behaviors. In institutions, decisions and actions 
are rational.  
James Fearon and David Laitin put forward a cooperation equilibrium theory. 
This theory explains the escalation of conflict and spiral of the security dilemma to the 
point of violence that is in no one’s obvious self-interest. Conflicts are said to escalate as 
rational individuals take steps to defend themselves. In doing so, they threaten the 
security of others, creating a security dilemma.34 Even when individuals and groups don’t 
see each other’s arming as a threat, arming of insurgency groups in Aceh has tense the 
attention and wrath of the Indonesian military. Fearon and Laitin analyze why groups, 
when presented with an escalating security dilemma, cooperate instead of raise arms in 
self-interested defense. Here, the explanation of equilibrium theory can answer the 
question, which is spiral equilibrium and in-group policing equilibrium. Spiral 
equilibrium theorizes that as others see a situation spiraling toward violence, they 
cooperate in a self-interested way with one another and conflicting parties in order to 
                                                             
34 See James D. Fearon, and David D. Laitin. “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation.”  American Political 
Science Review 90, no. 4 (1996): 715-735. 
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lower tensions. The in-group policing equilibrium theorizes that groups ignore the 
offenses of others, assuming their own ethnic group will sanction them.  
In line with Fearon and Laitin, Barbara F. Walter essentially argues that cost and 
benefit calculation is used in making any kind of agreement. Furthermore, ethnic war will 
happen if one ethnic group refuses to agree because the cost is more than the benefits. 
Thus, it is impossible to achieve an agreement when ethnic groups in conflict meet face-
to-face because the cost of tolerance to the other group is higher than the benefit in 
achieving agreement.35  Here, the security dilemma is the explanation of rationality to 
such attitudes as genocide. David Lake and Donald Rothchild develop on analysis of 
security dilemma from James Fearon to emphasize that ethnic war arises mainly because 
information failures and troubles of commitment prevent competing groups from getting 
a negotiated agreement that all would prefer.36 However, an ethnic conflict or settlement 
is not always based on the costs and benefits calculation, because people often use myths 
and symbols to demonize and dominate other groups, which can lead to conflicts. 
  
a. Strengths of rational choice theory 
Rational choice theories can explain that extreme ethnic violence (war and 
genocide) is the result of the actor’s utility-maximizing strategy. For example, Fearon 
stated that the cases of Sudan's civil war and Rwanda's genocide claimed that the 
rationalist models are proven because the genocide can be understood as resulting from 
                                                             
35 Barbara F. Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement.” International Organization 51, no. 3 
(1997): 335-364. 
36 David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic 
Conflict.”  International Security 21, no. 2 (1996): 41-75. 
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information failures, commitment problems, or rational power-conserving elite 
strategies.37 Hence, rational choice theory assumes that ethnic conflict is the result of an 
actor’s rational activity of widespread interests such as prosperity, power, and security. 
David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild stated that rationalist rationale is essentially taken 
from the instrumentalist conception of what ethnic identity is: "The instrumentalist 
approach . . . understands ethnicity as a tool used by individuals, groups, or elites to 
obtain some larger, typically material end .... [Ethnicity] is primarily a label . . . that is 
used for political advantage." 38 Ethnic war, in this logic, is the result of the rational 
pursuit of individual and group self-interest. Two different types of ethnic conflict reveal 
how this process works: One type emphasizes that ethnic conflict arises depending the 
elite motivations; the second type places the security dilemma at the center of the process 
by which a rational clash leads to war.  
Ethnic conflict based on rational choice theory is fundamentally caused by 
motivations of the actors who utilize their power in an ethnic group to mobilize the 
group’s members secure the actors’ self interests. The elites recognize ethnic groups as an 
effective institution for them to pursue their self-interests and they understand that it is 
easier for them to mobilize the intra-ethnic group because the elites can use a communal 
language. This type of rational theory analyzes that masses do not want violence but 
elites do. Leaders who are concerned about losing power provoke ethnic conflict in order 
to change the agenda toward issues that support their staying in power. The mass 
                                                             
37 James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 379-
414. 
38 David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds., The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, 
and Escalation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), 5-6. 
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recognize the violence, so even if they are unsure about which side provoked it, they can 
rationally intensify their fear that the other group might be harmful. Consequently, the 
mass may rationally support policies that provoke conflict, war or even genocide, 
calculating that the costs of violence are lower than the costs of facing vulnerable 
violence. At this point, rational choice theory can explain the self-interest of actors as 
maximizers of group potential.  
Another explanation of the conflict process is found in Fearon’s work about 
international conflict that states that uncertainty and security dilemma can create conflict. 
Fearon’s work explains how conflict arises because of misinformation or propaganda.  
Uncertainty is a key concept in explaining misinformation because uncertainty create and 
often overestimate about the rival group’s resentment and thus, uncertainty can lead to 
conflict in response.39 Moreover, Lake and Rothchild explain that the conflicted ethnic 
groups are uncertain about the result of conflict and thus the group calculating to be the 
loser may not understand how to avoid conflict by compromising beforehand.40  
The next explanation from Russell Hardin (1995) about conflict is the existence of 
security dilemma. Security dilemma arises because of no certainty of trustable 
commitment between groups. It is very possible that in the future one group may break 
the commitment to another group. Thus, military action often provokes a security 
                                                             
39 James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 379-
414. 
40 David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic 
Conflict," International Security 21, no. 2 (1996): 41-75. 
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dilemma.41 Therefore, this situation creates a motivation for conflict, even that with 
deadliest violence. A powerful explanation of rational choice theory is an application of 
the security dilemma in relations with ethnic conflict. This application is presented by 
Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," to show that security 
dilemma is a key factor in the rational choice theory or in the realist model of 
international relations theory. The security dilemma model explains the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia and interactions between Russia and Ukraine, to illustrating the theory’s 
utility and articulation.42   
b. Weaknesses of rational choice theory 
Rationalist theory is exclusively based on a rational calculation and material 
interest. This limited focus of the roots of ethnic conflict, specifically a rational 
calculation and material or economical interest are completely the key factors of the 
competition of the groups that chase these interests and calculations. Here, the rational 
choice theory ignores the non-rational (myth and symbols) calculation and non-material 
interests in favor of an ethnic competition that could very possibly lead to an ethnic 
conflict or war.  
Ethnic conflict or war is not based merely on the rational calculation and 
economical interests, but also on the myths and symbols that are manipulated by the 
elites that utilize emotions to mobilize groups. It is essential to note that the Acehnese 
ethnic wars continue regardless of the form of national government power in control. 
                                                             
41 Russell Hardin, One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1995). 
42 Barry R. Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” Survival 35, no. 1 (1993): 27-47. 
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Thus, the rational choice theory could not exactly explain the Acehnese ethnic wars in 
Indonesia. One could use the symbolic politics theory to analyze how the Acehnese 
ethnic wars began, interpret the nature and development of the conflicts, and predict the 
future of the Acehnese ethnic wars. 
Fearon and Laitin remark that nonviolent and cooperative interactions are more 
universal than violence between groups. Collaborative alliances are one form of 
cooperative relations and thus may be more expected than not. Yet, they do not base their 
assumption of cooperation on groups’ shared criticism and objectives. Instead, the 
dynamics of spiral equilibrium point to the minority groups’ fear of increased violence by 
central government as a starting point. This fear then compels minorities to cooperate, 
which may take the shape of signing ceasefires with the government as a means to 
minimize tensions. It also may compel them to form alliances with one another in an 
attempt to formally influence the actions of neighboring ethnic armies.43 However, the 
fact that conflict still exists is proof that collaborative alliances between ethnic groups are 
vulnerable. This vulnerability arises because ethnic groups have their myths that are 
exaggerated as a device to fight against the other groups, such as warrior ethos. 
  
c. Inapplicability of rational choice theory to the Acehnese conflicts 
Concerning the argument from Anderson of imagined political community; 
rational choice theory is inapplicable because Indonesia as a single “imagined political 
community” has failed because of the extreme differences on cultural feeling of 
                                                             
43 James D. Fearon, and David D. Laitin. “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation.”  American Political 
Science Review 90, no. 4 (1996): 715-735. See also James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," 
International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 379-414. 
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belonging to a nation. The Acehnese and West Papuan ethnic groups, for example, have 
distinct histories from the rest of Indonesia ethnicity. Specifically, Anthony Reid (2004) 
argues that the Acehnese have a significant different cultural historical background from 
the larger Indonesian groups. The Aceh’s economic, politics, and culture were more 
related to the Indian Ocean and the Malayan Peninsula and not closely related to the Java 
Sea, which was owned by the Javanese ethnic group until the late-nineteenth century.44 
The Acehnese have a different sense of nation, and thus since Indonesia gained 
independence in August 17, 1945, the Acehnese wanted to build their own nation.45  
As stated by the rational choice theory, ethnic conflict or war is merely based on 
rational calculation and economical interests. Moreover, Fearon and Laitin argue that the 
interactions between ethnic groups are nonviolent and cooperative.46 However, in fact, 
the ethnic conflict or war also could arise because of the myths and symbols that are 
utilized to manipulate the ethnic group by the elites, politicians or leaders who exploit 
emotions to mobilize the ethnic groups. Nevertheless, ethnic conflict still exists 
regardless of the resources competitions or rational calculation, for example, the myth of 
warrior ethos in the Acehnese ethnic group. By enacting the myths of warrior ethos in 
group defense, religious dignity, and self-sacrifice for the ethnic groups, the actors will 
receive honor from their groups as heroes or sabilillah, those who died in the name of 
God and the Acehnese ethnic group. Another significant example is the independent of 
                                                             
44 Anthony Reid, “War, Peace and the Burden of History in Aceh,” Asian Ethnicity 5, no. 3 (2004): 301. 
45 Edward Aspinall, "From Islamism to Nationalism in Aceh, Indonesia" Nations and Nationalism  14, no. 
2 (2007), 249-251. 
46 James D. Fearon, and David D. Laitin. “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation.”  American Political 
Science Review 90, no. 4 (1996): 715-735. 
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the Acehnese would be considered merely as a strategy in pursuing the Acehnese elites’ 
self-interests and thus, the rationalist theorist could not account an ideological reason in 
pursuing Acehnese independent from the Indonesian state. Therefore, pure rationalist 
theory is incomprehensive in analyzing the Acehnese war against the Javanese 
Indonesian side.  
 
D. Psychological approaches 
Psychological approaches deal with power over other ethnic groups, prejudice, 
and negative feelings about the other group. A prominent constructivist theorist of 
ethnicity is Anthony D. Smith, who focuses on the importance of a myth-symbol 
complex to explain who a group’s members are, its nations and history, or the meaning of 
being a member of an ethnic group.47 The myth-symbol complex is the fusion of myths, 
memories, values, and symbols. Here, the status of group symbols to control the 
existence, status, and group’s security furthermore, it is the reason why people of certain 
ethnic groups are eager to fight and even die for it. The people are even devoted to their 
leaders who manipulate those symbols for the leader’s self-interests. Nationalism is 
supported by the sacred ethnicity in a way that a nation is like a religion that needs to be 
worshiped. For example, Free Aceh Movement (GAM) has its own flag, theology about 
Islam and mythical history such as the Hikayat Perang Sabil (HPS) or the holy war, and 
in return the people get a sense of strength as a nation. GAM used the HPS lyrics in order 
                                                             
47 Anthony D. Smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation (London, Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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to influence the Acehnese people to view Indonesian rulers as colonialist.48 At this view, 
one can see the power and the presence of ethnicity. Fighting for one’s own ethnic group 
means gaining respect, self-interest, for the sake of the ethnic group and its territory, 
influencing the other people through one’s beliefs and for one’s nation. This ethnic 
loyalty will be a success in a way that symbols appear convincing and relevant. In recent 
situations where ethnicity has become more important because of the people’s literacy 
and mass media, which makes obvious the relationship of the state and ethnic groups, and 
even mobilizes the group in the name of ethnic and nationalism.  
On the other side, Roger Peterson (2002) introduces the three different emotions 
that can motivate ethnic violence. They are fear of a threat from the other group, hatred of 
it, or resentment of its higher status, which is usually implied by its political domination. 
Here, he focuses on the mechanisms motivating ethnic war and the importance of 
emotions in manipulating people’s objectives and their preferences.49 G. E. Marcus 
analyzes the role of emotion in politics supports this view. At this point, he concludes 
that emotions are triggered by historical events and furthermore, emotions lead to a quick 
evaluation of the recent condition in politics.50 It implies that ethnic wars deal with the 
emotional need to demonize the other groups, which can create hostile situations that 
could lead to conflicts.  On the other hand, Daniel Bar-Tal, et al. argues that collective 
                                                             
48 Teuku I. Alfian, "Aceh and the Holy War (Perang Sabil)" In Verandah of Violence: The Background to 
the Aceh Problem, edited by Anthony Reid (Seattle: Washington DC, University of Washington Press, 
2006), 117-119. 
49 Roger D. Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred and Resentment in Twentieth-Century 
Eastern Europe (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
50 G. E. Marcus, “Emotion in Politics” Annual Review of Political Science 3 (2000): 221–250. 
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emotional elements are a construct of society that resolves conflicts.51 Robert T. Schatz 
and Howard Lavine show that national symbolism motivates a psychological attachment 
to the nation as an abstracted social entity. Symbolic involvement guarantees certain 
political engagement such as at the intra-group and intergroup levels with the nation as a 
social-political system.52 
    
a. Strengths of psychological approach 
Psychological theories present a powerful argument in explaining ethnic conflict 
and even war. Donald Horowitz introduces an emotional motivation in ethnic war.53 
Horowitz argues that people tend to choose maximizing the difference between their 
group and another rather than maximizing benefits of their own group. Here, people give 
some benefits for their group to guarantee that the other group obtained even less.54 The 
ethnic group conflict is directed into such competition for group benefits. The 
consequences are that the competition fights for dominance of the state to show their 
group’s status of superiority compared to the other group and thus the competition 
legitimizes the group’s pursuit of a superiority status objective.55 Therefore, ethnic 
conflict is about superiority upon the other groups through political domination toward 
                                                             
51 Daniel Bar-Tal, Eran Halperin, and Joseph D.  De Rivera. “Collective Emotions in Conflict Situations: 
Societal Implications” Journal of Social Issues 63, no. 2 (2007): 441--460. 
52 Robert T. Schatz, and Howard Lavine. “Waving the Flag: National Symbolism, Social Identity, and 
Political Engagement” Political Psychology 28, no. 3 (2007): 329-355. 
53 Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Barkley, and Los Angeles: California, University of 
California Press, 1985). 
54 Ibid.185 and 226-227. 
55 Ibid. 145-147. 
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the other groups. Horowitz’s explanation shows that the psychological logic of emotional 
driving forces is more vigorous than economic, linguistic or any other particular benefits.  
Another powerful explanation of psychological approaches is about prejudice. 
Kaufman explains that myth-symbols of a group, including prejudice, play an important 
role in ethnic group war. An emotional feature of prejudice, stereotyping and negative 
feeling, creates a hostile situation toward the other group.56 At this point, Horowitz 
explains that in addition to the contest for dominance (superiority), fear of group 
extinction is also a powerful motivation for ethnic war. Such feelings of worry are 
because of demographic fear and domination by opposing groups in history. In short, 
Horowitz argues that this fear of extinction is directed to the hostile feeling, and finally 
leads to violence of conflicted groups.  
Horowitz’s argument about the roles of emotions as part of psychological logic in 
the ethnic group war illustrates the weaknesses of rational choice theory. The ethnic 
conflict or war is not purely because of economic or material benefits. Nevertheless, the 
ethnic wars arise because of the psychological factor, which is the competition of 
superiority over the other group and thus the competition motivates a hostile attitude even 
though they must destroy other groups for some cost. 
  
b. Weaknesses of psychological approach 
The theory from Anthony D. Smith, as mention above, which is concerned with 
the importance of a myth-symbol complex, cannot explain the ethnic conflict in a way 
                                                             
56 Stuart J. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2001), 26. 
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that the myth and symbols were only the tools that exist in a group or nation. Here, the 
myth-symbol complex is merely a tool to defined ethnic identity such as language, 
religion, culture, and territory. Myths and symbols can be found in ethnic group history 
and thus the creators of myth-symbols are often not the parties that manipulate the myth-
symbols, but it is the leader or politicians who take advantage and exploit the myth-
symbols to mobilize certain ethnic groups in certain events.57 The myths and symbols are 
a device for elites to mobilize the ethnic group for their self-interest. Here, if the myths 
and symbols that produce hatred should be activated by the elites, then an “ancient 
hatred” should be activated and changed into a “modern hatred” by the recent elites to 
manipulate the myths and symbols that already exist in inside ethnic group history.  
On the other hand, emotion is a very important element of psychological approach 
because political decisions often are motivated by emotions. However, ethnic conflict 
arises because emotion or contest for status cannot consistently explain ethnic war.  
Emotions need tools and actors to mobilize certain ethnic group to have conflict or war 
with other groups. The tools, like complex myth-symbols, and actors, like leaders or 
politicians, can mobilize ethnic groups to have conflict and war without considering costs 
and benefits of the war, for example, the flag. The group’s flag or the contending flag is a 
symbol that stimulates a sense of competition of superiority and emotions of certain 
ethnic groups as shows below.  
 
 
 
                                                             
57 Ibid. 24. 
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Figure 2.1 A fighter risking his life securing the GAM’s flag 
 
Source: http://www.achehtimes.com/photos/gam/gam03/index.htm (retrieved at March 20, 2008). 
Here, political choice is generally an emotional expression and politics are about 
manipulating the emotions of people as individuals and as a group. Furthermore, symbols 
exist as devices for these manipulations. Therefore, the symbolic politics theory is more 
coherent in a way that the theory fills the gaps between the existence of symbols as ethnic 
identity and emotions as a political choice’s expression. 
  
c. Inapplicability of the psychological theory in the Acehnese conflicts 
Psychological theory focuses on the importance of the emotions through myth-
symbols, such as the flag. The flag or contending flag, as a certain group symbol, can 
provoke a sense of competition of superiority, domination and emotions of certain ethnic 
groups. In Aceh, Free Aceh Movement (GAM) used the flag as the symbol of freedom to 
fight against the Indonesian national government including the Indonesian military. The 
GAM uses the flag to provoke emotions of the Acehnese and the rival group, which is the 
Indonesian national government and its military, to show their superiority and its political 
dominance in their own territory. The flag obviously is an effective tool that used is 
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by GAM elites or politicians like Hasan di Tiro, the leader of GAM, to mobilize the 
Acehnese to fight against the Indonesian national government and its military.  
Figure 2.2 The GAM’s supporter provoke the emotions of the Indonesian military 
 
Source: http://www.achehtimes.com/photos/gam/gam03/onguard.htm. (Retrieved at March 20, 2008). 
 
The image above shows that the supporters of the GAM to provoke the emotions 
of the Indonesian military and to show the GAM domination in Aceh territory use the 
GAM flag. Here, the flag of GAM is only a device for the actors to provoke conflicts. It 
implies that it is the actors who should activate the emotions through the flag myth-
symbols to trigger the conflict or war. Thus, emotions and myth-symbols cannot instantly 
be used as factors that trigger the conflict or war. The psychological approach, in 
Acehnese ethnic conflicts can only be used because the role of emotions is very important 
as a device for actors to set up a conflict. It implies that the psychological approach of 
emotions is inapplicable in analyzing the Acehnese ethnic conflicts.  
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E. Symbolic politics theory 
This theory was originally taken from Murray Edelman’s book on the conception 
of myths and symbols.58 Edelman argues that politicians or elites can manipulate ethnic 
myths and symbols to evoke emotional responses in their followers, thus motivating them 
to change their preferences to align with the superficial good, or need, of the ethnic 
group. Hence, Edelman is combining his idea with Smith’s concept about the importance 
of a myth-symbol complex to explain who a group’s members are, its nations and history, 
or the meaning of being a member of an ethnic group. He also includes Roger Peterson’s 
idea about the importance of emotions in manipulating people’s objectives and their 
preferences and the role of emotion in politics. Here, ethnic wars clearly involve 
emotions to demonize the other ethnic groups, which can lead to a hostile situation and 
furthermore, the ethnic conflicts or wars. 
Stuart J. Kaufman explains that ethnic wars are the result of the mobilization of 
myths and symbols.59 For example, a flag has an attractiveness to evoke emotions of an 
ethnic group or a nation, and a flag as the symbol that has its own myths can lead to 
conflict and war. The key assumption of this theory is that “people make political choices 
                                                             
58 Murray Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence (Chicago, IL: Markham 
Publishing Company, 1971). 
59 Stuart J. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2001); Kaufman, Stuart J. “Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? Testing Theories of 
Extreme Ethnic Violence” International Security 30, no. 4 (2006a): 45-86; Kaufman, Stuart. J., Satoshi 
Machida, and Yu Wang. “Symbolic Politics and Ethnic Conflict in Malaysia and the Philippines” 
International Studies Association Annual Meeting, San Diego, California, 2006b, and Stuart J. Kaufman, 
“Symbolic Politics and Ethnic War in the Philippines” International Studies Association Annual Meeting, 
Chicago, Illinois, 2007. 
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based on emotion and in response to symbols.”60 At this point, the assumption is that 
ethnic myths and symbols exist and bond the ethnic group.  
Thus, if both involved parties used politics that intended to dominate other ethnic 
groups, then ethnic war will come up as a result. The case in Balkans, Sudan and 
Rwanda’s ethnic genocide had justified that symbolic politics has the power to explain 
the ethnic war. Furthermore, the most recent work of Kaufman in the Philippines 
concludes that ethnic war in the southern Philippines can be explained by the symbolic 
politics theory. Symbolic politics theory emphasizes that violence is driven by hostile 
ethnic myths and an emotionally driven symbolic politics based on those myths. An 
ethnic war will occur when ethnic myths justify hostility toward the other group, fears of 
group extinction, and the opportunity to mobilize.  
At this view, I argue that symbolic politics theory should be tested to explain 
broader cases, especially in Southeast Asia, because it will give a broader explanatory 
power of the theory. The symbolic politics theory was intended to explain the ethnic war 
in post-Communist societies of Eastern Europe, which have no traditional social 
structures like in Southeast Asian countries, because their previous social structures had 
been destroyed by Stalinist terror.61 The traditional social structure in Aceh, the patron-
client system, is nevertheless a critical factor in explaining its dynamics of escalation and 
de-escalation of ethnic group conflicts. On this system, the patron (the elites) is 
                                                             
60 Stuart J. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2001), 29. 
61 Stuart J. Kaufman, “Symbolic Politics and Ethnic War in the Philippines,” International Studies 
Association Annual Meeting (Chicago, Illinois, 2007), 27. 
 
39 
traditional leadership that spread through family network as an attachment to the 
traditional aristocratic class, the sultanate and the Islamic scholars (the ulama).62   
The sultanate and the Islamic scholars (the ulama) as the local leaders or elites 
play a very significant role in the Acehnese movement against the Javanese Indonesian 
side. Daud Bereueh or Hasan di Tiro is claimed as the heir of sultanate and at the same 
time, they are also as the Islamic scholars. The significant factor in enabling elites like 
Bereueh and di Tiro to mobilize because hereditary aristocrats with social power to 
mobilize followers. It was this social stratum that helped the GAM to mobilize the 
Acehnese so quickly to revolt against the Indonesian state. Thus, based on this literature 
review, symbolic politics theory becomes the model to be tested in the Acehnese ethnic 
wars. 
  
a. Strengths of symbolic politics theory 
Symbolic politics theory was designed to fill the gap of the rational choice and 
psychological theories that could not satisfactorily explain the ethnic war. The symbolic 
politics theory successfully combines the substantial elements of rational choice theory 
and psychological approaches. The symbolic politics theory is able to grasp the important 
roles of elites or politicians’ strategies of self-interest. Here, the logic of rational choice 
theory of the elite’s motivations and security dilemma is the central matter of the ethnic 
group conflict or war process. On the other hand, symbolic politics theory also identifies 
                                                             
62 Alfian, “The Ulama in Acehnese Society,” in Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia, compiled by Ahmad 
Ibrahim, Sharon Shiddique, Yasmin Hussain (Pasir Panjang, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1985), 82-86. See also Yusny Saby, Islam and Social Change: The Role of the Ulama in Acehnese 
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the important role of emotions as part of psychological approaches. Emotions in a form 
of competition of status through political domination and fear of extinction are very 
effective in stimulating people to have conflict or war against the rival group. Therefore, 
symbolic politics theory is more satisfactory in explaining the ethnic conflict or war.  
The next strong point of the symbolic politics theory is that symbolic politics 
theory refers to political activity focused on arousing people emotions rather than 
addressing interests. It implies that the symbolic politics theory addressing the weakness 
of rationalist theory and psychological adequate explanation.  
The weakness of rational choice theory is that political choices are not based on 
the rational interests. The political choice is often driven by emotional considerations 
rather than the cost-benefit calculation. Even Kaufman explains that emotions change 
people preferences.63 More fascinatingly, an insight looking from a rationalist theorist, 
Samuel Popkin, on his book entitled The reasoning Voter, mention that “data presented in 
an emotionally compelling way may be given greater consideration and more weight than 
data that is statistically more valid, but emotionally neutral.”64 It implies that emotional 
decisions on political choices are stronger than rational decisions. In short, people are 
more likely to base their decisions on emotion.  
In this sense, Kaufman argues, “people choose by responding to the most 
emotionally potent symbol evoked.”65 He continue to argue that political choice is mostly 
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emotional expression, politics is mostly about manipulating people’s emotions, and 
symbols provide the tool for such manipulation because symbols have both cognitive and 
emotional effects.66 Therefore, symbolic politics theory shows the strong point that 
political choices is mostly driven by emotional decisions than the cognitive judgments by 
using the symbols to manipulate the elites’ supporters.  
Another strong point of symbolic politics theory is that this theory is applicable to 
explain the major ethnic group conflict such as the ethnic war in Syria (1998), Sudan and 
Rwanda (2000), the post-Communist societies of Eastern Europe (2001), Palestinian-
Israel (2004), Malaysia (2006), and the Philippines (2006 and 2007). These conflicts 
illustrate that symbolic politics theory is more coherent than rational choice and 
psychological theory.  
In the research of Kaufman for Sudan and Rwanda cases (2000), he tested, head 
to head, the rational choice theory which previously was explained by Fearon and Laitin 
compared to the symbolic politics theory. The symbolic politics theory indicators such as 
the myth, fears, opportunity, hostile mass attitudes, mass hostility, and hostile 
mobilization were present in Sudan and Rwanda war.  
The rationalist theory could not identify the reason of the member of conflicting 
ethnic groups to adopt elites predatory goals. Moreover, the rationalist theory on Sudan 
and Rwanda war failed to explain why ethnic cleavages were so prominent in these cases 
but not others. While the symbolic politics theory could explain the reason of why 
members of the conflicting ethnic groups follow the predatory elites goals. It was the 
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emotion of myths, symbols, and fears of extinction of the member of ethnic group that 
makes the supporters follow the predatory elites goals. Furthermore, symbolic politics 
theory could explain the extreme ethnic cleavages in Sudan and Rwanda. This extreme 
cleavage arises because the elites put so much effort and so many resources into making 
symbolic appeals. The result was that the symbolic politics theory is more successful than 
the rational choice theory in explaining the Sudan and Rwanda ethnic war.  
The symbolic politics theory is shown to have more power than rational choice 
and psychological theory in explaining the ethnic conflict or war, the deadliest ethnic 
violence, and even the ethnic peace, as illustrated in the cases of Syria, the post-
Communist societies of Eastern Europe, Palestinian-Israel, and the Philippines. The 
symbolic politics theory could even explain the extreme ethnic violence in Sudan and 
Rwanda by comparing it to the explanation of rational choice theory in the same case of 
Sudan and Rwanda. In the comparison case of Malaysia and the Philippines, symbolic 
politics theory could satisfyingly investigate the reason for conflict or war in the 
Philippines and why in Malaysia the ethnic conflict did not take place. 
  
b. Weaknesses of symbolic politics theory 
Despite the strong elements of the symbolic politics theory, this theory has some 
weaknesses. The symbolic politics theory has not become a theory that can explain most 
of the ethnic conflicts or wars around the world. Hence, this theory needs further 
explanation and more analysis toward the phenomena of the ethnic war. The most 
significant testing on the symbolic politics theory was in post-communist countries in the 
Balkans. However, the rest of the cases have not been representative because the 
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cases were investigated in very small number and only for certain ethnic war events. 
Therefore, this theory needs to be tested further through much research to prove its 
explanatory power of the ethnic war.  
One significant weakness of the symbolic politics theory researches mostly only 
analyzes conflict, war or even the most extreme ethnic violence-notably by Stuart 
Kaufman (1998, 2000, 2001, 2004, 2006, 2007). However, only in Malaysia does the 
symbolic politics approach explain the ethnic peace. This fact shows that the symbolic 
politics theory has not been widely used as a theory that can explain the ethnic peace. 
Even for the Malaysian case study, the symbolic politics theory only is used to test one 
conflict that arose in Malaysia around 1960s between the Chinese and Malays ethnic 
group.  
Cases like the Acehnese ethnic wars, which have been going on for more than 
fifty years from the Daud Bereueh movement until the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), are 
relatively new and needs more testing. The complexity of the Acehnese ethnic wars are 
also a very interesting case in Southeast Asia because the Acehnese ethnic wars have a 
very long historical journey even if we compare the wars to the ethnic conflict in 
Malaysia and the Philippines and the conflicts remaining unresolved. Aceh has become a 
gate to Southeast Asia since in the colonials’ era and thus, Aceh plays a very important 
role in Southeast Asia. Here, the symbolic politics theory should be tested in the case of 
the Aceh wars because it can give a more explanatory power to the theory.  
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c. Applicability of the symbolic politics theory in the Acehnese ethnic conflicts 
or wars 
The symbolic politics theory is vastly applicable for the Acehnese ethnic conflicts 
or wars because this theory can explain the interests, motivations, and choices of the 
actors, the devices that the actors use to provoke conflicts, and the reasons to have 
conflicts. For example, On the Aceh case, the elite actors like Daud Bereueh or Hasan di 
Tiro, had different interests, motivations, and choices in defending their ethnic group. 
Daud Bereueh’s movement used religious motivations of Islam to defend their identity as 
the Acehnese separate from the North Sumatran people who have a different religion, 
Christianity, and to form the Indonesian Islamic state. Daud Bereueh’s movement used 
the myth of Islam to encourage, provoke, and even manipulate the Acehnese to join with 
the Darul Islam movement to create their own Islamic nation. Thus, the physical conflicts 
between the Daud Bereueh movements through the Darul Islam rebellion were 
unavoidable.  
On the other hand, Hasan di Tiro through GAM (Free Aceh Movement) has 
different interests, motivations, and choices in defending the Acehnese ethnic group as a 
political entity. He used nationalism rather than Islamism as a motivation to fight against 
the Javanese Indonesian central government. He used nationalism of the Acehnese ethnic 
group to differentiate from the majority of the Indonesian people who are more than 80% 
Muslim. Nationalism implies that the Acehnese differentiate their identity as the 
Acehnese ethnic group with the Javanese ethnic group who dominate the Indonesian 
people. In this logic, Hasan di Tiro exaggerates the differences to provoke the emotions 
of the Acehnese and at the same time, to trigger the Javanese Indonesian central 
 
45 
government’s emotions. In response, the Javanese used their power philosophy to 
dominate the Acehnese. Therefore, both Acehnese elites, Daud Bereueh and Hasan di 
Tiro, substantially used the myth-symbols such as the flag, religion, ethnicity or 
nationalism as their devices to create emotional supporters and the ethnic masses to 
create a hostile attitude and situation to stimulate group members to fight against the rival 
group like the Javanese Indonesian central government. 
 
F. Conclusion  
This study derives partly from my disagreement with dominant theory about the 
ethnic conflict or war, which are the pure rational choice theory and the psychological 
approach. First, the mainstream theory is the rational choice theory that has been widely 
used and accepted by scholars. This theory derives from the instrumentalist approach. 
This approach mainly used the cost and benefits calculation on ethnic conflicts. It is the 
elites who use the instrument of ethnic group to gain their own interests. The rationalist 
theorists consider that people take any political choice is based on the rational 
calculation. Thus, every people will consider the costs and benefits of conflict or war. In 
this sense, war will only happen if the people choose to war because they already 
consider the benefits is bigger than the cost if they go for war. Clearly, the pure rationalist 
theorists can be located in the instrumentalist approach in interpreting the ethnic conflict 
or war. However, the cost-benefits calculation fails to count the non-rational factors, for 
example, the role of the emotions, and ideological consideration in ethnic conflict or war.  
Second, there is also the psychological approach that emphasis the significant role 
of the emotions that trigger ethnic conflict or war. For example, fears, hates, and 
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resentment are the concrete construction of hostile emotions. In addition, the competition 
of domination over the rival group to shows their superiority motivates hostile attitudes 
toward their rival group. In this sense, any political choice from the fanatic supporters 
and their elites is based on emotional considerations than the rational considerations. 
Thus, conflicts arise because of the emotions from one group over the other group in 
purpose of the political domination. Psychological approaches deal with power over other 
ethnic groups, prejudice, and negative feelings about the other group. At the heart of this 
argument is the notion that emotions are created through myths and symbols. The myth 
and symbols is a device to defined and control ethnic identity, existence, status, and their 
security. Therefore, the fanatics supporters of certain ethnic group are willing to fight and 
even died for their ethnic group’s myths and symbols. However, the psychological 
approach could not explain why the myth and symbols motivates ethnic war. In fact, this 
approach neglects the importance of leaders or politicians. In this case, it is the elites who 
could activate the myth and symbols, by provoking the followers to defend their ethnic 
group’s myth and symbols, for their own goals and thus conflict would arise. Another 
problem is the role of emotions on ethnic group conflict. Emotions is also could not 
directly become the trigger of conflict. Emotions need devices for example, myths and 
symbols, and leaders to mobilize hostile emotions to lead to conflict or war.  
My study provides an alternative interpretation of the Acehnse ethnic conflict. 
Focusing on the three significant case studies of the Acehnese rebellion, I emphasis the 
study of symbolic politics theory as tool of analysis in explaining the motivation, the 
process and the result of the Acehnese ethnic conflicts since 1945 to the recent situations. 
I argue that the Acehnese and the Javanese Indonesian leaders or elites should see the 
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Acehnese rebellions as a politics of myths symbols. The outbreak ethnic conflict in 1953 
and in the Soeharto New Order period, and the subsequent peace in the 1998 reform 
period should be understood in terms of the politics of myths and symbols, particularly 
the conflict between the leaders that provoke the ideological myths and symbols in order 
to shows their political dominations over the rival group. Therefore, the symbolic politics 
theory is combining the rationalist theory and the psychological approach in explaining 
the Acehnese ethnic conflicts in a more comprehensive manner.  
After this literature review I will utilize the symbolic politics theory on the 
Acehnese rebellions. Initially, Chapter 3 will discuss the setting of Indonesian and the 
context of the political situation and finally the nature of the Acehnese conflicts. The 
objective of chapter 3 is to give deeper understanding of the political setting of the 
Acehnese rebellions in Indonesia. Chapter 4,5, and 6 will apply the symbolic politics 
theory on the Acehnese rebellions on three different regimes and periods in Indonesia, 
which are under Soekarno regime, Soeharto regime, and the reform regimes after 1998.  
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CHAPTER 3: 
INDONESIA AND THE ACEHNESE REBELLIONS 
 
A. Introduction 
This chapter will explain the significance contexts of the geography and ethnicity, 
the politics of Indonesia, and how the Indonesian politics relate to the Acehnese 
rebellions. In this chapter, my discussion will begin by acknowledging the geography and 
ethnicity of Indonesia and will continue with exploring the politics and ideology in 
Indonesia since 1945. Furthermore, this chapter will analyze the ideological debate 
between the Islamic ideology proponent and the secular nationalist proponent that 
influence the stance of the Acehnese in dealing with the Indonesian central government. I 
will carry on my discussion on the nature of the Acehnese movement from their first 
rebellion in 1953 to their most recent rebellion in 1998 and the period after the changes of 
the Indonesian regime from an authoritarian to a more democratic regime. The objective 
of this chapter is explaining the significant setting of the Aceh conflicts in Indonesian 
context.  
 
B. Geography and ethnicity in Indonesia 
Before further discussion of the Indonesian politics, it is necessary to identify the 
geography and ethnicity of Indonesia in order to recognize the complexity of the 
Indonesian government in coping with the archipelago territory, which is more prone to 
the separatism movements. As Monica Toft illustrates, the existence of regional 
concentration of a particular group is very nearly a necessary condition for ethnic 
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rebellion.67 This factor obtained in Aceh, as most of the Acehnese ethnic group was 
concentrated in Aceh territory.  
Geographically, Indonesia is an archipelago that located in Southeast Asia, which 
consist of 17,508 islands. It is between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The area in total is 
1,919,440 sq km and consists of 1,826,440 sq km of land and 93,000 sq km of water. 
More prominently, the country’s geographic position on the Pacific Rim of Fire leaves 
the country vulnerable to earthquakes, volcanoes and tsunamis such as the one that struck 
Aceh and Nias in 2004.68 This tsunami contributed to changes in the political 
constellation between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian central 
government.  The post-tsunami conditions have changed the attitudes of the Acehnese 
through the GAM and also change the Indonesian central government so that negotiations 
for peaceful situation are achievable.  
The Indonesian area spans from Sabang to Merauke, a geographical allegation of 
the Indonesian nationalists to show their claim in managing the ex-Dutch colonial area 
after Indonesian independence in 1945. Under the symbolic language of “from Sabang to 
Merauke,” the Indonesian nationalist wanted to show that the Indonesian national space 
of Sabang of Aceh territory which start at the northern tip of Sumatra, the westernmost 
town, which lies off the coast of Aceh, and spans to Merauke, which lies in the 
southeastern corner of Irian Jaya (West Papua) territory. This entire region, nationalists 
believe, is integrated in a nation-state of Indonesia. However, these two territories, 
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Sabang in Aceh and Merauke in Irian Jaya, ironically are in the provinces where the 
demands for independence from Indonesia are very strong and as a result, the Indonesian 
nationalists often use this symbolic language to propagate its political agenda of a nation-
state based on geographical territory.69 Consequently, it is very difficult for the 
Indonesian central government to manage the more than 3,000 miles long archipelago 
and thus, rebellions, such as the Acehnese revolt, are more likely to occur in Indonesia.  
Figure 3.1 The map of Indonesia 
 
Sources: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html (retrieved at June 20, 
2008). 
Regarding ethno-linguistic issues, officially, the Indonesian people use Bahasa 
Indonesia as the national language, which originated from Malays language. However, 
the largest ethno-linguistic group is the Javanese, which comprise 40.6% of the 
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Indonesian population.70 At the same time, there are more than 300 ethnic groups with 
unique ethnic languages in Indonesia. Each ethnic group in Indonesia has their own 
territory base that very possibly leads to chauvinistic sentiments. Consequently, as 
Monica Duffy Toft shows, the existence of regional concentration of a certain groups is a 
required condition for ethnic insurgence, but when certain group stretch in different area, 
they almost never rebel.71 This pattern is detected in many places in Indonesia. The 
rebellions of Papuan, Moluccas, East Timorese, Sundanese in West Java, and the 
Acehnese are examples of the consequence of the ethnic group concentration based upon 
territory. This phenomenon is known as regionalism revolt. Hence, these ethnic group 
rebellions fulfilled one of the necessary conditions of insurgency to revolt to the 
Indonesian central government.  
Therefore, based on the geography and ethnicity in Indonesia, it is very difficult 
for the Indonesian central government to rule a 3,000 mile long archipelago, which 
consist of 17,508 islands, and more than 300 ethnic groups with their own ethnic 
languages. As a result, it is easy for separatist movements to gain ground in Indonesia.  
 
C. The politics and ideology in Indonesia 
On March 1, 1945 the Investigating Committee for the preparation of Indonesian 
independence was established under the support of Japanese occupation authorities to 
prepare for the Indonesian independence. This committee consisted of all representations 
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of the Indonesian ethnicity and geography. Here, there were two groups that oppose each 
other on the issue of the philosophical basis of an Indonesian state. There were the 
Islamic proponents who wanted to make an Islamic Indonesian state formally and the 
secular nationalist proponents who intended to unite all religions that exist in Indonesia.72 
Both trains of thought had roots in the history and development of the Indonesian 
movements desire to gain independence. The secular nationalist groups argue that the 
struggle for independence began with the establishment of the first nationalist Indonesian 
movement of Budi Utomo (Noble Endeavor) on May 20, 1908, which arguably was “the 
first organization of the Indonesian nation which was arranged in a modern fashion, and 
which was the major significance.”73 The Budi Utomo was the pioneer of all other 
nationalist groups, which were based in Java because all of the members were the 
Javanese ethnic group. This movement came into existence as a reaction against 
colonialism and was aimed at a free Indonesia based upon nations. A free Indonesia 
became the final goal of the Budi Utomo. Hence, the secular nationalist group intended to 
unite all the different groups, ethnicity, geography, or even religions background under a 
principle unitary nation-state of Indonesia. In this context, on June 1, 1945, Soekarno (a 
secular nationalist and the first President of Indonesia) offered his Fives Principles (the 
Pancasila) as the intended basis of the state. They are as follows: Kebangsaan 
(Nationalism), Internasionalisme atau Pri-Kemanusiaan (internationalism or 
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Humanitarianism), Mufakat atau Demokrasi (Deliberation or Democracy), Kesejahteraan 
Sosial (Social Prosperity) and Ketuhanan (Beliefs in God). Furthermore, Soekarno 
offered the Eka Sila (One State Principle), which was the gotong royong (mutual 
cooperation, a unitary or integrality) principle74. It implies that Soekarno intended to 
create one nation-state of Indonesia based on the secular nationalist principles, the 
Pancasila.  
On the other hand, Islamic nationalist groups referred to the establishment of the 
Sarekat Islam (S.I, Islamic Association) on October 16, 1905, as the starting point of the 
Indonesian nationalist movement. In addition, the Islamic group aimed that the struggle 
for the Indonesian independence had started a hundred years ago. It involved the heroes 
Abdul Hamid Diponegoro, Imam Bonjol, Sultan Babullah of Ternate, Teungku Cik di 
Tiro from Aceh and many others hero whose jihads (holy struggle in the name of God) 
shaped the history of Indonesia. Here, the Islamic groups aimed to formally create an 
Islamic Indonesian state in order to preserve an Indonesian independence for Ummah 
(Muslim community) and the freedom of Islam. Hence, the Islamic groups urged The 
Preparation Investigating Committee for Indonesian Independence to formally use the 
Islamic principles as the state philosophical basis of Indonesia by stating that they used 
the Shari’ah Islam (Islamic Laws). At the end of June 1945, The Preparation 
Investigating Committee for Indonesian Independence finally decided to use the Piagam 
Jakarta (Jakarta Charter) as the basis for the state principles. However, the words “with 
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the obligation to carry out the shari’ah Islam (Islamic Laws) for its adherents”75 became 
the center of a debate on national level and triggered the regional Islamic rebellions in 
West Java, South Sulawesi, South Kalimantan, and in Aceh under the Darul Islam 
(Abode of Islam) banner. 76 Therefore, both groups of Islam and secular nationalists were 
claimed they had their own historical roots basis to justify they ideology regarding on 
their struggle for the formation of the Indonesian new nation-state. However, the states 
philosophical basis remained unresolved until Indonesian gained and proclaimed its 
independence from the Japanese on August 17, 1945 and decided to adopt the Pancasila 
as the philosophical basis to govern the state. The Independence took place in Jakarta, the 
Indonesian capital city.  
 
D. Ideological debate between the Islamic and secular nationalist groups 
Islamic proponents’ political thoughts recognize that the majority of the 
Indonesian people identify Islam as their religion. 86.1% of the Indonesian populations 
are Muslim, 237,512,355 people, and thus, Indonesia has largest Muslim population in 
the world.77 However, not all those who identify as Muslim are devoted to Islam although 
they formally call themselves Muslim. One reason why it is difficult to determine 
Indonesian devotion to Islam is because there are many different types of Muslim in 
Indonesia. According to Herbert Faith and Lance Castles stated that there are five 
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influencing fundamental political Indonesian thought, which are radical nationalism, 
Javanese traditionalism, Islam, democratic socialism, and communism. These ideologies 
molded and influenced the Indonesian people, especially those who are Muslim. 78  
Figure 3.2 The Political map in Indonesia in 1955 
 
Source: Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, “Indonesian Political Thinking: 1945-
1965” (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970), 14. 
Clifford Geertz argues that ideologically, there are two types of Muslim people in 
Indonesia. The first type is santri. Santri define those Muslim who are very religious and 
strictly follow Islam and the second type of Muslim is abangan. Abangan is a syncretistic 
people, the “statistical Muslims” or “Muslims of a sort” 79 or in other words, abangan is 
the secular people who acknowledge the existence of religion but they do not practice the 
religion.” Santri is a religious and a devoted person to Islam as their ideology and 
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abangan is on the other side of santri and thus, abangan ideologically, is more close to 
nationalist. The political preferences of santri people tend to adopt Islam as their 
ideology and their political preferences include choosing the members of the house of 
representative and they prefer Islam as their philosophical basis for Indonesian state. In 
contrast, the abangan people prefer secular nationalist when voting for their 
representative and prefer Pancasila, as the Indonesian state philosophical basis.  
In fact, many Indonesian, since the 1955 general election, tended to support 
secular nationalists (abangan) rather than santri even though most of Indonesian 
identifies them as Muslim.  This pattern of support was shown in every general election 
in Indonesia. The two most recent general elections (1999 and 2004) in Indonesia also 
indicate that the secular nationalist (abangan) is still stronger rather than the santri.   
3.1 Major Parties in Indonesian and Recent Parliamentary Elections Result (Percent of 
Vote) 
Name Notes 1999 2004 
Golkar (functional Group 
Party) 
Secular party, former ruling party of 
Suharto [nationalist, abangan] 
22.4 21.6 
PDI-P (Indonesian Democratic 
Party of Struggle 
Secular party, the third-largest party 
under Suharto’s rule [and this party 
originated was the re-birth of PNI of 
Soekarno, the first Indonesian 
President’s party]. [nationalist, 
abangan] 
33.7 18.5 
PKB (National Awakening 
Party) 
Inclusive party, supported by 
Nahdlatul Ulama, the largest Muslim 
organization. 
12.6 10.6 
PPP (United Development 
Party) 
Islamist party, the second-largest 
party under Suharto’s rule. 
10.7 8.5 
PD (Democrat Party) Secular party, newly formed before 
2004 elections as political vehicle 
for Yudoyono. [nationalist, abangan] 
- 7.5 
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PKS (Prosperous Justice Party) Islamist party, supported by 
networks of educated young 
Muslims. 
- 7.3 
PAN (National Mandate Party) Inclusive party, supported by 
Muhammadiyah, the second-largest 
Muslim organization. 
7.1 6.4 
Source: Qodari, Muhammad. “Indonesia’s Quest for Accountable Governance.” Journal of Democracy 16, 
no. 2 (2005): 79. 
Hence, the Indonesian people prefer to use the Pancasila (secular nationalist 
principles) as the philosophical basis of the Indonesian state rather than Jakarta Charter or 
Piagam Jakarta (state based on the Islamic religion).80 In fact, the Indonesian 
constitution forces the government to remain relatively neutral on the issue of religion. 
This rejection of Indonesia’s Islamic identity has caused several regional conflicts within 
the country. 
One of the consequences of rejecting Islam as the guiding political force was the 
rise of regional revolts. For example, a radical Islam movement has challenged the 
Indonesian national government almost since the state’s creation and dates from the late 
1940's and erupted in 1953 under Kartosuwirdjo leadership. The revolt initially began in 
the West Java province and spread out to Aceh under the banner of Darul Islam. The 
Dural Islam (Abode of Islam) movement was the earliest Islamic group that challenged 
the secular nationalist Indonesian central government, which until the 1960's used 
military resistance to shape and influence the creation of an Indonesian state based on 
Islam. The Darul Islam movement aimed to create Negara Islam Indonesia (NII, 
Indonesian Islamic State). Furthermore, the Darul Islam movement had spread to Aceh 
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led by Daud Bereueh, the Acehnese ulama (Islamic scholar) leader, who considered 
Indonesian national government inconsistent with the principles of Islam as a state 
philosophical basis81. Starting from 1976, Hasan di Tiro, the descendant of Tengku cik di 
Tiro, as an Islamic hero in Indonesia and the leader of Free Aceh Movement (GAM), 
fought for the Acehnese Islamic nation-state independence not only because of greater 
autonomy on religious issues and the economic exploitation by Jakarta, but also under the 
banner of nationalism.82 Therefore, the political ideology debate occurred on a national 
level had influenced the position of the Acehnese in taking action to defend their identity 
and its political entity as part of the Islamic community in creating the Indonesian Islamic 
State.  
 
E. The Origins of the Acehnese rebellions 
The history of the Acehnese rebellion has lasted for decades, even though not 
continuously in the form of clearly armed conflicts. Despite the fact that all events are 
interconnected, every period of rebellion has its own cause, actors, local as well as 
national influences, and reactions of the Indonesian central government to the Acehnese 
rebellion. The rebellions of the Acehnese are symbolized by the events that motivate the 
Acehnese to revolt against the Indonesian national government. The three symbolic 
events are the Daud Bereueh movement in 1953, the formation of Free Aceh Movement 
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and its complexity throughout the New Order era under Soeharto regime (the second 
Indonesian President), and the GAM in the Reformation era after 1998.  
Since Indonesia gained its independence on August 17, 1945, the Indonesian 
central government could only exercise minimal control over the Aceh region because of 
the struggle to ensure Indonesian state survival in the face of increasing Dutch 
disturbance. At the same time, the Dutch had made no attempt to re-inhabit Aceh and 
thus Aceh was left to its own devices.83 Consequently, Aceh’s commitment to the 
Indonesian central government at that moment was strengthened by the fact that it was 
free to run its own affairs without central interference, and the Acehnese expected that 
their region's “historical separateness and its contribution to the national revolution 
…would be accorded due recognition in a future Indonesian state.” 84 At the same time, 
the Acehnese had given plenty economic and political contributions to the Indonesian 
central government in the emerging periods of Indonesia’s independence. For example, in 
1948, the Acehnese contributed financial assistance and two airplanes from the Acehnese 
people to the Indonesian central government.85  
 
a. The Darul Islam movement under Daud Bereueh leadership 
In 1953, the Acehnese was felt disappointed by the Indonesian central 
government because nit abandoned the autonomous status of the Aceh region and 
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designated Aceh as a part of the North Sumatra province. Moreover, Aceh had its own 
military force under Daud Bereueh, the Acehnese ulama (Islamic scholars) leader that 
was very influencial in the Acehnese peoples’ lives, and the Acehnese military had its 
own trading networks that were separate from the Indonesian central government control 
until the end of 1952. The policies from Indonesian central government that included 
Aceh part of the North Sumatra Province had insulted the Acehnese self-respect and 
more importantly, the policy also damaged the network of self-government that had been 
operating in the late 1940’s.86 The Acehnese objections were based on the fact that they 
were already loyal to the Republic of Indonesia through contributions of airplanes and 
financial assistance. The Acehnese contributions were a concrete devotion and the 
Acehnese people were kind of hero during the revolutionary years. However, because of 
their forced inclusion in North Sumatra Province, they had been marginalized and 
betrayed by the Indonesian central government.87  
Another disappointment of the Acehnese was that the constitution of the 
Indonesian state was not based on Islam or the Jakarta Charter and instead the 
Indonesian’s constitution was based on Pancasila (the Five Principles), which prioritized 
secular principles. Historically, the Acehnese have a strong identity as militant Muslims 
because Aceh is well known as Pasai Kingdom, the first Islamic kingdom in Malays area. 
Moreover, when they fought against the Dutch, the Acehnese used the myths of Hikayat 
Perang Sabil (HPS, the Epics of the holy war) as their Islamic depiction of the holy fight. 
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Those who struggled in this epic would be rewarded with the delights of paradise.88 This 
epic also includes discussion of prosecuting holy war against infidels. Hence, the 
Acehnese have a strong identity as devoted Muslims. The consequences of adopting the 
myth of HPS resulted in a revolt to have an Islamic Indonesian state in 1953 under Daud 
Bereueh leadership through the Darul Islam rebellions.89 Bereueh was a very central 
leader because the Acehnese recognized him as an Islamic leader, a noble heir, and as an 
official Aceh local government leader.  
 
b. Free Aceh Movement under Soeharto’s regime of the New Order era (1969-
1998) 
The second symbolic event is the insurgency led by Hasan di Tiro. The 
insurgency started in 1976 with the formation of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). 
Hasan di Tiro established GAM as the Aceh-Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF) 
in October 1976. He is a descendant of well-known ulama (Islamic scholar) family of 
Muslim clergy and more importantly, he is a grandson of Teungku Cik di Tiro, the hero 
of the anti-colonial fight against the Dutch.90  
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The insurgency arose because central and regional failed to commit to a policy of 
special autonomy of Aceh Province. However, the Free Aceh Movement’s main goal is 
to gain Aceh independence while the Darul Islam revolt sought an Islamic state. For 25 
years (1951 through 1976), Hasan di Tiro lived in the United States of America as a 
student and later became a businessman. Even he claims, in his published diary, that he 
was in exile in the United States of America.91 Moreover, di Tiro was committed as an 
Indonesian delegation member in the United Nations until the Darul Islam rebellions 
broke out in 1953 and di Tiro choose to support Daud Bereueh. Hasan di Tiro secretly 
returned to Aceh because of his beliefs in his historical family obligation, which is to 
struggle for the Acehnese independence.92  
The GAM’s ideology is national liberation. Hence, the GAM’s purpose is to make 
the Acehnese free from all political suppression, including the Indonesian government.93 
GAM portrayed the Javanese Indonesian government as the continuation of the Dutch 
colonial rule. They have similarities in terms of their behavior of invasion and occupation 
of the Acehnese people. In contrast, the Indonesian government described the GAM as a 
betrayer of the Republic of Indonesia. Moreover, the GAM’s objective is to ensure “the 
survival of the people of Aceh-Sumatra as a nation; the survival of their political, social, 
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cultural, and religious heritage which are being destroyed by the Javanese colonialist” 
and to reopen “the question of decolonization of the Dutch East Indies or ‘Indonesia.” 94 
Here, Schulze categorized the Acehnese as ethnically nationalistic and follower of 
Islam.95 
Schulze pointed out that the Acehnese nationalist movement constructed by GAM 
is ethnic rather than public. They construct themselves through the primordial perspective 
that ties the Acehnese through blood, religion and ethnic group affiliations. Therefore, an 
Acehnese is defined as “a person whose family has resided in Aceh over several 
generations, is Muslim, and is a member of one of Aceh’s nine suku [ethnic group]: 
Aceh, Alas, Gayo, Singkil, Tamiang, Kluet, Anek Jamee, Bulolehee, and Simeuleu.”96  
The GAM was a small, very organized, and ideological organization that 
consisted of 70 people as their core organizers, which led by a highly educated elite 
class.97 The GAM declared the Acehnese an independent nation for the second time in 
December 4, 1976 after Daud Bereueh declared its independence for the first time. The 
second declaration of Aceh independence aimed at showing the political and ideological 
features of the Acehnese fights. This second declaration was a symbol that created a 
hostile situation in Aceh and was an instrument to mobilize the Acehnese to follow Hasan 
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di Tiro, as the leader of Acehnese. However, the GAM’s members were unprepared well 
in term of the organization financial supports and in the armed forces to fight against the 
Indonesian military forces. For example, the GAM owned only a “few old guns and 
remnants from World War II”, and got money from townspeople to support their fights.98 
It was proven by the fact that, by the end of 1979, Indonesian central government ran 
counterinsurgency operations and easily crushed the GAM by government forces.   
Even though the GAM failed, it was never entirely destroyed by the Indonesian 
government forces. During the 1980s, some of the GAM members remained in the forests 
of Aceh and the recruitment of GAM members continued.99 From his new exile in 
Sweden since 1976 to recently,100 di Tiro commanded his followers in Aceh by sending 
recorded speeches and writings. Furthermore, he searched for International political and 
military support and opened GAM organizations in Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, the 
United States, and Europe.101  
In 1989, GAM consolidated its organization and was more aggressive than it had 
been in 1977 because in 1989, GAM had larger amount of supporters and a more skilled 
military. Their actions spread throughout the Aceh territory aggressively. In 1989 through 
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1991, GAM had gained strength and had around 200 to 750 active members. Even though 
Libya had provided military training, it did not offer the GAM any additional funds or 
weaponry. Some money was apparently raised among the Acehnese, weapons were 
stolen, or perhaps, purchased, from the Indonesia security forces. GAM acquired 200 
automatic rifles and light machine guns by June 1990.102 
The activities of the Free Aceh Movement provoked a harsh response from the 
Indonesian military. In fact, the Indonesian government deployed 6,000 troops in Aceh, 
bringing the total number of soldiers in July 1990 to 12,000 troops.103 Since July 1990, 
Aceh was designated a Daerah Operasi Militer or “DOM” (area of military operations) 
by the Indonesian central government. This designation implies the military has a 
heightened degree of authority and could perform its maneuvers with impunity. The 
Indonesian military, well known as ABRI (currently called TNI), adopted a strategy in 
Aceh centered on a terror campaign known as “shock therapy,” which aimed to create 
fear in the society and make the Acehnese abandon their support of the GAM.104 While 
the separatists were widely reported to have committed violence, there was a big 
difference in the scale of violence between the two sides in this respect. Indonesian 
lawyers reported in November 1990 that the community criticized the Indonesian armed 
forces actions, and that “their hatred and fear of ABRI” had reached its peak. The 
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Indonesian military personnel were stereotyped as a party that was unaware and reckless 
of local customs and traditions, thus worsening the degree of popular antipathy.105  
 In addition to military policy adopted by Indonesian government, an estimated 
50,000 Javanese, who came as part of a national transmigration program of Soeharto, the 
second President of Indonesia, in the 1980s and 1990s, were terrorized into leaving their 
homes in North, East, and Central Aceh. Following harassment by the GAM including 
terrorization, the acquisition of property and goods through the use of force and even 
arms threats in September 1999, thousands of the Javanese transmigrants were escaping 
Aceh reported by The Jakarta Post.106 
Nonetheless, the Indonesian military forces accomplished their main goal of 
neutralizing the GAM’s paramilitary threat.107 The Indonesian central government’s 
response was victorious and immediately effective. Since the DOM policy was 
implemented in the 1991, the GAM’s actions decreased to a minimum and many of 
GAM’s leaders in the field had been captured or killed. However, the government faces 
new burden of human right violations, antipathy, and more importantly the increase of 
the Acehnese support and the popularity of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) for the 
Acehnese freedom and independence. According to the International Crisis Group report 
of 2001, the number of casualties resulting from the conflict between 1990 and 1998 was 
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1,000-3,000 killed, 900 to 1,400 Acehnese missing and presumed dead, 500 maimed, and 
700 dwellings torched. The Javanese Indonesian government caused the vast majority of 
deaths.108  
By the end of the DOM policy in 1998, GAM had nearly been defeated in Aceh. 
However, the potential power of GAM is still powerful and continues to survive. It is 
because the leader of GAM, Hasan di Tiro, was secure in exile where he continued to 
spread the idea of the Acehnese independence. Another reason is that some of the GAM’s 
elite members escaped to Malaysia and continue to exist alongside the refugees. And the 
last reason why GAM continues to have power is that the DOM is responsible for along 
with the new generation of the Acehnese to witness the military violence. After Soeharto 
falls in 1998 the new generation of the Acehnese strongly identified themselves as 
supporters of GAM. The Acehnese continued to feel as if were the victims of the 
Indonesian military.109 When Soeharto’s regime collapsed, it was a great opportunity for 
the Acehnese to claim their right to justice and freedom. Here, the GAM re-emerged and 
furthermore transformed into a more popular ethno-nationalist movement since the 
reformation era in 1998 onward.  
 
c. Free Aceh Movement in reformation era (1998-now) 
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The reformation era of 1998 brought important opportunities for GAM to develop 
and re-establish itself because of the financial crisis in the Indonesia state and because of 
the momentum of the East Timor referendum to separate from the Indonesia state in 
1999, the proximity of the 1989 DOM, and the decline of credibility of the Indonesian 
central government. The people of Aceh found the courage to come forward and bring 
the years of terror and brutality to the attention of the communities. The fast growing for 
desire a referendum to choose whether or not the Acehnese wanted to stay a part of 
Indonesia or if they wanted to separate as their own nation-state was the common will of 
the Acehnese and a the measure of their political activism after years of suppression 
under DOM.  
Inspired by the Timorese referendum in choosing whether they wanted to stay a 
part of Indonesia or if they wanted to be an independent nation-state of East Timor, 
which resulted in Indonesia being forced to give up its claim on the territory, made the 
people of Aceh look for a similar option. In September 1999, East Timor’s referendum 
was held and in the following month, there were massive rallies across Aceh that 
encouraged a similar referendum. The referendum of East Timor was a “blueprint” for 
the Acehnese and also a key propaganda strategy employed by the media and other 
information communication technologies. The Acehnese assumed that the international 
community would have the same sympathy for them as they did for the East Timor 
people. Baharuddin Yusuf Habibie, the Indonesian transition President or the third 
President, who replaced the President Soeharto, visited Aceh in March 1999 and 
promised that the army's abuses would be investigated and the perpetrators prosecuted. 
These promises went unfulfilled and only encouraged secessionist sentiment and 
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damaged the central government’s credibility (Head, 1999 on www.wsws.org, retrieved 
at June 23, 2008). In addition, the arrival of the Abdurrahman Wahid, the fourth 
Indonesian President, in October 1999 brought little relief to the Acehnese although 
Wahid stated that he would personally handle the Acehnese conflict. Once in office, 
however, he was pressured by his administration to withdraw his support.110  
The reluctances of the Acehnese to build a peace process with the Indonesian 
government were because of the Indonesian commitment problem and the violence of the 
Indonesian military during the DOM era. The Acehnese had little reason to believe the 
Indonesian national government’s assurances of special autonomy because the promises 
of commitment regarding the Acehnese conflict were broken. The Indonesian military’s 
violence actions during the DOM period made a renewed conflict more likely, due to 
widespread antipathy towards the Indonesian military. Therefore, it provided the GAM 
with willing recruits who were motivated to take revenge on the military.111  
On May 18, 2003, the negotiations between the Indonesian national government 
and GAM finally failed.  The GAM negotiators rejected the autonomous status for the 
territory within Indonesia that was offered by the Indonesian central government and 
refused to put down their arms. As a result the Indonesian national government warned 
the GAM that this offer of an autonomous status and ceasefire order was their final offer 
in that negotiation. Hence, the Indonesian national government had warned that GAM’s 
rejection would mean a new military attack and this stalemate ended the peace process. 
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On the GAM side, Malik Mahmud told journalists “the Indonesian government wishes to 
continue its war on the Acehnese.” He continued stating that, “We shall fight. We are 
ready. We have been fighting for twenty-seven years.”112  
Regarding this issue, obviously the GAM and the Indonesian national government 
had very different goals. The GAM wanted independence because they had memories of 
the brutality of the Indonesian military in the DOM era from 1989 to 1998. They have 
strong feelings regarding their distinct identity, which derives from the history of the pre-
colonial sultanate, the resistance to the Dutch military actions and more recently the 
GAM insurgency due to a reaction to the policies and behavior of the Javanese Soeharto 
regime.113 In contrast, the Indonesian national government wanted an autonomous status 
within Indonesia for Aceh.  These different desires of the GAM and Indonesian 
government regarding negotiation have made it difficult for both parties to reach an 
agreement.  
Because the Indonesian national government under Megawati Soekarno Putri’s 
leadership, the fifth Indonesian president and descendant of Soekarno, perceived the 
GAM as refusing to compromise, signed a decree placing Aceh under martial law. In 
May 19, 2003, the Indonesian national government under Megawati Soekarno Putri’s 
leadership immediately implemented military Integrated Operation I and II (Minority 
Rights Group International, 2005: p. 20). Directly after the decree been signed, the 
military commander in chief, General Endriartono Sutarto, commanded tens of thousands 
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of troops to gather in Aceh to begin a “Security Restoration Operation” for purpose of 
“[destroying] GAM forces down to their roots.” The troops’ duty, he said, was simple: 
“they ha[d] the task of finishing off, and killing those who still engaged in armed 
resistance.” 114 This message of martial law marked the end of the negotiation process 
that had begun early in 2000. The enforcement of the military operations ended exactly a 
year after its implementation in May 19, 2004 and since this date the Indonesian national 
government declared civil emergency status in Aceh territory.  
 
F. Conclusion 
The formation of the Indonesian nation-state in an archipelago has created a great 
deal of complexity when it comes to managing the archipelago for the Indonesian central 
government. This situation arose because geographically, Indonesia consists of more than 
17,000 islands and ethnically, Indonesia has more than 300 ethnic groups that have 
certain territory that is more prone to separatism because of the ethnic group 
concentration in certain places. These unique geographical and ethnic concerns have 
created various political and ideological debates from the beginning of the Indonesian 
formation in 1945. The debates were between the Islamic supporters and the secular 
nationalists supporters. The Islamic supporters claimed that Indonesia should be an 
Indonesian Islamic state based on the Jakarta Charter, while the secular nationalist groups 
demanded Indonesia should be a unitary secular state based on Pancasila, which 
prioritized a secular nationalist principles.  
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One of the consequences of these ideological conflicts was the attitude of the 
Acehnese in response to secular nationalists’ Indonesian government. The Acehnese who 
identified themselves as strong believers of Islam were concerned about the secular 
Indonesian state basis that would threaten the Acehnese through the designated policy of 
the Indonesian central government that included Aceh a part of the North Sumatra 
Province whose population consist of North Sumatrans who were non-believers of Islam. 
Hence, to defend their identity as strong believers of Islam, the Acehnese revolted against 
the Indonesian central government under the Darul Islam (Abode of Islam) banner in 
1953. Therefore, the adoption of Islam as the dominant religion and the basis for the 
political movement was clearly the main reason the Acehnese revolted against the secular 
Indonesian central government.  
However, the revolts for the Acehnese change over time from Islam as the main 
basis of the Acehnese rebellion to nationalism combined with Islam as the guiding force. 
The Acehnese, through the leadership of Hasan di Tiro, differentiated their identity as 
Acehnese from the Javanese Indonesian government. In 1976, di Tiro took the 
opportunity to change the Acehnese identity from strong believers of Islam to Aceh 
nationalists. Di Tiro promoted the idea that Aceh should be viewed as a separate nation 
by promoting ethnic pride designated Aceh as the formal language of the Acehnese 
nation. The Javanese Indonesian central government was seen as the oppressors of the 
Aceh nation. Obviously, di Tiro’s political agenda was to combine a new identity of Aceh 
nationalism and Islam as traditions of the Acehnese values. With this ideological 
combination of Islam and nationalism, he attracted the Acehnese attention to support his 
 
73 
political agenda to create a new Aceh nation by re-declaring Acehnese independence in 
1976. 
 Hasan di Tiro succeeded in attracting masses of the Acehnese peoples’ support to 
create their own nation to gain their freedom from the Javanese Indonesian government. 
The Acehnese supported the GAM under Hasan di Tiro leadership because the 
Indonesian government exploited the Acehnese resources by taking most of their 
economical resources to Java and left nothing to the Acehnese. Moreover, the Javanese 
Indonesian government continued to use Pancasila as the state basis of Indonesia, while 
the Acehnese still wanted to uphold Islam formally as their legal basis in Aceh territory. 
Hence, conflicts were unavoidable between the Acehnese and the Indonesian central 
government though its armed forces.  
After we discuss the contexts of geography and ethnicity, the political dynamic in 
Indonesia and the nature of the Aceh rebellions. On chapter 4 I will analyze the symbolic 
politics approach on the first case study of the Acehnese rebellion under the first 
Indonesian president, Soekarno regime. The aim of chapter 4 is to give details 
explanation of the applicability of the symbolic politics approach on the first erupt of 
Aceh conflict under the Javanese secular nationalist Soekarno regime.  
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CHAPTER 4: 
THE ACEHNESE CONFLICTS UNDER SOEKARNO’S PERIOD 
 
A. Introduction 
After we discuss the context of Indonesian politics, the debate of ideology, and 
the relationship of Indonesian politics to the nature of the Acehnese rebellions; I will now 
discuss the applicability of the symbolic politics approach on the first outbreak of the 
Acehnese conflict under Soekarno regime. This study attempts to explain the first 
outbreak of the Acehnese conflict within the Indonesian state against the Indonesian 
central government under Soekarno leadership. Focusing on the myth hostility, fears, 
opportunity, mass hostility, and hostile mobilization my main goal is to highlight the 
symbolic politics theory on the 1953 Acehnese rebellion under the Darul Islam 
movement. I argue that the outbreak of the Acehnese conflict must be viewed as a result 
of the politics of the myths and symbols from both elites. The elites from both sides 
utilize the myths and symbols that exist on their own group to provoke the hostile 
situations and thus, mass hostility arise especially on the Acehnese side.  
The Acehnese under Daud Bereueh leadership feel threaten by the fact that 
Soekarno forces the Acehnese to adopt secular Pancasila ideology rather than the Islamic 
ideology in Indonesia. Moreover, Soekarno insist to include Aceh territory to the North 
Sumatra Province. These Indonesian government policies are considered a threat to the 
existence of the Acehnese identity. In response the Daud Bereueh declared the 
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Acehnese independent as a way to shows their nation’s strength over the Javanese 
Indonesian side. Kartosuwirjo as the Darul Islam movement leader supported this revolt. 
Thus, conflict between the Javanese Indonesian government and Daud Bereueh 
movement was unavoidable because myths, fears, and opportunity were present. 
Conflicts are more likely to happen because the Daud Bereueh evoked the myths and 
symbols of the Acehnese as the true believers of Islam.  
In this chapter my discussion will begin by exploring the three preconditions of 
the Acehnese ethnic conflict; the myths of hostility from both ethnic groups, fears of 
extinction on both sides, and the existence of opportunity for mobilization leading to 
hostile situations. These hostile situations are followed by mass hostility, which created 
elites like Soekarno and Daud Bereueh. Eventually, their politics of myths and symbols 
created hostile emotions among their supporters and thus, conflict arose.  
 
B. Myths justifying hostility 
The Acehnese used the myth of Islam as a way to fight against the Dutch colony, 
the non-believers of Islam, concretely created by the Hikayat Perang Sabil (the Epic of 
the Holy War) for the devoted Muslim of Aceh.115 The Daud Bereueh used his power as 
an Islamic scholar leader of the Acehnese to revive this myth in order to gain support 
from the Acehnese. He used this support to justify his political agenda and create new 
hatred toward the secular nationalists of Indonesian central government.  Peter G. 
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Riddell116 stated that historically, the Acehnese had their experiences with the colonials, 
starting from the Portuguese in the 16th and the 17th Century and then the Dutch. The 
Acehnese ethnic identity formation began through the anti-colonial campaigns, using the 
Islamic value and its myths as their core political culture. In the 16th and the 17th Century, 
the Acehnese identified themselves as the ‘Serambi Mecca’ to shows their identity as the 
most devoted territory and people to Islam. At that time, the Acehnese dealt with 
violence, which became an effective catalyst in identity formation. The contact with the 
Ottoman Turkish authorities led to the acquisition of significant material assistance. The 
Aceh sent various envoys to Sulaiman the Great in Constantine in 1563, requesting help 
against the Portuguese. Furthermore, this sense of pan-Islamic authority overriding pan-
Malays sentiment is found in the developing perception of final authority laying not with 
the Acehnese, but with significant people in the Muslim heartlands of Mecca.  
Here, the Acehnese identified themselves as the strong believers of Islam because 
they feel significantly related to the Ottoman Empire in Turks. More importantly, they 
felt bound with the people in the Muslim heartlands of Mecca and it implies that the 
Acehnese felt more devoted to Islam than the rest of the Indonesia ethnic groups.  These 
myths and symbols of Islam and its relationship with the Mecca Muslim community 
allow the Acehnese to justify hostile conditions against non-believers and secular 
Javanese ethnic groups. This hostility is present after the revolution from 1945 to 1949 
and fueled the debate of the formation of the Indonesian Islamic state.  
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Under the Dutch periods, the Acehnese wrote their ethnic literature on the epics of 
Hikayat Perang Sabil (HPS), also known as jihad or the Holy War. This HPS myth-
symbols complex is a very important text that was used by the Acehnese in fighting the 
Dutch colonialism. The Acehnese persisted with the tradition and rhetoric of Holy War, a 
belief that had been deeply rooted among the Acehnese people.117 This is the language of 
the Moslem community that glorifies the heroism of the sabililah, from Arabic, which 
means one that dies for the faith. The Acehnese has emerged as heroes seeking death as 
the only means towards the highest self-fulfillment. This passion to kill those enemies 
who are not Muslim brings social and spiritual merit. In this case, the enemies were the 
colonials who were non-believers of Islam. 
The myth-symbol complex becomes one of the key aspects that is increasing 
hostility through chauvinism or warrior (leader) ethos, in which they believe that their 
own group is greater and better than the other groups. The myths can be re-portrayed by 
elites to create such hostile conditions. Using the myth-symbol complex that is already 
familiar, the elite uses and propagates these myths as a way to achieve legitimacy. The 
myth of Perang Sabil (Holy War) was used by the Daud Bereueh movement under the 
Darul Islam movement as a means to fight in the name of Islamic religion against the 
non-believers of Islam and the Javanese ethnic group through the Indonesian central 
government. This myth has been exaggerated to justify the hostile situation and mobilize 
the ethnic war.  
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Moreover, during the revolutionary period from 1945 to 1949 the Acehnese 
gathered with the rest of the Indonesians, including the Javanese, to fight against the 
Dutch who intended to return to the ex-Dutch East Indies territory. The Acehnese used 
the myth in fighting the kaphee or non-believers of Islam against the Dutch. This myth 
was meant to demonize the Dutch and create a symbol for religious fighting against the 
Christian Dutch. As a result the Acehnese elites and the ulama (Islamic scholars) gained 
full popular support from the Acehnese people.118 The Acehnese symbolized the struggle 
of revolution and together with the rest of Indonesia defended Islam from the Dutch. 
Obviously, the Acehnese are strong believers of Islam and thus they are willing to share 
the revolutionary struggle with the rest of Indonesian because both parties have the same 
religion. 
However, after the revolution ended, the Indonesian central government upset the 
Acehnese by not using Islamic law and instead used Pancasila as the states basic 
principle to unite all religions, cultures, languages, and demographic differences. Hence, 
the Acehnese made an expression to demonize the Indonesian central government saying 
habis manis sepah dibuang (meaning “after the sugar cane has been chewed it is thrown 
away”). The Acehnese success in the Indonesian revolution had been forgotten once the 
Dutch were defeated and Indonesia gained its independence in 1945.119 This expression 
created the myth that the Acehnese started to hate the Indonesian central government, 
which was dominated by the Javanese ethnic group. In other words, the Acehnese made 
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an expression of dissatisfaction to mythologize the secular Indonesian central government 
as an inconsistent party. This myth further legitimized the Acehnese creation of hostile 
attitudes toward the Indonesian central government.  
In line with the Acehnese expression, the Acehnese mythologize the Indonesian 
central government, which is dominated by the Javanese. Arguing their intentions are 
similar to the Dutch intention, which wanted to make Aceh a secular or non-Islamic 
territory. The Dutch fought against the Acehnese ulama or Islamic scholars to 
Christianize the Acehnese. Meanwhile the Indonesian central government under 
Soekarno’s leadership wanted to make a unitary Indonesian state by making all 
territories, including Aceh, form under the secular state based on Pancasila. 
Consequently, the Indonesian central government duplicating the Dutch colonial 
strategies by followed the policies applied by the Dutch in Java.  
In fact, in a disappointing meeting with the first Indonesian president of Soekarno 
in Kutaraja in 1948, the president only promised the Acehnese he would try to make 
Aceh an Islamic region. Soekarno emphasized his reluctance of an Islamic Indonesian 
state and only stated that Indonesia would be based on Islamic principles, which believes 
in God, to include the Pancasila.120 This behavior of the Soekarno was influenced by the 
myth of power in the Javanese political culture. Pancasila is based on the concept of the 
power of Javanese culture, which stipulates that power would increase if the leader could 
unite the heterogeneous groups of Indonesia under his leadership. Hence, it implies that 
the Pancasila as state principles is clearly referred to the concept of power of the 
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Javanese culture.121 In this context, the Acehnese see the Pancasila as derived from the 
Javanese culture that dominated the Indonesian central government. This government 
also appears to want to dominate Aceh territory.  
Furthermore, the Acehnese ulama, which gathers in Persatuan Ulama Seluruh 
Aceh (PUSA, all Aceh Religious Scholars’ Association), has become the opposition of 
the Javanese oriented Indonesian central government. This is because the Indonesian 
central government consider the ulama strongly supported by the Acehnese people in 
struggling for the Islamic state.122 In this sense, the ulama create the myth of non-
believers of Islam for the Indonesian central government because the central government 
unwilling to uphold the Islamic law of Indonesian state through the Piagam Jakarta 
(Jakarta Charter).123 Hence, it justifies any ulama’s actions to uphold the Islamic state in 
Aceh and thus this Islamic myth justify the hostile attitudes.  
At the national level, it was the ideological competition between the nationalists 
versus Islamic groups in frame of nation-building process. The nationalist groups prefer 
to uphold the secular ideology of Pancasila as the Indonesian state philosophy. 
Meanwhile, a number of Islamic groups favor the Jakarta Charter in order to uphold the 
                                                             
121 Benedict Anderson, Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia (Ithaca, London: 
Cornell University Press, 1990), 26. 
122 Nazzaruddin Sjamsuddin, The Republican Revolt: A Study of the Acehnese Rebellion, 48-49. 
123 Martin van Bruinessen, “Islamic state or state Islam? Fifty years of state-Islam relations in Indonesia,” 
in Indonesien am Ende des 20 edited by Ingrid Wessel (Jahrhunderts, Hamburg: 1996), 22-23. Liem Soei 
Liong, “Indonesian Muslims and the State: Accommodation or Revolt?” Third World Quarterly 10, no. 2 
(1988): 869-896. See also Nadirsyah Hosen, “Religion and the Indonesian Constitution: A Recent Debate,” 
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 36, no. 3 (2005): 419. 
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Islamic identity in the state philosophy.124 Moreover in 1949, an Islamic group called the 
Darul Islam movement, which the Acehnese merge with, arose in West Java. Under the 
leadership of Sekar Madji Kartosuwiryo it responded to the competition between the 
nationalist and Islamic groups. The Darul Islam movement’s objective was to create a 
Negara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic State) as republic. Kartosuwiryo thus 
symbolized the pioneer of the modern Islamic group movement in Indonesia.125 
In short, the Acehnese revived the “ancient hatred” toward the kaphee Dutch, 
which dominated Aceh and tried to Christianize and oppresse the Acehnese. Hence, the 
image of the Dutch colonists became one of non-believers of Islam and the oppressors of 
the Acehnese. In the same way, the Acehnese recreated a modern hatred toward the 
secular Javanese oriented Indonesia central government as the non-believers of Islam and 
the oppressors of the Acehnese. This myth was to justify their movement to make the 
Indonesian state an Islamic state because the Acehnese perceived themselves as strong 
believers of Islam.126  
The Javanese Indonesian myths. The Javanese are the majority ethnic group in 
Indonesia, until recently they comprised 40.6% of the Indonesian populations.127 The 
Javanese ethnic group dominates the national structure of Indonesia. Furthermore, the ex-
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Dutch capital for the Dutch East Indies was in Batavia, which is located on Java Island. It 
has become the centre of Indonesia. All central economic, political, social and even 
cultural ideologies are on Java Island. Hence, it is no wonder that the Javanese dominate 
the Indonesian government. For the newly independent government, Aceh, just as it was 
for the old colonial authorities in Batavia or Jakarta, revealed to be a remarkably complex 
region to control. The Javanese people called and described the Acehnese as a “stubborn” 
people.128  
On the other hand, the mythologies of Javanese culture, that is the concept of 
power were obviously the main symbols for the Javanese Indonesian central government 
under Soekarno leadership. This symbol brought conflict with the regions that did not 
want to obey them. The myth of the Javanese concept of power had influenced Soekarno 
in implementing various policies to all regions and affected the way the Indonesian 
central government behaves. The concept of power in the Javanese culture required that if 
a leader wants to have the ultimate power then he must be able to unite all different 
sources of power. For example, Indonesia is a perfect imagined community that unites all 
differences such as ethnic groups, religions, or even culture.129 Hence, the motto of 
Indonesia is “Bhineka Tunggal Ika” or unity in diversity.130  
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Another example is the Pancasila. Pancasila is the concept of unifying the 
diversity that exists in Indonesia as the philosophical basis of the state. The first principle 
of Pancasila stated that the Indonesian belief of “One Lordship”. Here, the Indonesian 
people admit religions that exist in Indonesia and thus; it also mean that Indonesia 
through the leader (president) unites the religions diversity. It implies that Indonesia 
wanted to harmonize the differences through unifying all differences. For instance, the 
policy of not granting Aceh an autonomous status and then including them in the North 
of Sumatra was meant to unify the diversity. In this sense, Soekarno attempted to unite 
Aceh, which is predominantly a Muslim area with the predominantly Christian area of 
North of Sumatra. This decision was meant to increase his power over the regions in 
Indonesia as the single political entity.  
Soekarno’s interests for national unity were part of his concern attributed to the 
Javanese cultural myth about a dispersion of power. Hence, he directed the Pancasila 
ideological foundation, which referred to the 1928 nationalist struggle of the Sumpah 
Pemuda (Oath of Youth). The Sumpah Pemuda was an Indies-wide youth congress, 
which declared that the future independent republic would create “satu bangsa, satu 
bahasa, and satu tanah air” (one people, one language, and one nation).131 The Sumpah 
Pemuda mythologizes the Javanese Indonesian central government and military to guard 
Indonesian independence and guarantee the diverse nation comprising hundreds of ethnic 
groups and religions. Hence, when the Acehnese had spoken out against the Islamic 
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Indonesian ideological foundation, the Javanese Indonesian central government claimed 
that the Acehnese were betraying the Sumpah Pemuda Oath. Therefore, the Sumpah 
Pemuda Oath myth was justifying hostility of the Javanese Indonesian government.  
Furthermore, in the concept of power of the Javanese stated, “power does not 
raise the question of legitimacy.”132 The Javanese Indonesian central government 
implemented the policy toward the Acehnese without an agreement between the central 
government and the Aceh regions declaring it was justifiable. Hence this myth of power, 
in this context, is justifying hostile attitudes of the Javanese to oppress the Acehnese. In 
addition, the myth of Java as the centre of power and the belief that the leader is justified 
to act in any means to make the followers obey legitimizes the use of violence, conflict, 
and even war.  
 
C. Fears of extinction  
The Acehnese fears. According to Nazzaruddin Sjamsuddin, in his book “The 
Republican Revolt: A study of the Acehnese Rebellion,” soon after the revolutionary 
period ended in 1949, the Acehnese began to ask that the future of the Indonesian state to 
be an Islamic state rather than a secular state. Initially, the Acehnese were successful in 
channeling their demand to make an Aceh province based on the Islamic Law through 
Syafruddin Prawiranegara, the Deputy Prime Minister.133 In December 1949, this demand 
responded without restraint by Syafruddin Prawiranegara, acting as the Head of the 
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Pemerintah Darurat Republic Indonesia (PDRI, Temporary Government of the Republic 
of Indonesia), to established the province of Aceh. In addition, he also appointed the 
military region of Aceh as the governor of Aceh. On the contrary, the Indonesian Prime 
Minister Abdul Halim soon rejected the Acehnese demand, even though the Acehnese 
gained the approval of Syafruddin Prawiranegara. Even more, Soekarno, the Indonesian 
president, did not support the idea of Indonesian Islamic state.134  
It implies that the imagined community of Indonesia under the Republic of 
Indonesia was the unity of all culture, religion, and ethnic groups that exist in the ex-
Netherland colonial territory. While the Acehnese’s imagined political community was 
an Islamic Indonesian state. The distinct imagined political community between the 
Acehnese and the Indonesian central government was influenced by the dominant culture 
in each party. The Indonesian central government under Soekarno leadership was 
influenced by the Javanese culture. The Javanese culture influenced Soekarno to unite all 
regions of ex-Netherlands colonies.135 Historically, the period of Sultanate in Aceh was 
viewed as the first Islamic Kingdom, Kingdom of Peureulak, to be recognized in the 
region of Southeast Asia.136 Therefore, the Acehnese and the Javanese Indonesian 
government had different the imagined communities. In this sense, the Acehnese felt 
threaten by the fact that the dominant Javanese ethnic group wanted to make domination 
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through assimilation program under the secular “imagined community” state of 
Indonesia.  
Specifically, the Acehnese felt threaten by the decision of the Indonesian central 
government policy to included Aceh in the North Sumatra Province. The Acehnese 
feared the loss of their identity as Acehnese, which is a devoted Muslim region. The 
Acehnese see Islam, as their religion, as the symbol that drove them to fight against the 
Dutch before Indonesian independence and in the revolutionary period of Indonesian in 
1945 to 1949. The Acehnese thought that their ethnic group’s existence is at risk. These 
fears were inflated by emotion and feelings of the in and out-group. The Acehnese felt 
that they were not part of the North Sumatra Province because they have distinct 
characteristics, historical heritages, and cultural differences. Hence, the Acehnese were 
reluctant to be included in the North of Sumatra Province because they fear being 
dominated by the non-Aceh, Christian, and secular people in North Sumatra and Java 
area. This condition can confirm an unfriendly manner to the other groups.  
Historically, the Acehnese had long experience of being dominated by the Dutch 
as a colony in Aceh. The Acehnese had been dominated and been the victims of the 
Dutch domination, and thus this condition triggered fears of the Acehnese ethnic groups 
extinction under the Indonesian central government. Furthermore, the myth of 
domination plays an important role in creating the fears of the dominated group. Once 
fears exist in a group, it justifies any violence in the name of self-defense. Such fears and 
threats facilitate the Acehnese ethnic group mobilization to defend themselves. For 
example, the Dutch oppressed the Acehnese especially the ulama, the informal 
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Acehnese leaders and Islamic scholars, as a form of domination to show their superiority 
over the Acehnese. The myth of the Dutch and the Javanese Indonesian domination 
create such fears for the Acehnese and more importantly creates the feelings of hatred 
and revenge to the rival group. In this case the rival group is the Javanese Indonesian 
central government.  
In addition, the Acehnese have a long history dealing with the Sumatra area. 
Since the 1500’s, before the Acehnese dealt with the Dutch, the Acehnese perceived 
themselves as a single nation. This single nation even ruled over the Sumatra territory. 
However, the coming of the Dutch to the Aceh land significantly changed the situation. 
The Acehnese fell short in their rule over the other Sumatran territories. Even more, the 
Acehnese and Aceh territory was dominated by East Sumatra.137 This situation shows 
that the Acehnese, psychologically, could not accept the domination of a non-Acehnese 
leader in Aceh because they fear being dominated by the non-Acehnese in their own 
home.  
However, the Indonesian central government has simply called this fear as only a 
regional sentiment.138 The Indonesian central government did not recognize the 
psychological development of the Acehnese, which could stimulate the power of ethnic 
group fear to provoke ethnic mobilization and violence in the form of a revolt. The 
Indonesian central government’s policy of uniting the Aceh area with the North of 
Sumatra Province offended the Acehnese and fueled the fear of non-Acehnese 
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domination. Therefore, the Acehnese felt threaten by the policy and such fears facilitate 
the Acehnese ethnic group mobilization to defend themselves.   
The Javanese Indonesian fears. The formation of Indonesia as an imagined 
community is the final answer for the Javanese Indonesian central government. Which 
derived from the Sumpah Pemuda myth that there was demand to unite a nation from all 
the ex-Dutch East Indies territories under one banner of Indonesia despite the differences 
of ethnic languages, religions, territories, and ideologies. This myth of Sumpah Pemuda 
had created a strong state philosophical foundation, which is the Pancasila. The 
Pancasila, the five principles, was designed to establish a political compromise. 
Pancasila could construct a common platform on which all competing ideologies could 
meet and yet not threaten the essential unity of the Republic. Soekarno even emphasis 
that National unity will be threatens if one exclusive ideology, Islam in particular, were to 
be enshrined as the basis of the state for all citizens.139 Hence, it implies that the national 
unity will be threaten if there is an ideology dominating one another or if one region is 
unwilling to unite because of the ideological, religions, culture or languages differences. 
In this sense, there will be no Indonesia as a nation if each of the regions of the ex-Dutch 
East Indies is unwilling to gather in one nation of Indonesia. This illustrates the fear of 
the dominant ethnic group of Javanese because they have lost their power or domination 
over the rest of the Indonesian territory. This insecure condition could create a hostile 
manner toward the rival group.  
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The Javanese Indonesian government feels insecure because the Acehnese have 
disrupted the creation of the Indonesian state. The Acehnese actions stimulate a hostile 
manner for the Javanese. These psychological developments rationalize fear to provoke 
ethnic mobilization, conflict, or even to act in the deadliest violence, genocide. The myth 
of national unity of Indonesia plays important roles in exposing that the Acehnese 
embarrass the Javanese ethnic group. The Acehnese felt that they had been very loyal to 
the Javanese Indonesian central government and that is the reason the Acehnese 
demanded their own province and asked Islamic law be used as the Indonesian state 
philosophical foundation. In fact, this Javanese fear justifies any violence in order to keep 
the national unity, as self-defense, under the secular Indonesian state. Such fear and 
threats stimulate the ethnic group mobilization to defend on their belief for self-defense.  
 
D. Opportunity to mobilization 
The ethnic conflict or war will take place if freedom for the ethnic group to 
mobilize is present with no state’s repression. Aceh, under the Soekarno period, had 
significant opportunity to mobilize the Acehnese ethnic group because the Acehnese, 
especially the ulama, dominated the local rulers and local government structures. It had 
shown the Indonesian situation after gaining its independence from the Japanese in 1945. 
The period after Indonesian independence was the period of reclaiming the independence 
from the Dutch and maintaining the stability of domestic politics of Indonesian as a state 
and nation. This situation was illustrating the ignorance of the Indonesian central 
government toward the regions and thus it creates the feeling of regional sentiment as an 
opportunity to revolt toward the ignorant central government.  
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The Indonesia state, at this time, was vulnerable and combined with President 
Soekarno’s centralizing policy created the opportunity for ethnic conflict or war in 
Indonesia. As Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin points out, vulnerable states like Indonesia 
typically establish control in their central territory to gain order. In exchange for 
maintaining order, these regional leaders are given power to control what passes in the 
institutions of the state in their regions.  Soekarno aimed to centralize power under his 
leadership in 1950’s by supporting his own cabinet, the loyal regional leader such as the 
North Sumatra leader, and regional military, to challenge the Acehnese leader, the ulama. 
The process weakened state institutions in regions like Aceh and Sumatra because the 
threatened ulama used their local institutions to keep power. One result of this process 
was the rise of regional sentiment from the East and North Sumatra regions, with 
Soekarno supporting the North and East Sumatra challengers.140  In Aceh, the local 
leaders of ulama were strongly supported by the Acehnese because the Acehnese were 
very dependent on the religious leaders. For this reason, the Indonesian central 
government attempted to disengage the Acehnese from their ulama so that it could gain 
control. For example, the Indonesian central government dropped the Acehnese leaders 
and upheld the non-Acehnese leadership in Aceh territory.141 This process showed the 
ignorance of the Indonesian central government’s policy with respect to the prevailing 
local conditions. This created the opportunity needed for the regional sentiment to 
mobilize the ethnic group into using conflict or war.  
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The Acehnese people felt embarrassed by the central government‘s treatment of 
the ulama. Here, the Acehnese value system was deeply based on Islam. Hence, the 
Acehnese would no doubt have opposed any contradiction to religious values. Obviously, 
the insult to the ulama, as their religion’s teachers, was against the Islamic religion. This 
gave the ulama the opportunity to mobilize. For example, the effect of the policy for 
putting non-Acehnese in the Aceh region was unacceptable behavior for the non-
Acehnese. This policy ignored the local norms and beliefs allowing gambling and alcohol 
consumption, inappropriate relationships between men and women, and even the 
institutionalization of prostitution. The policies for putting the non-Acehnese in 
bureaucratic structure in Aceh had seriously distracted from the Acehnese values system. 
Therefore, it affects the image of the Indonesian central government in Aceh through its 
official’s inappropriate behavior.  In this sense, the ulama, as the Acehnese religious 
leader, used their own resources to fight back. The ulama fought back using the threat of 
force in the name of Islam as their religion. The politicization of religion and the 
militarization of politics could not be kept separate for long. Fueled by Soekarno’s policy 
concerning the demand of Aceh Province to be separated from the North of Sumatra 
Province and the Islamic Law as the Indonesian state philosophy rather than the secular 
Pancasila, the result was political violence along religious lines. Another opportunity 
factor was demographic concentration.  As Monica Duffy Toft shows, the existence of 
regional concentration of a certain group is a required condition for ethnic insurgence, 
while certain groups almost never rebel.142  This factor detected in Aceh, as most the 
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Acehnese was concentrated in the tip of the northern of Sumatra. Hence, the Acehnese 
fulfilled one of the necessary conditions of insurgency to revolt against the Indonesian 
central government.  
In mid-1951, the Acehnese disappointment toward the Indonesian central 
government heard by Kartosuwirjo, the highest leader of Negara Islam Indonesia (NII, 
Indonesian Islamic Nation). In early 1952, Kartosuwirjo instantly sent his representative, 
Abdul Fatah, alias Mustafa, to approach Daud Bereueh. Abdul Fatah gave a copy 
Kartosuwirjo’s dakwah (religious explanation) on the Darul Islam movement and 
requested Daud Bereueh and his loyal followers of the Acehnese to merge with the Darul 
Islam movement.  The Kartosuwirjo’s dakwah mostly contained Islamic ideological 
justification of the Darul Islam movement in Indonesia to convince Daud Bereueh of the 
religious movement in the name of Islam. In early 1953 the Darul Islam encouraged the 
Daud Bereauh to prepare the military supports. Daud Bereueh gained the military support 
from Persatuan Bekas Pejuang Aceh (Association of the Veterans of Aceh) and the 
Pandu Islam (Islamic Boy Scout) as the youth military forces.143 The joining of the Darul 
Islam and the support from the local military have created the opportunity for the Daud 
Bereueh to mobilize the Acehnese to revolt against the Indonesian central government. 
 
E. Mass hostility 
The Acehnese hostility toward the Javanese Indonesian. While myths justifying 
hostility sometimes remain hidden in a society, those in Indonesia did not. The negative 
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stereotypes of kaphee (non-believers of Islam) Javanese generated chauvinistic feelings 
among the Acehnese over the Indonesian central government. This was because the 
Javanese, under Soekarno leadership, rejected the implementation of the Islamic law 
based on the Jakarta Charter as the Indonesian state philosophy. In addition, the 
Acehnese also put the negative stereotype of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI, 
Indonesian National Military) since the ended of the revolutionary period of 1945 to 1949 
as the non-believers’ army. Seeing these attitudes, Aspinall argues that the basic mind-set 
of the Acehnese in Aceh is ethno-religious chauvinism. Furthermore, he argues that this 
attitude case from the formation of identification of the Acehnese with the dominant local 
culture as ‘‘Aceh [nese] is identical with Islam.” Hence, he argues that the Acehnese 
become fluctuating and unpredictable neighbors.144 Thus, these negative images of the 
Javanese as kaphee people have been persistently expressed and preserved in Aceh 
society.   
The existence of negative attitudes of the Javanese and their supporters has also 
been confirmed in Aceh society. The Acehnese rejected and labeled the Javanese 
Indonesian central government as kaphee because the non-Acehnese government officials 
in the Aceh local government had really bad behavior such as gambling, drinking liquor, 
or even engage in prostitution. These values are against the Acehnese local values and 
beliefs. Moreover, the Acehnese describes the Javanese Indonesian central government 
and its supporters as similar to the kaphee Dutch. The Javanese have a very similar 
attitude to the Dutch, betraying and acting in inconsistent manners toward the Acehnese. 
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For example, the Acehnese success in supporting the Indonesian revolution through 
blood and wealth had been forgotten once the Dutch were defeated and Indonesian 
independence was gained. More importantly, the Acehnese defense in the Indonesian 
national revolution period of 1945-1949 was forgotten.145 In general, the Javanese 
Indonesian government under Soekarno leadership maintained a secular or kaphee 
behavior that cannot be trusted. It is important to note that this negative image of the 
Javanese showing the Acehnese feelings of hostility were obviously strong and 
widespread throughout Aceh territory.  
The Javanese Indonesian hostility toward the Acehnese. The explicit Javanese 
attitude toward the Acehnese was a negative stereotype that had to be stamped out. The 
stubborn myth symbolize that the Acehnese had always many demands of the Indonesian 
central government. For example, the Acehnese insisted on to implementation of Islamic 
Law of the Jakarta Charter as the Indonesian state basis philosophy was a concrete form 
of stubborn people. Another example of the myth of the Acehnese being stubborn was 
their rejection to be included to the North of Sumatra Province in 1950’s. The Daud 
Bereueh, as the leader of the Acehnese, kept claiming that even though the Indonesian 
central government remained passively silent concerning the existence of the Province of 
Aceh, it did exist. In early September 1950, Daud Bereueh strongly banned the regional 
Information Office to spread out the information about the Indonesian central 
government’s policy of the establishment of the Province of North Sumatra, which 
included Aceh. More importantly, at the end of October 1950, Daud Bereueh left Aceh 
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and went to Java to convince the Indonesian central government to recognize the 
Province of Aceh. His reason to go by himself was because he thought that the Javanese 
would respect him for his loyalty during the revolutionary period.146 In this sense Daud 
Bereueh, as the Acehnese representative, became really forceful and demanding of the 
Javanese Indonesian central government. Thus, the Javanese describe the Acehnese as the 
stubborn people who did not obey their decision.  Therefore, it creates a negative 
stereotype and attitudes of the disobedient Acehnese in the eyes of the Javanese 
Indonesian central government. In the myth of the Javanese culture of power, the ruled 
people must obey the ruler and more importantly, the ruled people never ask the ruler 
decision on them as the follower.147 The Javanese myth of the conceptions of the proper 
relations between ruler and ruled is that the relations between ruler and ruled did not 
allow for any social contract system of mutual obligations between the ruler and ruled.148 
It implies that the rulers always know what is best for the community and the ruled 
people need only to do what the ruler order to them.  
In addition, the patron-client model is a perfect model to explain the relation 
between the central of Javanese Indonesian central government (patron) and the regions 
such as Aceh (client). Anderson points out that the patron-client model is parallel to the 
elite-mass approach, which is symbolized by the terms of pemimpin and rakyat. The term 
pemimpin referred to the leader or elites, while the term rakyat referred to the people or 
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the masses. It assumed that the rakyat are those who are the party that unintelligent, while 
the pemimpin are more knowledgeable.149  
The case of Soekarno as pemimpin and his relations with the rakyat was as the 
penyambung lidah rakyat (literally means “the extension of the people’s tongue” or vox 
populi).150 Any words or statements from Soekarno for the Javanese are more like orders. 
In the case of Aceh, when Soekarno was reluctant to approve the existence of the 
Province of Aceh, it implies that the Javanese follow on what Soekarno said to the 
Acehnese to obey the pemimpin.  Therefore, the Acehnese disobedience to Soekarno 
created a series of negative feelings and attitudes from Javanese toward the Acehnese. 
This myth of Javanese power relations between the ruler and the ruled has created hostile 
attitudes of the Javanese Indonesian central government to take actions toward the 
Acehnese as rakyat who do not want to obey the ruler of Indonesia. 
  
F. Hostile mobilization (The process of mobilization for war) 
Aceh was the only region that escaped from the Dutch reoccupation in the 
revolutionary period. For this reason Aceh constituted a practically independent region. 
The ulama (Islamic scholars) directly took the position in Aceh and established an 
independent region from the Dutch. The ulama became the forerunner of resistance 
against the Dutch colonial expansion in Aceh territory. Hence, in this logic, Syafruddin 
Prawiranegara, the Deputy Prime Minister, declared Aceh as a separate province from the 
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North Sumatra Province. Nevertheless, the Indonesian central government declared plans 
to include Aceh into North Sumatra Province in August 1950.151 The Indonesian central 
government triggered many conflicting events that lead to the first Acehnese conflict 
against the Indonesian central government.  
Furthermore, the Aceh provincial representative assembly supported the 
Indonesian central government. The Aceh representative controversially supported and 
showed their loyalty to the Indonesian central government, which on the contrary to the 
Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh (well known as PUSA, or Aceh Islamic Scholars 
Association) shown their disagreement. The PUSA members felt threatened by this 
situation. Hence, the PUSA threaten to retreat their members from the provincial 
government. Seeing this condition, the Indonesian central government with Prime 
Minister Muhammad Natsir, persuaded the leader of PUSA, Daud Bereueh, to gather in 
an integral nation-state of Indonesia based on the unity of diversity basis. However, 
Natsir’s persuasion to Daud Bereueh failed and met a dead end.  
Consequently, the Indonesian central government took actions through the 
changing of the administrative personnel in Aceh region. It was a Javanese who became 
the chief of administration in Aceh. More importantly, the Indonesian central government 
transferred the local military units to the other islands such as the Sulawesi Island and 
replaced them with troops from outside the Acehnese. Another change made by the 
Indonesian central government was the usage of the Acehnese that against the existence 
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of PUSA. These people formed an organization of Badan Keinsafan Rakyat (BKR, 
People’s Consciousness Agency) to replace the incapable PUSA members of the 
provincial government personnel.  The reaction of the PUSA and the Acehnese local 
military toward the Indonesian central government was the resignation of some PUSA 
members from the Aceh provincial government and the resignation of the Acehnese local 
military. Hence, the PUSA members and the Acehnese local military made propaganda to 
the Acehnese people about the wrong policy of the Indonesian central government.152  
Even more, by the end of November 1951, sixteen ulama of PUSA were arrested 
and put behind the bars in Medan.153 Those arrested were related to the campaign of anti-
Indonesian central government and BKR and none of the arrested ulama were brought to 
court. The anti-PUSA people under the leadership of Tarmuli went to Daud Bereueh’s 
home in Kutaraja and when they arrived they shouted insults at him several yelled, “the 
head of the killers and looters.” 154 At the same time, they chased Daud Bereueh into the 
backyard, with some soldiers threatening to shoot him. The provocation was intended to 
provoke the PUSA to act and to show the domination of the Indonesian central 
government through the BKR and formal local military that filled by non-Acehnese.  
More importantly, in 1953, the tensions were increasing as the 1955 Indonesian 
national general election approached. The tensions at the national level were over the 
ideological conflict between the proponent of Islamic state and the opponent of the 
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Islamic state or the secular parties. The national tensions between the Islamic state 
supporters and the secular nationalist supporters were relevant to the tensions in Aceh 
region. A central symbolic event that connects the national and Aceh situation was the 
All-Indonesian ulama conference in Medan-North Sumatra in April 1953. At this 
conference, hostile attitudes came out explicitly from the ulama in Indonesia by sending 
the massages to the people around Indonesia of final decision to make an Indonesia 
Islamic state. More significantly, the national ulama conference was held under the 
chairmanship of the representative of the Aceh ulama or PUSA leader, Daud Bereueh. 
After the conference, Daud Bereueh directly took a trip all over Aceh to propagate the 
ulama conference decision.155  
Under Daud Bereueh’s leadership, the PUSA members who agreed on devoted 
Islamic values and the formation of the Indonesian Islamic state created para-military 
units. The two units of the para-military recruitment were the para-military Boy Scout 
Organization (Pandu Organisasi) and Ex-revolutionary Troops of Aceh Veterans (Bekas 
Pejuang Aceh). Daud Bereueh organized these two para-military organizations in 
preparation of the making of an Indonesian Islamic state. The Daud Bereueh movement 
invoked the Acehnese communal mythology. At that time, Daud Bereueh invoked an 
Islamic mythology rather that an ethnic or nationalist mythology. For the Acehnese, 
Islam being a communal religion and ideology, and at the same time it was also the 
Acehnese way of life that have a certain territory for the exercise of its belief and 
teachings and for the religious rule of Shari’a (Islamic laws) and adapt laws.  
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On September 20, 1953, Daud Bereueh declared the formation of the Islamic state 
of Indonesia under the banner of Darul Islam movement. At the same time, the 
declaration of the Islamic State of Indonesia followed by the well-planed attacks by the 
Boy Scout Organization (Pandu Organisasi) and Ex-revolutionary Troops of Aceh 
Veterans (Bekas Pejuang Aceh) to several Indonesian military and police unit posts in 
most of the district (Kabupaten) in Aceh. On September 21, 1953, Daud Bereueh cleverly 
took the opportunity to mobilize the Acehnese ethnic group to arise the rebellion under 
the banner of Darul Islam movement when Soekarno, the first president of Indonesia, 
opened the National Sports Week in Medan. Daud Bereueh proclaimed the establishment 
of Negara Islam Indonesia (NII, Islamic State of Indonesia) in Aceh. He declared the NII 
by announce his political manifesto in Indrapuri village in south of Kutaraja. His political 
manifesto was the justification of his rebellion because he acknowledge that the 
Acehnese consider their territory as the “doorstep of Mecca”, which historically their 
resistance used the Islamic myth-symbols to fight against the Dutch colonial. It implies 
that the Acehnese used chauvinist and Islamic myth-symbols complex mobilization in 
their struggle against the Javanese Indonesian central government.  
Daud Bereueh, on his political manifestation, stated that politics is part of Islam 
as their religion they believe in and thus, Islam should be the basic foundation of 
Indonesia nation-state. He demonize the President of Soekarno in the first place because 
he consider that Soekarno did not understand about Islam by stated “ Our God has said: 
Any one who does not practice the laws established by God is an Infidel.” 156 Moreover, 
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he called the secular laws was a chaotic laws that should be replaced by the Islamic laws. 
More importantly, Daud Bereueh provokes the Acehnese in his political manifestation by 
saying that he warns the Indonesian central government not to used physical violence 
through armies. However, Daud Bereueh stated that if the Indonesian central government 
insisted to use the military and then Daud Bereueh claimed ready used his military and 
arms in facing the infidel Indonesian central government.157  
The Aceh political manifestation implies that Daud Bereueh felt fear of their 
ethnic group existence was at risk. These conditions confirm a hostile manner to the 
Indonesian central government. He portrayed the Acehnese as the victims of the secular 
Indonesian central government. The Acehnese mythologize their experiences of being 
dominated by the Dutch and been the victim of the Dutch colonial domination and Daud 
Bereueh re-emerge this fear in dealing with the policy of the Indonesian central 
government and thus, this condition trigger fears of the Acehnese ethnic group extinction. 
At the same time, this situation forms revenge to the oppressors, the Indonesian central 
government. Once fears arise in the Acehnese ethnic group, it justifies any actions, 
including the deadliest violence, in the name of self-defense. Here, such fears and threats 
facilitate the Acehnese mobilization to defend themselves, even though it was the 
Acehnese are the ones who aggressively create the conflicts.  
This political manifestation proclaimed when most of the provincial government 
of Aceh were in Medan to attend the national sport week. All channels and instrument of 
communication between Aceh and Medan were cut-off. With this situation, the Tentara 
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Islam Indonesia (TII, Islamic Army of Indonesia) took chances to mobilize the Acehnese 
to prepare with weapons and rifles in villages ready to attacks the closest towns.  
Soon, the Acehnese elites began manipulating these groups, who came to be 
known as the kaphee (non-believers of Islam), for their own purposes. Such elites also 
overvalued the threat of the Javanese Indonesian central government in public 
propaganda. Therefore, the Acehnese tended to associate all bad behaviors with the 
Javanese Indonesian central government. By this time, the violence seemed out of 
control. The Acehnese were re-emerge perang sabil (holy war in the name of Islam) 
against the kaphee Javanese Indonesian central government. The Acehnese under Darul 
Islam demonize the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI, Indonesian national military) 
associated them as tentara kaphee (the non-believers’ army). The Acehnese chanted the 
Islamic cry of “Allahu Akbar” (God is the Greatest). More over, the Acehnese under 
Darul Islam rebellion exaggerated hostile feeling toward the kaphee Indonesian 
government by using the flag, a white crescent and star on red background.158 The 
Acehnese painted and furnished their houses with this red flag to shows that they support 
the rebellion and to shows their domination over the Aceh territory. 
In early October 1953, the Acehnese under Darul Islam took six of seven 
Kabupaten (towns) and two out of twenty-one kewedanaan (district). The youths, school 
children, teachers, villagers, and even the Acehnese government officials join the 
rebellion. Hence, the Aceh government administration totally malfunctions. The mass 
involvement signed that the rebellion were well prepared by the PUSA members long 
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before the outbreak.159 Instantly, conflicts between the Acehnese and the Indonesian 
military were unavoidable. More than 4000 people died in defending their beliefs on the 
conflict between the Acehnese and the Indonesian central government.160 
 
G. Conclusion 
The Daud Bereueh movement centered the theme of ideology was the primary 
motivation for the Acehnese to fight against the Indonesian central government and Islam 
was the main identity that united the Acehnese rebellions under Daud Bereueh 
leadership. The preconditions of the symbolic politics theory for ethnic violence are all 
present in the Acehnese conflict on this period. Opportunity to mobilize, mutually hostile 
mythologies generating emotive symbols of conflict, and ethnic fears steaming from the 
histories of ethnic domination are present in this period. These conditions produced a 
politics of extreme nationalist group of GAM and ethnic hostility.  
The mobilization process of the ethnic war in 1953 was primarily elite-led process 
on both sides. The Javanese Indonesian central government were refuse to granted an 
Aceh province and force the Acehnese to adopt the secular Indonesian national state 
foundation, the Pancasila. Therefore, Soekarno mobilize the military to attack Aceh. 
While Daud Bereueh mobilize the ulama who became the informal local leaders in Aceh 
under the Aceh Islamic Scholars Association (PUSA). He also creates para-military Boy 
Scout Organization (Pandu Organisasi) and Ex-revolutionary Troops of Aceh Veterans 
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(Bekas Pejuang Aceh) to attack the Javanese government in the name of Islamic myth of 
the Islamic state.  
The declaration of the Islamic State of Indonesia followed by the well-planed 
attacks by the Boy Scout Organization and Ex-revolutionary Troops of Aceh Veterans to 
several Indonesian military and police unit posts in most of the district (Kabupaten) in 
Aceh. In September 21, 1953, Daud Bereueh cleverly took the opportunity to mobilize 
the Acehnese ethnic group to arise the rebellion under the banner of Darul Islam 
movement. The Soekaro’s government and their military introduced to restore order 
quickly by counter-insurgency operations. What drove this security dilemma that led to 
conflict were the actions of armed groups and the also the provocations of the elites using 
the Muslim myths, fears of domination over the rival group and chauvinist mobilization 
had make conflict likely to happen in Aceh.  
In chapter 4, I already addressed the puzzle of how myths and symbols, fears, 
opportunity, mass hostility, and hostile mobilization lead to conflicts between the 
Acehnese under Daud Bereueh and the Javanese secular Soekarno regime. After chapter 
4 as the first case study, I will utilize the symbolic politics approach on chapter 5 of the 
second phase of the Acehnese rebellion under Soeharto regime, the second Indonesian 
president and well known as the New Order regime. The goal of chapter 5 is to presents 
deeper explanation on the reasons of the Aceh ethnic conflict under the Javanese 
Soeharto regime from 1969 to 1998 period based on the symbolic politics approach. On 
chapter 5, I will discuss specifically on the hostile myths and symbols, fears of extinction, 
opportunity to mobilization, mass hostility, and chauvinist mobilization. These 
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indicators intend to show the applicability of the symbolic politics theory on Aceh ethnic 
conflict under the Soeharto regime.  
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CHAPTER 5: 
THE ACEHNESE CONFLICTS UNDER SOEHARTO’S PERIOD  
(THE NEW ORDER ERA) 
 
A. Introduction 
The continuation of the Acehnese conflict was started since the changes of the 
Indonesian regimes from the Soekarno’s Old Order period, the first president of 
Indonesia, to the Soeharto’s New Order period, the second president of Indonesia in 1965 
after a military coup. The Acehnese gained the status of Aceh Province in 1959 and two 
years later in 1961 it received Daerah Istimewa (special region) status from Soekarno and 
was guaranteed autonomy of religion, customary Islamic law and education. As a result, 
Daud Bereueh gave up the rebellions against the Indonesian central government. 
However, the relations between the Acehnese and the Indonesian central government 
remained problematic.161  
Ethnic conflict between the Acehnese and the Javanese Indonesian government 
under Soeharto regime occurred because of a fundamental clash between the Acehnese 
myth-symbol complex focused on fears of ethnic (nation) domination and the Javanese 
one emphasizing the sovereignty and the national integrity of the Republic of Indonesia. 
Each party defined dominance in Aceh as an important to its national existence and saw 
the other party aspirations as a threat of group extinction. Aceh itself thus became, for 
both parties, a symbol of national aspirations and of the hostility of the other party. The 
                                                             
161 Edward Aspinall and Mark T. Berger, “The Break Up of Indonesia?” in Third World Quarterly 22 no.6 
(2001): 1016. 
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result was a security dilemma and violence, then a politics of nationalist extremism that 
led to conflict or war. 
This chapter examines the symbolic politics theory on the Acehnese ethnic 
conflicts under the Soeharto’s New Order period from 1969 to 1998. Specifically, my 
discussion will begin by exploring the three necessary conditions of the Acehnese ethnic 
conflict, which are the myths hostility from both conflicted ethnic group, fears of 
extinction from both sides, and the existence opportunity to mobilization the could lead to 
the hostile situations, followed by mass hostility, which created by both elites between 
Soeharto and Hasan di Tiro. Eventually, their politics of myths and symbols create hostile 
emotions among their supporters and thus, conflict arise as a result. 
 
B. Myth justifying hostility 
The Acehnese myths. The myth in the first rebellion of the Acehnese was the 
identity myth of Islam rather than as a nation of the Acehnese ethnic group. The 
Acehnese during the Daud Bereueh era identified themselves as strong believers of Islam 
because, historically, they felt that they had a very strong connection to the Ottoman 
Empire and Mecca as the heartland of Islam and thus, the Acehnese strongly defend their 
identity, as devoted Muslim, by declaring their effort in creating an Indonesian Islamic 
state used the Jakarta Charter. Consequently, the Acehnese through Daud Bereueh 
leadership was revolt under the Darul Islam movement to create Indonesian Islamic state 
by using the Islamic identity myth.  Therefore, conflict was unavoidable between the 
Acehnese and the secular Indonesian central government in 1953.  
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However, the Acehnese rebellion, during the Soeharto’s New Order era, used a 
different myth in provoking the Acehnese people to join the revolt. It was the myth of 
sovereign Aceh state before the Aceh war on March 26, 1873, where the colonial Dutch 
came to annex the land of Aceh. It is Hasan di Tiro who was re-emerging the myth of 
creation of the Negara Aceh Sumatra (Aceh Sumatra State). He proclaimed Negara Aceh 
Sumatra on December 4, 1976 and claimed it as a “Successor State” free from Dutch 
domination and was hand over on December 27, 1949 to Indonesia.162 He also used a 
symbolic language of neo-colonial to describe Indonesia because Indonesia gained and 
continued to rule the ex-Dutch territory in the Dutch East Indies.  
Hasan di Tiro did not formally declare Islam as the foundation of the Acehnese 
national state to create an image of nationalist secular nation that is accepted by the West. 
However, di Tiro still used the myth of Islam as ways to grasp the Acehnese heart 
because di Tiro recognizes the Acehnese have a very high pride of Islam. Hence, it is not 
shocking that di Tiro provoke the supporters of GAM regarded their struggle as a holy 
war (udep sare mate syahid) even though they acknowledge that they were fighting 
against the Indonesian government whose majority were Muslims.163  
Apparently di Tiro acknowledge that the usage of the Islamic slogans, after the 
declaration on December 4, 1976, were not effective to attract the Acehnese Islamic 
scholars (ulama) to the GAM’s side. Hence, Hasan di Tiro introduced new Aceh national 
                                                             
162 M. Isa Sulaiman, “From Autonomy to Periphery: A Critical evaluation of the Acehnese Nationalist 
Movement,“ in Verandah of Violence: The Background to the Aceh Problem, edited by Anthony Reid 
(Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2006), 135. 
163 Ibid. 135. 
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symbols by taking the aspirations from the myths of the Acehnese glory in the past and 
the heroism of the people in fighting the Dutch colonial. It was the myth-symbol of the 
GAM’s flag. Hasan di Tiro present the two myth-symbols in the GAM’s flag to the 
Acehnese was related to the Acehnese Kingdom as an independent nation and to the 
Muslim identity of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the combination of the two myth-
symbols manifested on the flag of GAM as follow: 
Figure 5.1 The  flag of GAM 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_Aceh_Movement 
The first aspiration of the GAM’s flag is related to the heroism and the myth-
symbol of the Acehnese Kingdoms before the Dutch colonial came in to the Aceh nation 
in 1873. The flag of the Aceh government Kingdom, named “Alam Zulfiqar” those made 
by Sultan Ali Mughayat Shah (the first Aceh Sultan) in the 1511-1530 period164, as 
follow: 
 
                                                             
164 This image of the Aceh government kingdom can be found in, 
http://www.chinahistoryforum.com/index.php?s=735fd03b1aa58da4b5a9f774e13d8ee4&showtopic=9865 
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Figure 5.2 The flag of the Aceh government Kingdom (1511-1530) 
 
Source: http://img156.imageshack.us/my.php?image=acehflagalamzulfiqar02mi7.jpg 
This flag was the symbols of the Aceh government of Sultan Ali Mughayat Shah 
that memorizing the glory of the Aceh Kingdom as a nation over the Malays peninsula. 
Di Tiro mythologizes the past glory of the Acehnese Kingdom through the Alam Zulfiqar 
flag. This flag symbolized Aceh as a political entity of a nation. Hasan di Tiro re-emerge 
the myth-symbols of this Aceh nation’s flag aimed to rise of ethnic sentiments with 
claims that the Sultanate of Aceh had previously extended beyond the present 
administrative territory. Di Tiro uses this device to differentiate the Acehnese as a 
separate nation from the Javanese Indonesian nation. Furthermore, di Tiro uses this flag 
myth as a symbol to fight against the dominance Javanese Indonesian oppressor. 
The second aspiration of Hasan di Tiro to use the recent GAM’s flag was related 
to the Ottoman Empire. The relation to the Ottoman Empire symbolized close 
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connections between the Acehnese and the Ottoman Empire as the Centre of the Muslim 
in the world. It implies that the Acehnese identified themselves as strong believers of 
Islam alike in the Ottoman Empire period. It is shown on the similarities between the 
GAM’s flag and the Ottoman Empire’s flag, which had the star and the crescent moon as 
the symbols of Islam, as shown below: 
Figure 5.3 The flag of Ottoman Empire 
 
Source:http://www.chinahistoryforum.com/index.php?s=735fd03b1aa58da4b5a9f774e13d8ee4&showtopic
=9865 
These two myths-symbols’ aspirations had formed the GAM’s flag myth-symbol 
to create a new identity of Acehnese as a nation that devoted to Islam. The creation of the 
new myth creates hostility among the Acehnese in a way that the Elite or politician like 
Hasan di Tiro manipulate the past pride and heroism of the Aceh Kingdom to be used as 
his device to introduced Aceh as a separate nation with Indonesia based on its historical 
background of the Aceh Kingdom which had strong relations with the Ottoman Empire. 
It implies that di Tiro create a myth of an Acehnese nation’s flag to justified a hostile 
condition and attitudes to the Javanese Indonesian as a different nation before the 
Javanese Indonesian dominate Aceh. In other words, the Acehnese created a challenge 
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through a creation of Acehnese nation with its GAM’s flag myth to the secular Javanese 
Indonesian nation under Soharto leadership. 
The Javanese Indonesian myths. At this period, Soeharto manipulated the 
Javanese people through his political agenda of the national integrity as one nation. He 
used the agenda of the national integrity myth as a way to eliminate all other ideologies 
that could disrupt his plan to centralize his power into his hand only as the president. 
Here, he wanted to create a nation pride through his national integrity policy as a symbol 
of a strong nation. Therefore, all other identities that already exist such as religion, 
ethnicity, or any other identities should only follow his agenda. He uses the Pancasila as 
his device to create a national integrity because the Pancasila was a symbol of unity of a 
pluralistic country.  
Initially, the purpose of Pancasila was to create a common ground for the creation 
of an independent, unified, modern Indonesian state regardless of religion, ethnicity or 
regional origins. However, every regime including their contestants claimed their own 
interpretation of Pancasila and even legitimizes any actions is Pancasila based. Hence, 
Douglas Ramage argues that Pancasila is a very flexible Indonesian ideology because of 
various interpretation of Pancasila that legitimize all actions of a regime or the 
oppositions as an effective justification device to achieve their own goals.165 Soeharto 
even frame the Pancasila as a way to terminate any other ideologies for example, 
capitalism, communism, or even religion based ideology. It was proven by his 
                                                             
165 Douglas Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance, (London: 
Routledge, 1995). 
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controversial policy in 1984 of Pancasila as the only ideological foundation that should 
be adopted by any organizations in Indonesia. Soeharto’s government codified Pancasila 
into national law and thus the government banned any organizations that rejected to adopt 
Pancasila as their rules, constitutions, or characters.166 
The Soeharto’s government aimed to integrate all Indonesian regions uses the 
device of Pancasila as a sole ideological foundation. The Javanese Soeharto’s 
government would eliminate any ideologies that threat the Indonesian national 
sovereignty of the Pancasila. In fact, Soeharto’s government demonized the GAM rebels 
as separatists or GPK (Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan/Security Disruptive Movements) 
that disrupt the Indonesian national integrity. Therefore, the myth of national unity by 
using Pancasila as a sole ideological foundation effectively creates a hostile attitude 
toward the Acehnese that rebels against the Soeharto’s government.   
 
C. Fears of extinction  
The Acehnese fears. Typically, the strongest ethnic fears are underlain by the 
histories of ethnic domination. The Javanese had dominated the Acehnese since 
Indonesia gained its independent in August 17, 1945. The Acehnese fears were 
particularly acute because domination and minority status were associated in their minds 
with ethnic domination. It was proven by the extreme domination by killing the Acehnese 
who were engaged with the Daud Beureuh movement. Furthermore, the domination 
associated with ethnic domination because of the Javanese Indonesian government under 
                                                             
166 Ibid. 3-4.  
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Soekarno leadership insists to include Aceh territory to the North Sumatra Province. It 
symbolizes a Javanese ethnic group domination over the Acehnese because Soekarno, as 
a Javanese, intended to re-group all ex-East Indies Dutch colonial territory under a nation 
called Indonesia regardless their religion, ethnicity, or regional origins.  
Another domination of the Javanese over the Acehnese was an ideological 
domination through Pancasila ideology over Islamic ideology. The Acehnese who 
claimed as the strong believers of Islam felt threaten by the Soekarno’s decision in using 
Pancasila as the Indonesian state philosophical foundation. The Acehnese felt threaten 
because Soekarno obligated the Acehnese to adopt Pancasila as their sole fundamental 
state principles. Consequently, the Acehnese fear had no space to practice their culture 
and religion as their identity. It implies that this policy symbolizes Javanese ethnic group 
domination over the Acehnese.  
The Acehnese feared that the same thing would happen in Aceh like in the 
Soekarno presidency and in the past of the Dutch colonial period used the symbol of 
ethnic domination refers to the process. Thus they referred to the Soeharto’s government 
program in 1971 of transmigration by sending more Javanese to the Aceh territory.167 The 
new Javanese resident in Aceh got many advantages and privilege through transmigration 
program such as, they got land to farm and some money to life outside Java Island. 
                                                             
167 Riwanto Tirtosudarmo, Demografi dan Konflik: Kegagalan Indonesia Melaksanakan Proyek 
Pembangunan Bangsa? (Demography and Konflict: The Indonesian Failure in Implementing the Nation 
Development Project) in Konflik Kekerasan Internal: Tinjauan Sejarah, Ekonomi-Politik, dan Kebijakan di 
Asia Pasifik (Internal Violent Conflict: History, Political Economy, and Policy Perspective in Asia 
Pacific)”, eds. Dewi Fortuna Anwar et al. (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2005), 73-74.  
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 Historically, this transmigration program was similar to the Dutch colonial 
program in order to fulfill a very cheap Javanese labor to gone to outside Java Island, 
include Aceh territory. It was known as a Javanese domination (Jawanisasi) project.168  
This Jawanisasi project had create ethnic group conflict in ways that transmigration 
program merely aimed to assimilate, if not dominate, all ethnic group in Indonesia to 
achieve national integration by sending the Javanese to outside Java Island.  This history 
has exacerbated by the fact that the Javanese took control in Aceh local government 
structure or street level bureaucracy, military, or even as business elites who dominate 
private and government companies. For example, Tim Kell on his work mentioned that 
most of the elite, who dominate the economical resources such as liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) production, were the Javanese.169 Hence, demographically, the Acehnese received 
this massage as a Javanese ethnic domination over the Acehnese.  
The Javanese Indonesian fears. The Rebellious and stubborn image of the 
Acehnese/GAM has developed into a chauvinist Acehnese and fundamentalist of Islam. 
This image encourages fear as well as hostility toward the Acehnese. Even di Tiro 
admitted that the Javanese colonial indeed put a strong labeled the GAM as “the terrorist 
or the separatist”.170 The stereotype of the Acehnese as rebellious, stubborn, chauvinist, 
and fundamentalist, is inevitably a source of fear, surely made worse for those whose 
                                                             
168 Ibid. 67. 
169 Tim Kell, The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion, 1989-1992 (Ithaca, New York: Cornel University, 1995), 
27.   
170 Hasan di Tiro, The Price of Freedom: The Unfinished Diary (Noshborg, Sweden: National Liberation 
Acheh Sumatra, 1981), 28. 
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parties used myth as “the terrorist, the separatist” or GPK171 (Gerakan Pengacau 
Keamanan/ Security Disruptive Movements). Anyone socialized by threats such as the 
GPK is likely to have a visceral reaction in case of conflict with real GAM. The tough 
image projected by the Soeharto’s government and military as “GPK,” surely contributed 
to such fears. In Addition, some Javanese settlers on Aceh were victimized by GAM’s 
members engaged in criminal in response to the loss of their land.172 Many of the 
Javanese victims choose to stay behind the Indonesian military, undoubtedly increasing 
fears among the Javanese who remained.  
Furthermore, Hasan di Tiro exacerbated the fear of the Javanese by stated that the 
choice for the Acehnese is that life in slavery of the Javanese or death with honor as a 
free man.173 It implies that di Tiro propagated to the Javanese Soeharto government that 
GAM would fight against the neo-colonial Javanese in any ways. For example, di Tiro 
mention on his diary that he would love to lead the Acehnese to fight against the neo-
colonial Javanese and thus he returned to Aceh in 1976 to declare the Acehnese 
independence as a nation.174 Hence, undoubtedly this propaganda creates fears among the 
Javanese.  
In addition, the GAM also used the hikayat perang sabil (the epic of the holy 
war), which explained how sufferers in the war would be rewarded with the happiness of 
                                                             
171 The term of GPK used by Soeharto’s government to demonized the separatist movement in Aceh of 
GAM.  
172 Riwanto Tirtosudarmo, Internal Violent Conflict: History, Political Economy, and Policy Perspective in 
Asia Pacific, 73-75. 
173 Hasan di Tiro, The Price of Freedom: The Unfinished Diary, 12. 
174 Ibid. 24-25. 
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paradise. The main theme of the hikayat perang sabil and epics is prosecuting holy war 
against infidels.175 It implies that the Acehnese have duty to engaged with the holy war 
against the infidels Dutch colonial and the Javanese. Di Tiro claimed that hikayat perang 
sabil epics are a holy war against the neo-colonial Javanese.176 As a result, it creates fears 
among the Javanese because this physical fear among Javanese was strong and visceral. 
One could says “the GAM believe that they will go to heaven only if they have killed a 
Javanese, which represented by the Javanese Indonesian military and Soeharto 
government. The Javanese reaction to this fearful situation was hostile panic by declaring 
the DOM (Daerah Operasi Militer, Military Operation Territory) in 1989 to 1998. The 
fear remains pervasive until the reform period after 1998.  
Another fear of the Javanese Soeharto government was his ambition’ s failure to 
integrate Indonesia under Pancasila as sole state philosophical foundation. The GAM 
declaration of independent in 1976 is considered as a serious threat to the unity of 
Indonesia and against the Pancasila. These situations create a sudden panic among the 
Soeharto government and thus it creates a hostile situation and attitudes of the Soeharto 
government and the military to react toward the GAM’s independent.  
 
D. Opportunity to mobilization 
The weakness of the Indonesian state, combine with President Soeharto’s 
centralizing policy in his ruling period, created the opportunity for ethnic war in 
                                                             
175 Edward Aspinall, “From Islamism to Nationalism in Aceh, Indonesia,” in Nation and Nationalism 13 
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176 Hasan di Tiro, The Price of Freedom: The Unfinished Diary, 24-26. 
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Indonesia at that time. The Soeharto’s government policy by declaring Pancasila as a 
sole philosophical foundation and the creation of DOM created the opportunity for ethnic 
war in Aceh. As Tim Kell points out, weak states like Indonesia typically manage to 
establish political order in their central base (Java Island) only by putting his client in 
regions and took all decisions from central government only as their patron. In exchange 
for maintaining order, these clients are given control of what passes for the institutions of 
the state in their regions.177 Soeharto attempted to centralize power in the 1984 by 
producing Pancasila as sole philosophical foundation of any organizations and banning 
any other ideologies like ideologies based on regional origins, ethnicity, or religions. 
Hence, regions like Aceh revolts against this policy and furthermore the process 
weakened state institutions in this region. The GAM used their power over those 
institutions as political assets in their struggle to take over the state power in Aceh.178  
One result of this process was the rise of GAM with their paramilitary associated 
with Hasan Tiro’s political leader. In Aceh, the Acehnese armed groups called AGAM 
(armed forces of Free Aceh Movement) engaged in terrorist violence, apparently at the 
command of GAM’s politicians.179 On the other hand, Soeharto’s government used his 
client such as the Governor or local legislative in Aceh to fight back including the threat 
of force by implementing integrated military operation area, well known as DOM, in 
response. Indonesian police and more importantly, the national army became tools in 
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these local struggles. The result was politics became increasingly lawless throughout 
Aceh territory in the 1989 to 1998. The politization of religion and militarization of 
politics could not long be kept separate. The result was political violence along 
nationalism lines.180  
Yet another opportunity was demographic concentration. Monica Toft illustrates, 
the existence of some regional concentration of a particular group is very nearly a 
necessary condition for ethnic rebellion.181 This factor obtained in Aceh, as most of the 
Acehnese ethnic group was concentrated in Aceh territory.  
Even more importantly, as early as 1987 Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi 
became involved, on one account after he heard about the Aceh-Sumatra independence. 
Qaddafi began giving the GAM’s members military and ideological training.  Starting in 
1988, this covert military training aid was because of Hasan di Tiro’s personal network to 
maintain his bilateral link to the outside power.182  
 
E. Mass hostility 
The Acehnese hostility toward the Javanese Indonesian. As identified by 
Peterson, hostile emotions—hate, fear, and resentment—play important role in conflict. 
The fact seems to support the GAM’s claims that the Acehnese saw the Javanese 
Indonesian government and armed groups as their enemies. For example, Hasan di Tiro 
                                                             
180 Tim Kell, The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion, 1989-1992, 32-39. 
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claimed on his diary that the Javanese Indonesian government and Indonesian military 
are similar to the Dutch colonial and thus the Acehnese must fight against the neo-
colonial Javanese Indonesian government.183  They exploit every Acehnese resources 
such as LNG (liquid natural gas) and give nothing to the Acehnese prosperity.  Moreover, 
they oppress and dominate the Acehnese as a minority ethnic group.184 Therefore, the 
Acehnese hostility was the result mainly of fear.  
Another hostile emotion of resentment also played a role, the image of the 
Javanese were the land grabbers. For example, Peter Chalk point out that transmigration 
program was a symbol of Javanese domination over the Acehnese by sending Javanese 
people to outside Java Island such as Aceh territory. 185  Hence, this desire to assert 
political dominance in the Aceh province based on the belief that the Acehnese are the 
“owners and masters” of Aceh territory even if they had become the minority in 
Indonesia. 
Furthermore, the creation of negative stereotype of the secular and neo-colonial of 
the Javanese generated chauvinistic feelings among the Acehnese over the Javanese 
people. As di Tiro claim on his published diary, he stated that the nature of the Acehnese 
movement was nationalist religious chauvinism.  In this context, di Tiro illustrate that the 
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Javanese was similar to the Dutch colonial as the aggressor and thus, it was justifiable for 
the Acehnese to fight against the neo-colonial Javanese.186 
The Javanese Indonesian hostility toward the Acehnese. The negative stereotypes 
of the GAM generated chauvinistic feelings among the secular Javanese over the 
Acehnese even before the DOM implemented in the end of 1980s. Aspinall argues that 
the basic mind-set of the Javanese ethnic group under Soeharto’s government was ethno-
nationalist chauvinism. According to him, this attitude came from the identification of 
secular nationalist with a dominant national culture as secular nationalist Javanese. 
Therefore, he argues that the Javanese Indonesian government recognizes the GAM 
merely as the GPK or separatist.  
Damien Kingsbury illustrates the point with the typical attitudes expressed in 
Indonesian newspapers regarding the GAM’s attitudes. The Javanese Indonesian 
government controls the media though the Press Act articles 11 to support only the 
Indonesian government for the unity interest (nationalism). For example, Kingsbury point 
out that the Javanese Indonesian government required all journalists to adopt the 
“Pancasila journalism.” According to this concept, every media should support any 
government policies and acts in the name of national interest.187 In this context, any 
separatism action such as the GAM viewed as a form of betraying the commitment to 
Pancasila as a symbol of the Indonesian unity. Therefore, the media create a negative 
image of GAM as GPK (national security disturber), chauvinist, separatist, and even a 
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terrorist image. Furthermore, these negative images of the GAM have been persistently 
expressed and preserved in the Indonesian society.  
The existence of negative attitudes of Javanese toward the GAM has also been 
confirmed in media as the Javanese Indonesian government propaganda. They tightly 
control the media contents. According to Kingsbury, the Soeharto’s government ban any 
media contents related to ethnicity, race and religions and the activities of separatist 
movement such as in Aceh.188 Consequently, most of Indonesian society only knows 
GAM as a bad party who want to disrupt the unity of Indonesia or Indonesian 
nationalism. The Javanese prejudice toward the GAM is not a new phenomenon. It is the 
legacy of the Acehnese-Javanese hostility perpetuated under Soekarno’s government 
between separatism and integration.189 An ignorant and biased media aided by educated 
elites perpetuates the Acehnese-Javanese hostility to this day.  
 
F. Hostile mobilization (The Process of Mobilization for War) 
The precondition for hostility and fear such as ethnic history domination, 
contentious symbols, and potentially hostile mythology existed and thus, the violence 
mobilization process was elite-led. Both elites, the GAM and the Javanese Indonesian 
government, mobilized their resources to create political competition for ethnic 
dominance. Their purpose was to create a security dilemma for both sides as a way to 
protect and increase their own power.  
                                                             
188 Ibid. 156. 
189 Nazzaruddin Sjamsuddin, The Republican Revolt: A Study of the Acehnese Rebellion, (Singapore, 
Institute of Souteast Asian Studies, 1985). 
 
123 
The first main issue for the Acehnese was the creation of Pancasila as a sole state 
ideological foundation. The policy raised a Javanese symbolic status above over any 
other symbols as a national symbol. The Javanese Soeharto government required every 
Indonesian citizen to adopt the Pancasila as the only ideological principles of live 
regardless their religions, ethnicity, or their region origins. Bennedict Anderson stated 
that historically, Pancasila was taken from the Javanese mythology as Javanese symbols 
of great courage, faithfulness, and honor.190 Thus, the Pancasila basically was a symbol 
of the Javanese superiority over the other ethnic groups in Indonesia such as the 
Acehnese. This symbolic subordination of the Javanese language was annoying, but that 
fact did no lead to separatist violence as this policy passed in Indonesia.  
Separatist violence occurred mainly because The GAM elites stood to gain power 
by promoting separatist violence against the Pancasila policy. The Acehnese elites chose 
to turn the Pancasila issue into an ethno-nationalist struggle for group dominance. Thus, 
they immediately acted by promoting the Acehnese independence to challenge the 
Javanese Soeharto’s government. They justified their step by claiming that the GAM 
independence was the right of the Acehnese to be free from the neo-colonial Javanese. 
Moreover, Pancasila policy was a form of disrespectful attitude of the Javanese toward 
the right of the Acehnese. The real political agenda was already declared by Hasan di 
Tiro to create Aceh nation-state as their final goal. Hence, as Schulze explained that the 
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GAM’s ultimate goal was to create an Acehnese nation-state separate from Indonesia.191 
Thus, this tactics made accommodation difficult to achieve.   
The Indonesian media was another powerful device for the Javanese Indonesian 
government and their military: by playing on the symbolic issues at stake and stirring up 
anti-GAM (Acehnese) chauvinism, the media contribute an important role in building 
popular support for Soeharto government and the military to act in the name of 
nationalism. This media propaganda was to justify the military action to uphold the 
Pancasila myth as a symbol of unity of diversity in Indonesia. As the Press Act 
mentioned that any action of criticism of state leaders, the role and action of Indonesian 
military, or the Pancasila itself were a form of crime because it against the national 
interest.192  
On the other hand, the GAM was demonized by the Soeharto government as 
separatist who against the Pancasila. It implies that the GAM had been done a heavy 
crime and thus they were criminal. Since all media was still controlled by the Indonesian 
government, there can be no doubt that its editors were acting on orders from the 
government. The Indonesian media build popular support from the Javanese ethnic group 
by portrayed the GAM as separatist and criminal. The facts that GAM attacks against the 
Indonesian police, the army, and civil authorities had worsening the image of GAM as 
criminal for the Indonesian society.193 Another important evidence in mid-1990, the 
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Indonesian media found that GAM attack the Javanese transmigrants in North Aceh and 
thousands of them were intimidated by GAM’s members.194 Consequently, the 
Indonesian society was persistent to the Indonesian government reaction and the 
military.195  The GAM’s separatism of ethno-nationalist movement, combined with the 
growth of terror of their armed groups, worked to increase the feelings of threat on the 
Javanese Indonesian side.  
Throughout Soeharto period, the Indonesian press continued to encourage feelings 
of threat and inclinations toward a violent response among the Javanese population by 
manipulating nationalist symbols. The Indonesian independence is a symbol of unity of 
diversity regardless religions, ethnicity, and regions origins. Therefore, the Indonesian 
press portrayed the GAM as a betrayer of the unity Indonesia.  
Instead of seeking compromise, both sides acted to exacerbate the security 
dilemma. The Acehnese elites provoked the Acehnese nationalist movement into 
overreacting, and then used that overreaction to justify further moves toward secession. 
The Acehnese feared by the fact that more Javanese settlers to come to Aceh territory 
under transmigration program, and thus they fear of the Javanese domination in term of 
population. The Acehnese acknowledge that they are a minority ethnic group compared 
to the Javanese, thus they intimidate the Javanese settlers to defense themselves. This 
interethnic security dilemma create an emergent anarchy among the Acehnese because 
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they fears of physical insecurity were exaggerated on all sides. It was the Acehnese elites 
who exaggerated fears because of their manipulation and provocations of violence. As di 
Tiro provocation toward the Acehnese, he mentioned that the GAM’s tactics was 
offensive whenever an opportunity present.196 Here, the GAM gained popular support 
especially in rural area because the Javanese more concern and dominance in urban area 
of Aceh. Hence, the GAM took this opportunity to dominate the rural structure, for 
example, fill the village officials by the GAM’s members, civil servants, schoolteachers 
or even small traders. Moreover, they could serve their members of the armed forces and 
they got assistance from the veteran of the Darul Islam rebels in this area.197 In this 
context, most of rural area were dominate by the GAM and thus, it create such fear 
among the Javanese in urban area of Aceh. Therefore, the GAM succeeds to create 
security dilemma among the Javanese in urban area. 
Di Tiro’s command justified the Indonesian military actions to protect the 
manipulation of Pancasila as a symbol of unity in diversity of Indonesia. The Javanese 
elites like Soeharto fear that his ambition to unite all regions regardless their religions, 
ethnicity, or regional origins under his power would meet a failure ends. Thus, the 
reaction of the Soeharto’s government was simply to command the military to act more 
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offensive than ever. In 1989, the policy was immediately to implement a massive 
integrated military operation (DOM) in Aceh territory.198  
The Indonesian military provoke the fear of the Indonesian government in 
purpose to eliminate the GAM’s movement by exaggerated the GAM’s members. 
General R. Pramono, for example, believed that the GAM member were “everywhere” 
and thus he stated that the GAM followers estimated around hundreds of thousands.199 
However, this hyperbolic statement was only to justify their action to immediately 
implement the DOM in Aceh and create such fear among the Javanese Indonesian 
society. He provoke the fear of the Javanese government and society by stated: “the 
situation [in Aceh] was frightening and chilling . . . . GPK [GAM] had already seized 27 
units of ABRI’s [Indonesian Military] weapons.”200 Moreover, the Aceh Governor during 
that period, Ibrahim Hasan, exaggerated the conflict escalation by stated that the Aceh 
regional development was disrupted by the GPK (GAM) actions such as intimidated 
people, school were closed, and even more the terror acts.201 Therefore, the Indonesian 
military succeed in manipulating and provoking the situation and create a security 
dilemma for the Javanese Indonesian government and the escalation of conflict had been 
higher than ever.  
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The consequences were the Acehnese ethnic cleansing because the real power of 
GAM was not enough to crush the Indonesian military. In fact, many observers agreed 
that GAM members in July 1990 were not more than 750 people. While the Indonesian 
military at that period had already around 6000 troops and brought again 12.000 troops to 
Aceh territory under the DOM’s policy. Therefore, logically, it is difficult to believe that 
the Indonesian military in Aceh had no capacity to crush the GAM because GAM had out 
of number of members.  
The Soeharto’s government and the Indonesian military’s response to the 
Acehnese rebellion was the politics of generalization and stigmatization. They tended to 
see every Acehnese potentially as GAM members.202  This demonization of the Acehnese 
were used to justify cruel military actions and served as the basis of a brutal 
counterinsurgency campaign without considering the human rights.  
The Javanese Indonesian military mobilize the civilians under an organization of 
Ksatria Unit Penegak Pancasila (Nobble Warriors for Upholding Pancasila) in purpose 
to kill the GAM members and to force the Acehnese to accept the Pancasila as their 
ideology under Indonesia nation-state. In fact this group had help the Indonesian military 
kill around 300 Acehnese that suspected as GAM members. The Indonesian military 
were nurture, support, organize and even train some basic defense skills of this group.203 
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129 
Therefore, this action heightened the escalation of conflict or even an ethnic cleansing in 
Aceh.  
Thousands of Acehnese became victims of this brutality, for example, the 
Acehnese tortured, raped, arrested without any clear reasons, disappeared or even killed.  
Moreover, villagers were under the Indonesian military tight control because they 
acknowledge that the basis of the GAM movement in rural area.204 In 2001, Human Right 
Watch reported that more than 1,258 Acehnese were killed and even Amnesty 
International in 1993 reported 2,000 Acehnese had been killed under the DOM period. 
Moreover, Human Right Watch give an account at least 500 Acehnese disappeared.   
 
G. Conclusion  
The central theme of the GAM under the Hasan di Tiro leadership in this period 
was the nationalist Ideological and economical motives. The ideological motivation of 
GAM was to re-create an Acehnese nation that break away from the Indonesian state. 
Hasan di Tiro use this myth to provoke the Acehnse to regain their past glory of the Aceh 
Kingdom. However, the Javanese Indonesian government also provokes the Javanese by 
the mythology of Pancasila, which basically a Javanese symbol of a dominance position 
over the other ethnic groups, to dominate ideologically over the Acehnese. Moreover, the 
economical motivation is also plays significant role in creating hostile emotions for the 
Acehnse and the Javanese Indonesian government. Thus, it creates a security dilemma 
because the GAM aim was to create their own nation-state and fight against the 
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economical exploitations by the Javanese Indonesian government. The DOM policy was 
a result of the elites manipulation and provocation to lead the ethnic conflict by using the 
symbols to create such fear among the ethnic group member. A massive Javanese 
military under the Indonesian central government command had crush a relatively small 
numbers of the GAM’s core members. Thus, these fears justify offensive actions in the 
name of self-defense from both sides.  
In this context, the conflicts were imbalance because the strength of the GAM’s 
power was not as big as the Javanese Indonesian side. Even though, Hasan di Tiro could 
provoke the Acehnese myth and symbols, they were lack of resources to fight against the 
Javanese neo colonial. Hence, the Javanese Indonesian government could easily take the 
oil and LNG for them selves and shares nothing for the Acehnese. These imbalance 
conflicts had created such an Acehnese ethnic cleansing. This ethnic cleansing easily 
seen because after the declaration of Aceh independence in 1976 by Hasan di Tiro, the 
GAM was not develop under the Javanese Indonesian control by implementing the 
military operation to terrorize the Acehnese for more than ten years.  
After we analyze the second case study on chapter 5 of the ethnic conflict in 
Aceh, I will develop the symbolic politics theory on the subsequent peace on ethnic peace 
after the 1998 period in Indonesia. On chapter 6, I will discuss the necessary conditions 
of the symbolic politics theory on ethnic peace in Aceh. The elites on both sides plays 
very important role in influencing the peace process through the negotiations between the 
GAM under Hasan di Tiro leadership and the Indonesian government. The purpose of 
chapter 6 is to give different perspective on explaining the ethnic peace in Aceh after 
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the 1998 reform period. The symbolic politics theory on chapter 6 intends to give clearer 
explanation on the reasons of the ethnic group peace process.  
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CHAPTER 6: 
THE ACEHNESE SUBSEQUENT PEACE AFTER THE 1998 REFORM PERIOD  
 
A. Introduction 
After we discuss the Acehnese conflicts under the Soeharto New Order period in 
chapter 5 and in this chapter 6, the symbolic politics theory analytically takes the next 
step to explore the subsequent peace after 1998. This chapter will begin to discuss the 
applicability of the symbolic politics theory after the fall of Soeharto in 1998. The 
collapse of Soeharto regime had been became a symbol of changes and freedom of the 
Indonesian society from an authoritarian regime. At the same time, GAM under Hasan di 
Tiro leadership start to gained more popular support from the Acehnese and even from 
the international society. GAM took advantage of anger, new political openness, and 
demands for East Timor-style referendum, to rebuild. Furthermore, GAM getting more 
aggressive to fight against the Javanese Indonesian central government. Indonesian 
political and economic crisis create chaos situations and thus this situation threat the 
Indonesian integration from Sabang to Merauke.205 The Acehnese under di Tiro 
leadership keep struggling for their freedom as a separate nation from Indonesia. The 
main focus of reformation in Indonesia was to change centralize authoritarian system into 
decentralize democratic system. Therefore, autonomy was the only option for the 
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Indonesian transition government under Baharuddin Jusuf Habibie leadership to keep a 
unity of the Indonesian society. Thus, autonomy as a symbol of changes and freedom 
became a central debate in reformation period.  
This chapter examines the symbolic politics theory on the Acehnese ethnic 
conflict and the subsequent peace after 1998 reform period. This chapter specifically 
analyzes the myths, fears, opportunities, mass hostility, and the hostile mobilization in 
determining the existence of the ethnic conflict or peace between the Acehnese under 
Hasan di Tiro leadership and the Javanese Indonesian central government in the reform 
period.  
Ethnic conflict would be occurred because of a fundamental conflict between the 
Acehnese myth-symbols complex focused on fears of ethnic domination and the Javanese 
Indonesia government under the transition government period emphasizing the 
sovereignty and Indonesian national integration and saw the regional aspirations as threat 
for Indonesian existence. Geographically, Aceh is one of Indonesian unity pride symbol 
and thus, the Indonesian government insists that Aceh should be inside the Indonesian 
nation-state at any risk. However, the lack of opportunity to mobilize became a factor of 
ethnic peace under the Helsinki agreement in 2006. Moreover, the mass hostility did not 
appear on the Javanese Indonesian side. Therefore, the ethnic conflict did not occurred 
because the lack of elites’ manipulation on the politics of the myth and symbol in one 
side.  
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B. Myth justifying hostility 
The Acehnese myths. The myth of the Acehnese rebellion under di Tiro leadership 
on reform period was similar to the Acehnese rebellion under Soeharto’s regime, as 
mentioned in chapter 5. Di Tiro even used the symbol of reformation in Indonesia, which 
is the myth of freedom. On a similar intention of Hasan di Tiro under Soeharto regime, 
on chapter 5, he led the Acehnese movement pursuing their ultimate goal to create 
independence Acehnese nation. Di Tiro re-emerge the past glory of the Aceh Sumatra 
State before the Dutch colonial annex the Aceh territory. They used a mythology of the 
Aceh Sumatra State as a way to portrayed the Acehnese as an independent nation that 
separate from the Javanese Indonesian nation. Kirsten E. Schulze explains that Hasan di 
Tiro with his Acehnese movement ultimate goal was to re-gain independent from the 
neo-colonial Javanese government. She continue to explain that the GAM maintains that 
Aceh sovereignty should have been returned to the Sultanate of Aceh, which is to Hasan 
di Tiro as Aceh Sultanate descendent.206   
The mythology of freedom for the Acehnese also means that they could free from 
the Javanese Indonesian oppression. The military operation from 1989 create a grievance 
for the Acehnese because the Acehnese victimized in all form of violence such as 
intimidation or even be killed because of suspected as rebel. Thus, Hasan di Tiro and 
GAM gained more popular support from the Acehnese because the Acehnese felt as an 
in-group of the GAM to fight against the Javanese Indonesian military oppressor.  
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Another action from Hasan di Tiro was the usage of freedom myth-symbol that 
creates a hostile attitude and situation as a creation of the religious and nationalist 
Acehnese identity. Hasan di Tiro keep provoking the Acehnese people using religious 
and nationalist myth-symbols such as the epics of holy war against the (neo) colonial that 
oppress the Acehnese identity as devoted Moslem and a nationalist people. Thus, the 
Aceh nationalism was getting stronger than ever. In addition, The GAM flag, as a 
religious-nationalist symbol, was more popular than ever because the Acehnese perceives 
this flag as a symbol of freedom from the Javanese Indonesian government. Elite or 
politician like Hasan di Tiro manipulate the past pride and heroism of the Aceh Kingdom 
to be used as his device to introduced Aceh as a free nation based on its historical 
background of the Aceh Kingdom.  
The myth-symbol of freedom, religious, and nationalism through the GAM’s flag 
gained the biggest Acehnese popular loyalty. The data from the combined intelegence 
unit (SGI, Satuan Gabungan Intelijen) shows that the core GAM’s members in 2002 was 
3,649. It was more than 520 percent larger than the GAM’s members in 1976, which are 
only 70 GAM’s core members. Even more, in 2003 the GAM’s core members are 5,517. 
It increased 75 percent than the GAM’s core members in 2002.207 However, Kirsten 
Schulze mentioned that this intelligent data should be viewed cautiously because these 
data may not be accurate. The accuracy of the data was questioned because probably the 
Indonesian government would like to shows that GAM had no large popular support from 
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the Acehnese. Schulze continue to argue that the GAM’s members probably even more 
than 5,517 people.  
More importantly, the creation of East Timor state in 1999 from Indonesia 
became a blue print for the Acehnese to fight to re-gain their freedom from the 
neocolonial Indonesia. Since the Indonesian government under B. J. Habibie allowing the 
East Timor bid for independence in 1999, the Acehnese struggle raising expectations that 
a similar event might occur in Aceh. Hasan di Tiro and the GAM have used East Timor 
experience as a blueprint for Aceh nation to gain freedom from the Javanese colonial 
government.208  
The Javanese Indonesian myths. At this period, NKRI (Negara Kesatuan 
Republic Indonesia, Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia) is an imagined 
community became a final end for the Indonesian government and its military. Thus, the 
myth of NKRI (Negara Kesatuan Republic Indonesia, Unitary State of the Republic of 
Indonesia) as a final imagined community creates a hostile attitude from the Indonesian 
government in a way that they would fight against any parties who would disturb this 
mythology. It was clearly stated by General Ryamizard Ryacudu that the creation of 
NKRI (Negara Kesatuan Republic Indonesia, Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia) 
was a final price and the Indonesian military would fight for the NKRI at any cost.209   
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Donald K. Emmerson argue that historically the creation of Indonesia came from 
the Sumpah Pemuda (Youth Oath) as a symbol of the unity in diversity of Indonesia. He 
mention that the oath contain of three symbols, which are one nation, one people, and one 
language.210 The mythology of the 1928 Youth Oath is became a basis of the Indonesian 
military in reformation period to portray the Acehnse as a betrayer of this oath. Thus, 
General Ryacudu alert any groups that betray the Youth Oath would trigger a hatred and 
disaster.211 In other words, the myth of NKRI as an imagined community creates a hostile 
attitude of the Javanese Indonesian military.  
In this sense, the myth of unity in diversity and from Sabang to Merauke became 
more prone to conflict than ever. The Indonesian government used these myths to 
eliminate any separatist groups such as the East Timor movement, which eventually East 
Timor gained their independent from Indonesia. These myths also used by the Indonesian 
military to justified their actions to eliminate Acehnese separatist movement. For 
example, the continuation of the military operation of DOM policy in 1998 and afterward 
to eliminate the GAM was the fact that Indonesian military would do anything to defend 
Indonesia unity from Sabang to Merauke territory.  
 
C. Fears of extinction  
The Acehnese fears. Apparently, the histories of ethnic domination became the 
strongest Acehnese ethnic fears. Essentially, the Acehnese ethnic fears on reform period 
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were similar to the Acehnese movement under Soeharto government. The first issue is the 
Acehnese economical exploitation by the Javanese people. This domination creates such 
fear from the Acehnese because the Javanese also dominate the economical resources 
such as liquefied natural gas (LNG) and oil under Javanese Soeharto regime. Tim Kell 
argues that these economical resources were Java centric in a way that the economical 
exploitation benefits went to non-Acehnese people. He continue to argue that it was 
exacerbated by the over centralization of state power, especially under the Soeharto 
regime. The Acehnese have no freedom to conduct and manage their own trade and any 
other economy activities.212 Historically, Aceh’s economy was not dependent with the 
Indonesian people as an independent state in the past centuries.213 Thus, the Acehnese 
have no freedom to run their business because they must pay taxes and burden by trade 
law of the Indonesian central government, which based in Java.  
Another Acehnese fear is the Javanese Indonesian military brutality. The GAM’s 
propaganda portrayed the Indonesian military as the Javanese Indonesian military. This 
negative image arise because the Indonesian military dominated by the Javanese people 
and their actions follow the Javanese central government. The purpose of this negative 
image was to create fear among the Acehnese. The experience of Darul Islam movement 
and more importantly the DOM policy have made the Acehnese trauma because of the 
Javanese military brutality. In sum, the Acehnese was victimized by the military in the 
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name of national integrity without considering the human right of the Acehnese to be free 
from fear.  
The next issue is autonomy status. Autonomy is an old issue that demanded by the 
Acehnese since Soekarno to Soeharto’s regime. It is the Acehnese experience under 
Soekarno regime that promises to give more autonomy to the Acehnese in practicing the 
Islamic Shari’a law, education, economy and the granted a province status. However. 
This promise was never been implemented and only a lip service from the Soekarno to 
integrate Aceh to the Indonesian territory.214  
Furthermore, under the Soeharto New Order regime, the status of Daerah 
Istimewa Aceh (Aceh Special Region) in practicing Islamic shari’a law and Aceh local 
culture also only a myth. It is because the law and the local culture were never 
implemented. The fact, Soharto regime requires to adopt Pancasila for all regions as the 
sole ideological state foundation and the only law in Indonesia.215 Moreover, Soeharto 
obligate to use the Javanese terms for the lowest governmental structure for village. The 
Acehnese term for village is gampong, and replaced by the Javanese term of desa. 
Therefore, the special autonomy of Aceh was only a rhetoric and the Soeharto’s 
government took the autonomy status back and only symbolize Aceh as special region 
without any privilege granted to the Acehnese. Thus, it symbolizes the Javanese 
domination over the Acehnese on the state power.  
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The Javanese Indonesian fears. The disloyal image of the Acehnese/GAM and 
their leader of Hasan di Tiro have developed into a chauvinist nationalist Acehnese. This 
negative image motivates such fear and hatred toward the Acehnese. All Acehnese are 
suspected as disloyal people by the Indonesian military and thus, the Acehnese terrorize 
by the Indonesian military to prevent the Acehnese to support GAM. As a consequence, 
the Indonesian military is strongly firm to any military operations in Aceh territory. For 
example, they gather the villagers and the village leader to declare their loyalty to the 
NKRI (Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia). The Indonesian military also 
mobilize the villagers to attend the ceremony to declare and oath the villagers’ loyalty to 
NKRI and these activities propagandize through the Indonesian television. The villagers 
also must show their loyalty to the Indonesian flag as a symbol of loyalty. Moreover, the 
Acehnese required making an Indonesian citizens identification card as a symbol of 
loyalty to the NKRI and as a symbol of their rejection toward the GAM.216  
The Acehnese under Hasan di Tiro was strongly firm on their stance to gain their 
independent from Indonesia by using the East Timor blueprint to separate from Indonesia 
through a referendum. Hasan di Tiro used this blueprint as a public relations propaganda 
strategy by expecting the international support for East Timor could be transferred to 
Aceh.217 Immediately, the Indonesian military react to GAM’s stance by declaring war to 
any separatist activities from NKRI. Thus, the Indonesian military act in overreaction 
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manner because of the provocation of Hasan di Tiro and the GAM separatist activities. It 
implies the Indonesian central government fear to the situations. Hasan di Tiro’s strategy 
is considered as a serious threat to the unity of Indonesia. These situations create an 
immediate panic of the Habibie government and thus it creates a hostile situation and 
attitudes of the Habibie government and the military to react toward the GAM’s 
independent. The Indonesian government offers autonomy as a final answer for Hasan di 
Tiro. However, di Tiro immediately rejected the proposal because they had trauma of the 
autonomy experience either under Sokarno or Soharto’s government.  
The negative image of autonomy was associated with military violence actions. 
As the GAM leaders explained that special autonomy would be rejected because its 
negative associations with violent military rule.218 Historically, the term of autonomy for 
the Acehnese was merely the language of the Javanese Indonesian government to 
dominate the Acehnese through the military actions such as the DOM policy. One of 
GAM elites, Bakhtiar Abdullah, explained that the term of autonomy represents the 
conflict status with all Indonesian military cruelty such as murder, torture, rape, 
abduction, robbery, and various other serious human right violations.219  
GAM’s demand was firmly on the option of referendum to determine the future of 
Aceh. In this context, Aceh students formed the Aceh Referendum Information Center 
(Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh; SIRA) to support the GAM to demand a 
referendum on independence for Aceh. Thus, the tens of thousands of students did their 
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demonstration to support he referendum on Aceh independent. However, this situation 
responded carefully by the Indonesian government and military. For example, on 
September 22, 1999, the Indonesian House of Representative (Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat, DPR) and People’s Consultative Assembly  (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, 
MPR) granted a broader authority to the Aceh province of the special autonomy for 
Aceh. Thus, the Indonesian executive and legislative had been support the special 
autonomy option for the Acehnese within Indonesia.  
 
D. Opportunity to mobilization 
According to the symbolic politics theory of ethnic war, there would be no mass 
hostility if there were little opportunity to mobilize their own ethnic groups. Apparently, 
the situation after the riot in 1998 in Jakarta had open up the political space for the 
Acehnese to gain political opportunity of freedom to come up to the surface. On the other 
hand, the Indonesian government and the military were lack of opportunity to react. They 
were on the weakest position ever since the student movement in 1998, which resulted in 
the collapse of the Soeharto regime and the power of military. Thus, the mass ethnic 
hostility did not escalate.  
Four factors, in addition, made the hostile situations more controllable. First, the 
changes of the Indonesian government from authoritarian to a more democratic 
government lead to the changes of the Indonesian government behaviors toward the 
Acehnese by controlling the Indonesian military to act more carefully. Therefore, there 
was little opportunity for the Indonesian military to act offensively toward the Acehnese.  
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The people’s demand on democratization required the transition government to 
act wisely and on non-violence manner toward the Acehnese movement. The weak 
position of central government and military has lead to negotiations process between the 
Indonesian government and the GAM. This negotiation process was support by the media 
freedom in Indonesia. The democratization in Indonesia resulted on the press freedom. 
Thus, the Indonesian media could cover the story of the negotiation process freely. The 
press freedom contributes to the lack of opportunity for the Indonesian government and 
military to act offensively. Any reactions from the government and military became a 
concern and create a public opinion in domestic and international level.  
The second factor was the internationalization of the Acehnese movement 
negotiations issue weakens the Indonesian government and its military position to react 
offensively toward the GAM rebellions.  The internationalization of this issue was the 
existence of the Hendry Dunant Center (HDC) as a mediator of the Indonesian 
government and the GAM movement under Hasan di Tiro control. The mediation of 
HDC under the Martti Ahtisaari leadership brought to new stage of peace. At the same 
time, GAM gains more opportunity to mobilize the Acehnese by this international 
negotiation. Hasan di Tiro also was used this dialogue to gain international legitimacy 
and support. However, the international community on the neutral side and not to support 
the Acehnese break away from the Indonesian state as long the Indonesian could 
maintain the human right and a more just situation in Aceh. Thus, Hasan di Tiro and the 
GAM were on a weak side because they did not get the international support as they 
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expected.220 While, once again, the Indonesian government reacts carefully as they 
realize their less legitimacy on domestic and international level. The Indonesian 
government keeps offering the GAM’s elites to not break away from Indonesia as the 
only option to protect the unity of Indonesia.  
The third factor is the tsunami disaster factor. On the December 26, 2004, the 
sudden earthquake and tsunami had destroyed most of the infrastructure and estimated 
killed 129.775 people, 38.786 missing and 504.518 tsunami–displaced in Aceh Province 
from both the Acehnese and the Javanese people, and also their military forces.221 Jean-
Christophe Gaillards argue that tsunami disaster should be considered as what they called  
“tsunami disaster diplomacy.” This form of diplomacy is a powerful catalyst in 
diplomatic talks, since negotiation between both sides was ongoing before the disaster 
and was favored by recent changes in the political environment.222  
This disaster suddenly had created new situations in Aceh. Both sides had been 
lost their supporters. Many of GAM fanatic supporters killed and thus it led them to 
negotiation as the only way to save their people. In this sense, Hasan di Tiro and the 
Indonesian central government came to new proposal on the negotiation process. It is 
precisely as Gaillards stated that tsunami disasters have a short-term impact on diplomacy 
but, over the long-term, non-disaster factors, especially the internal political factors, have 
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a more significant impact.223 One significant internal political factor is the political will 
of the elite actors from both sides to continue the negotiation process. GAM under Hasan 
di Tiro’s leadership offer a self-government option rather than an autonomy or special 
autonomy option. The Indonesian government suspected that the term of self-government 
was problematic because the term was suspected as another term for self-determination of 
even independent.  
Eventually, GAM’s elites explain that the details of the self-government were, as 
follows: (a) greatly expanded authority to a “self-governing” territory of Aceh within 
Indonesia, with only minimal powers reserved to Indonesia; (b) a recognition of 
Acehnese symbols like a flag; (c) a different political system notably signed by the 
existence of the local political parties; (d) to protect Aceh’s special rights from the 
Indonesian House of Representative (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR); (e) a judicial 
system largely independent from that in the rest of Indonesia, with no right of appeal to 
the Supreme Court  in Jakarta over decisions by the top Acehnese court; (f) strong human 
rights demand on the past military abuses; and (g) replace the Indonesian National 
Military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) by the locally recruited police force.224 The 
problematic term of self-government and special autonomy was solved by the agreement 
in Helsinki on August 15, 2005. This agreement avoids the usage of the self-government 
and special autonomy terms.225 Therefore, the elite actors from both sides plays 
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significant roles in continuing the peace processes after the tsunami disaster diplomacy 
ended.  
Another important factor was the economic factor. The Aceh territory is rich of 
LNG (liquid natural gas) and oil. This economy resource shows the Acehnese dominance 
of the Indonesian economy made a total split with Acehnese too costly for the Javanese 
Indonesian government to attack GAM because they control of the Aceh economic 
resources has therefore served as a significant economy sources. The Acehnese 
dominance over the LNG (liquid natural gas) and oil in Aceh territory would only make 
the investors more reluctant to run their business in Indonesia.226 Thus, the Indonesian 
government aimed to protect the investors and thus, negotiations was inevitable for the 
Indonesian government. All of these considerations affected the opportunity structure for 
violent action on both sides. The Indonesian government had no incentive to permit 
further violence, as it would limp the economic potential on which their future success 
depended.  
 
E. Chauvinist mobilization and the clashes  
According to the symbolic politics theory of ethnic war, if both myths justifying 
hostility and fears of extinction exist in an ethnic group, mass hostility toward the other 
ethnic group aiming at political dominance becomes more likely—but it must, to have 
effect, be mobilized politically. This is what occurred in Aceh chaotic situations in 1999. 
GAM members in Aceh, which was motivated by a mythology demanding political 
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domination and by a fear of ethnic extinction, began to launch hostile action against their 
mythical enemy, the Javanese neocolonial government. In this pursuit they were 
mobilized by the chauvinist GAM’s elites like Hasan di Tiro. Since 1999 to 2004, GAM 
strategy was aimed creating chaotic situation through guerrilla warfare and a political 
strategy of internationalization.  
The guerrilla’s strategy of Hasan di Tiro was to provoke the Indonesian National 
Military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) to react offensively toward the GAM 
members. The tactics were mainly of hit-and-run ambushes and continued by the retreat 
into the mountains or villages among the villagers. One GAM guerrilla fighter stated “We 
don’t have to win the war; we only have to stop them from winning.”227 The guerrilla’s 
tactic was only to provoke the Indonesian National Military (TNI) to react abusive and 
charged as the human rights abuser. For example, GAM fanatic supporters attacks on 
vital industries, Javanese migrants, and populated areas in order to provoke and demonize 
the Indonesian National Military (TNI). Furthermore, the Indonesian National Military 
(TNI) abusive actions would attract the international community to suppress and put the 
Indonesian government in the corner. Therefore, the Indonesian government would be in 
a very weak position in facing the International community and the GAM in negotiations 
process.  
This strategy resulted on the Security Operations (Operasi Keamanan) from the 
Indonesian National Military (TNI) in order to create a friendlier image in front of the 
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Acehnese and the International community.228 However, the international non-
governmental organization (NGO) through the Hendry Dunant Center (HDC) under 
Martti Ahtisaari intervened quickly putting the GAM and the Indonesian government on 
the same table to solved the conflicts.229 There is no evidence that there was any fear in 
the Javanese Indonesian side before the clash on the reform period. In fact, they felt that 
they were embracing an important victory at that time. The Indonesian National Military 
(TNI) felt that they succeed to create a new image of human right friendly. The GAM 
failed to expect the incoming attacks from the Indonesian military when the GAM 
members did feel that something was coming. Hasan di Tiro also expects that the HDC 
would tend to defend GAM, but the fact that the HDC on a neutral position.230 It implies 
that Hasan di Tiro and his GAM failed to gain the international support for the Acehnese 
Independent break away from the Indonesian state. Therefore, negotiations were the only 
way to maintain their legitimacy.  
After both sides had an agreement of Helsinki in August 15, 2005, the elites from 
both side agree to create a new peace situation and thus, ethnic conflict did not occurred 
like the previous periods.231  It was proven by peace, just, and transparent Aceh Governor 
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direct local election in December 11, 2006. A year after the Helsinki Memorandum of 
Understanding, they hold a democratic Aceh Governor directs election for the first time 
ever. According to the Helsinki MoU, the Acehnese even have privilege to form local 
political parties and the Acehnese could support an independent Governor candidates. 
Thus, many of the ex-GAM members create some of the local political party and endorse 
the independent candidates. The International Crisis Group reported that the Aceh 
Governor direct election was not creating conflict because both elites from GAM and 
Indonesian government did not provoke the politics of the myths and symbols. Even 
more, GAM bring a massage of peace and change on the Aceh Governor local direct 
election by endorsing an independent candidates, which were Irwandi Yusuf and 
Muhammad Nazar. Furthermore, the International Crisis Group reported, “during the 
campaign, Irwandi and Nazar called themselves the Struggle and Peace Team (Pasangan 
Perjuangan dan Perdamaian).” 232  Furthermore, the Indonesian president and his vice 
president also encourage a peace situation. In a newpaper article on Presiden: Pilkada 
Aceh Titik Bersejarah (Local Direct Election: Aceh Local Direct Election as a Historical 
Momentum) (Kompas, December 11, 2006), Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the president 
of Indonesia for 2004-2009 periods, point out that the Aceh Governor direct local 
election as a historical peace momentum to create a more just development in Aceh and 
the unity of the Indonesian nation-state. Two days latter, in article Wapres: Kita Harus 
Ikhlas GAM Menang (Vice President: We Must Accept GAM’s Winning) (Kompas, 
December 13, 2006), Yusuf Kalla, the vice president of Indonesia for 2004-2009 periods, 
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describe that the Indonesian people should learn to accept the Aceh Governor direct local 
election won by ex-GAM’s members, which is Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar. 
Therefore, both sides commit to create a peace conditions after the Helsinki agreement in 
2005 through the peace, just, and transparent Aceh Governor direct local election as the 
symbols of peace and change for the Acehnese future life.  
In sum, when GAM had the opportunity to mobilize, their ambivalent mythology 
and lack of fear prompted political rather that violent mobilization. When they were 
given cause to fear-by the Javanese Indonesian government-their opportunity for violent 
counter-mobilization was quickly stopped by the HDC under the leadership of Martti 
Ahtisaari. Hasan di Tiro for GAM and the Javanese Indonesian government finally meet 
an agreement based on the Helsinki agreement in 2005. A neutral Mediation of the HDC 
resulted in a more promising future of the Acehnese within Indonesia. The GAM and the 
Acehnese could enjoy more just situations of the economical share of central and 
regional. Moreover, politically, the Acehnese could change the Indonesian political 
system by the existence of local party in certain regions and independent regional leader 
candidates. Culturally, the Acehnese could practice the Islamic shari’a law as their 
identity.  
 
F. Conclusion 
After I talked about the myth of hostility, fears of extinction, opportunity to 
mobilization, and chauvinist mobilization and the clashes, the pre-conditions of the 
symbolic politics theory on ethnic peace does present on the Aceh subsequent peace. The 
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lack of opportunity from both sides, and the reluctance elites from both sides to continue 
the war has resulted in negotiations process.     
Agreement between the Indonesian government and Hasan di Tiro for GAM on 
the reform period was predictable. The situation did not include all the pre-conditions for 
ethnic violence: hostile mythologies and ethnic fears did exist but there were lack of 
opportunity to mobilize their own ethnic groups. These conditions did not produce a 
politics of the chauvinist movement and ethnic hostility. GAM’s elites actively provoke 
the Javanese Indonesian elites to react utilizing the myth and their fears to create such 
opportunity to mobilize the Indonesian nationalist people. However, the Indonesian 
government did not provoke the myth and the fears of the Javanese politically. There 
were no responses from the Indonesian elites government in counter-mobilization to the 
GAM provocations. Therefore, elites from both sides reluctant to evoked the hostile 
emotions, myths, and symbols to conflicts.  
 In addition, tsunami disaster had contribute to change the attitudes of GAM and 
the Indonesian government and agreed to a more win-win solutions by a more just 
sharing among them. The mediation of Marti Ahtisaari also plays an important role as a 
symbol of neutral side to solve the conflicts. Thus, ethnic violence was avoided. The third 
party of Marti Ahtisaari expected to support the Acehnese independence by Hasan di Tiro 
and his GAM, but HDC under Marti Ahtisaari leaderhip stand on a neutral side. At the 
same time, they also insist the Indonesian government to not to use military actions in the 
name of the universal of human rights. Eventually, this situation makes both Acehnse and 
the Indonesian government sides had no other choices but to negotiate for peace.  
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After we discuss the subsequent ethnic peace in Aceh after the 1998 reform 
period, finally, I will conclude the research by making the assessment of the theory to 
shows the applicability of the symbolic politics approach and to explain the strengths and 
weaknesses of the theory. On the first part of chapter 7, I will assess the symbolic politics 
theory on the three case study of Aceh problem to shows the reasons of ethnic conflict 
and the subsequent peace in Aceh. I will continue to analyze the strengths and 
weaknesses of the symbolic politics theory based on the three case studies on the second 
part. The objective of chapter 7 is to give conclusion on the explanatory power of 
symbolic politics theory on Aceh war in Indonesia.  
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CHAPTER 7: 
CONCLUSION  
A. Introduction 
On earlier chapters, I discussed the symbolic politics theory on the case studies. 
Now I pull it all together how the theory relates to Acehnese ethnic conflict and the 
subsequent peace. This chapter aimed to assess the symbolic politics theory on the 
Acehnese ethnic conflict and the subsequent peace by analyzing the precondition of 
ethnic conflict through the myths, fears, opportunities, mass hostility, and the hostile 
mobilization. Thus, the symbolic politic theory would find the importance of it by seeing 
the pattern of the conflicts and subsequent peace. Symbolic politics theory applied on the 
three important events of the Acehnese conflicts, which are the Acehnese conflicts under 
Soekarno, Soeharto, and after the 1998 reform period. Based on the three case studies, the 
symbolic politics theory shows its strength in explaining the Acehnese problem in 
Indonesia. Furthermore, this chapter aimed to analyze on the strengths and weaknesses of 
the symbolic politics theory on the Aceh ethnic conflicts.  
 
B. Assessment of the symbolic politics theory on the Acehnese conflicts. 
a. Assessment of the theory on the Acehnese conflict under Soekarno period 
The first case study shows that myths justifying hostility (S1) are clearly present 
and important in the Acehnese case, a history of the Aceh war against the colonial Dutch 
and continue against the Javanese neo-colonial government. The Acehnese widely 
accepted the “Javanese neo-colonial government” as non-believers of Islam or secular 
nationalist, while the Javanese Indonesian government saw the Acehnese was the 
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stubborn people who did not wanted to adopt the Pancasila. The perception that 
Acehnese wanted to change Pancasila with an Islamic basis led also to Javanese 
Indonesian fears of group extinction (S2). The combination of the Acehnese stereotypes 
about the Javanese and violence by Javanese created similar fear on the Acehnese side. 
Opportunity for rebellion (S3) was provided by the difficult terrain and demographic 
concentration of Acehnese in Aceh province; the weak state institutions in regions; the 
insensitive central government to the local value; the Acehnese disappointment toward 
the Indonesian central government; and the creation of local military of DI/TII. Hostile 
mass attitudes—negative stereotype—on the Javanese side (S4) were present, as shown 
by the fact the Acehnese insist to implement the Islamic Law of the Jakarta Charter as the 
Indonesian state basis philosophy was a concrete form of stubborn people. Another 
example of the myth of stubborn was when the Acehnese rejected to be included to the 
North of Sumatra Province in 1950’s. Hostile attitudes on the Acehnese side also existed, 
primarily as a result of fear and resentment rather than hatred. The Acehnese fears arise 
because of the non-believers of Islam (kaphee) of Javanese Indonesian government and 
their military insist to adopt secular nationalist state foundation of Pancasila. The 
Javanese Indonesian government was also troubling behavior that cannot be trusted. It is 
important to note that this negative image of the Javanese showing the Acehnese feelings 
of hostility were obviously strong and widespread throughout Aceh territory. 
Symbolic mobilization (S5) is present on both sides as expected. The mobilization 
was mainly elite-led process on both sides. For the Javanese side, first covertly, but then 
overtly in Soekarno’s rejection of the Aceh province creation and required Acehnese, 
under the Daud Bereueh leadership, to adopt secular nationalist state foundation of 
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Pancasila. In order to pursue this objective, the Javanese Indonesian military was 
mobilized by the Soekarno to attack the Acehnese and their elite, especially Daud 
Bereueh. For the Acehnese, the movement was also elite-led process. The Acehnese 
elites especially the Aceh Islamic Scholars Association (PUSA, Persatuan Ulama 
Seluruh Aceh), para-military Boy Scout Organization (Pandu Organisasi) and Ex-
revolutionary Troops of Aceh Veterans (Bekas Pejuang Aceh) supported the Daud 
Bereueh movement, so the counter-elite leading the movement had to rely on their own 
resources. The Darul Islam movement under Kartosuwirjo, instantly played an important 
role and also became key motivation for the Acehnese to join the movement. The Daud 
Bereueh movement tried to create a myth of devoted Muslim and Indonesian Islamic 
state. It implies that they were fighting for their religion and the Muslim community 
against the secular nationalist regime. Obviously, it was the symbol of Islam that 
provided a rallying point.  
There was an essential security dilemma in Aceh: each side’s security efforts 
threatened the other side. The broad perception of threat on the Acehnese side motivated 
mass mobilization under the banner of Darul Islam movement. At September 20, 1953, 
Daud Bereueh declared the formation of the Islamic state of Indonesia under the banner 
of Darul Islam movement. At the same time, the declaration of the Islamic State of 
Indonesia followed by the well-planed attacks by the Boy Scout Organization (Pandu 
Organisasi) and Ex-revolutionary Troops of Aceh Veterans (Bekas Pejuang Aceh) to 
several Indonesian military and police unit posts in most of the district (Kabupaten) in 
Aceh. In September 21, 1953, Daud Bereueh cleverly took the opportunity to mobilize 
the Acehnese ethnic group to rebel under the banner of Darul Islam movement. The 
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Soekaro’s government and their military introduced to restore order quickly by counter-
insurgency operations. What drove this security dilemma that led to conflict were the 
actions of armed groups and the also the provocations of the elites using the myths, fears 
and chauvinist mobilization against which it took place.  
 
b. Assessment of the theory on the Acehnese conflict under Soeharto period 
This section aimed to assess the symbolic politics theory on the Acehnese ethnic 
conflict by analyzing the precondition of ethnic conflict through the myths, fears, 
opportunities, mass hostility, and the hostile mobilization. Thus, the symbolic politic 
theory would find the importance of it by seeing the pattern of the conflicts. 
Myths justifying hostility (S1) are present in the Acehnese case on the Soharto’s 
period. It was the myth of sovereign Aceh state before the Aceh war on March 26, 1873, 
where the colonial Dutch came to annex the land of Aceh. Di Tiro re-emerge the myth of 
creation of the Negara Aceh Sumatra (Aceh Sumatra State). He proclaimed Negara Aceh 
Sumatra on December 4, 1976 and claimed it as a “Successor State” free from Dutch 
domination and Javanese neo-colonial. Another device was the used of the GAM’s flag 
as a myth-symbol of their pride, glorify of their past, and a symbol of freedom. On the 
other hand, Soeharto used the myth of Pancasila as a symbol of unity of diversity to 
eliminate any other ideologies that could disrupt his plan to centralize power into his 
hand only.  
This Soeharto force to adopt Pancasila led to the Acehnese fears of group 
extinction (S2). Negative stereotype of the Acehnese sides also created similar fear on 
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the Javanese Indonesian side. For example, the stereotype of the Acehnese as rebellious, 
stubborn, chauvinist, and fundamentalist, is inevitably a source of fear for the Javanese 
Indonesian side, surely made worse for those whose parties used myth as “the terrorist, 
the separatist” or GPK. Another example was the used of the hikayat perang sabil (the 
epic of the holy war) by the Acehnese. Di Tiro claimed that hikayat perang sabil epics 
are a holy war against the neo-colonial Javanese side.  
Opportunity for rebellion (S3) was provided by the weakness of the Indonesian 
state, combines with President Soeharto’s centralizing policy in his ruling period, 
demographic concentration of the Acehnese in Aceh province territory, and the existence 
of physical training and ideological support from Muammar Qaddafi, the Libyan dictator, 
in 1987. Hostile mass attitudes on the Javanese side (S4) were also present, as shown by 
the image of the Javanese were “land grabbers” by sending the Javanese settlers under the 
transmigration policy. On the other hand, hostile attitudes on the Acehnese side also 
existed, primarily as a result of fear and resentment. The Javanese Indonesian 
government controls the media though the Press Act articles 11 to support only the 
Indonesian government for the unity interest (nationalism). The existence of negative 
attitudes of Javanese toward the GAM has also been confirmed in media as the Javanese 
Indonesian government propaganda. They tightly control the media contents. 
Symbolic mobilization (S5) is present on both sides as predicted. On the Javanese 
side, violent mobilization was primarily elite-led process explicitly since the first place. 
The fact was shown on the 1984 Pancasila policy as the sole foundation of the state. The 
Javanese Soeharto government forced every Indonesian citizen to adopt the Pancasila 
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as the only ideological principles of live regardless their religions, ethnicity, or their 
region origins. On the Acehnese side, in the similar process, the movement was much 
more elite-led. The policy raised a Javanese symbolic status above any other symbols as a 
national symbol. Separatist violence occurred mainly because the GAM elites stood to 
gain power by promoting separatist violence against the Pancasila policy. The 
Indonesian media was another powerful device for the Javanese by playing on the 
symbolic issues at stake and stirring up anti-GAM (Acehnese) chauvinism. Instead of 
seeking compromise, both sides acted to exacerbate the security dilemma.  
The Acehnese elites provoked the Acehnese nationalist movement into 
overreacting, and then used that overreaction to justify further moves toward secession. 
The Indonesian military provoke the fear of the Indonesian government in purpose to 
eliminate the GAM’s movement by exaggerated the GAM’s members. This hyperbolic 
statement was only to justify their action to immediately implement the DOM in Aceh 
and create such fear among the Javanese Indonesian society. The consequences were the 
Acehnese ethnic cleansing because the real power of GAM was not enough to crush the 
Indonesian military.  
In sum, ethnic conflict between the Acehnese and the Javanese Indonesian 
government under Soeharto regime occurred because of a fundamental clash between the 
Acehnese myth-symbol complex focused on fears of ethnic (nation) domination and the 
Javanese one emphasizing the sovereignty and the national integrity of the Republic of 
Indonesia. Each party defined dominance in Aceh as an important to its national 
existence and saw the other party aspirations as a threat of group extinction. Aceh 
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itself thus became, for both parties, a symbol of national aspirations and of the hostility of 
the other party. The result was a security dilemma and violence, then a politics of 
nationalist extremism that led to war.  
c. The Acehnese subsequent peace after the 1998 reform period 
This part examines the symbolic politics theory on the Acehnese subsequent 
peace after 1998 reform period. This chapter specifically analyzes the myths, fears, 
opportunities, and chauvinist mobilization in determining ethnic peace between the 
Acehnese and the Javanese Indonesian central government in the reform period. 
Indonesian political and economic crisis in 1997 create chaotic situations and 
soon it lead to the fall of Soeharto authoritarian regime in 1998. The collapse of Soeharto 
regime had became a symbol of changes and freedom from an authoritarian regime. At 
the same time, GAM took advantage of anger, new political openness, and demands for 
East Timor-style referendum, to rebuild. GAM start to gained more popular support from 
the Acehnese people and even the international society. The present of hostile myths (S1) 
and fears (S2) are important in the Acehenese peace process.  
However, the violence did not escalate because the Javanese Indonesian 
government and their military chose not to let it; instead of moving on to the next step in 
the escalation process, continued chauvinist mobilization, Javanese elites react very 
careful in responding the Acehnese provocations. Violent escalation may well have been 
possible. Nevertheless, the Javanese elites had strong strategic reasons to decrease their 
oppressive military actions because of the existence of the International community 
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pressure on the violation of human rights from the foreign countries with their investors 
and the activists beyond border like the international non-governmental organizations. 
This pressure led to the next reasons of the Javanese side. They needed the Acehnese 
economic contribution such as LNG (liquid natural gas) and oil productions, and because 
of their fears of extinction were soften by the reassertion of the Javanese political control 
in Indonesia.  
The tsunami disaster in December 26, 2004, also play crucial role as a new 
symbol of negotiation because both side lost their people in most of Aceh territory. On 
the Acehnese side, the tsunami immediately changes GAM position to separate from 
Indonesia. The absence of fears of extinction on Acehnese side and the changes of the 
Acehnese myths removed the motivation for initiating violence. Marrti Ahtisaari, the 
mediator and the 2008 peace noble prize winner, able to convince both side to agree on 
the mutually win-win solutions. The Javanese side did not use a military approach as 
usual in facing the new situations in Aceh and thus, this reaction prevented them from 
fighting back. It implies that the Javanese reassured that their dominance was safe 
because Aceh territory still on the Indonesia territory. While the Acehnese quickly found 
that their people and economy resources were protected. Resentments were also 
manageable, as both sides retained high status in their own eyes: The Javanese 
maintained their political dominance, while the Acehnese kept their political and 
economic dominance, and continued to feel culturally superior.  
Ethnic conflict would be occurred because of a fundamental conflict between the 
Acehnese myth-symbols complex focused on fears of ethnic domination and the 
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Javanese Indonesia government under the transition government period emphasizing the 
sovereignty and Indonesian national integration and saw the regional aspirations as threat 
for Indonesian existence. Geographically, Aceh is one of Indonesian unity pride symbol 
and thus, the Indonesian government insists that Aceh should be inside the Indonesian 
nation-state at any risk. However, the lack of opportunity to mobilize for the Javanese 
became a factor of ethnic peace under the Helsinki agreement in 2006. Furthermore, the 
mass hostility did not appear on the Javanese Indonesian side. Therefore, the ethnic 
conflict did not arise because the lack of elites manipulation on the politics of the myth 
and symbol in one side. 
In short, the applications of symbolic politics theory on the three important period 
of time of the Acehnese conflicts and subsequent peace had shows the strengths of the 
theory in explaining the phenomena. The hostile myths (S1) and fears of extinction (S2) 
were clearly present on the three case studies. Both sides had an enemy image of the 
other long before the conflicts broke out. Apparently, fears arise because of the political 
domination from one ethnic group over the other ethnic group.  
However, the opportunity to mobilize (S3) was present on the first two case 
studies, while the opportunity to mobilization on the third case study did not present. 
Furthermore, the lacks of opportunities did not lead to the hostile mass attitudes (S4). The 
three case studies show that the elites from the Acehnese and the Javanese sides play a 
very important role in determining the violent (S5). On the first two case studies, the 
elites from both sides let the violent broke out. While on the last case study, the elites 
from the Javanese side (government-led) did not counter the provocations and 
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mobilizations of the Acehnese elites. Therefore, the ethnic conflicts are likely determine 
by the elites manipulation and provocation toward the hostile myths and fears of 
extinction from their own ethnic group to create a hostile mass mobilization and 
eventually, violent was inevitable.  
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C. Strengths and weaknesses of the symbolic politics theory 
a. Strengths of the symbolic politics theory 
The symbolic politics theory of ethnic war on the Acehnese ethnic war in 
Indonesia does usefully account for the outbreak of the conflict and even more can 
account for peace process. The Acehnese case is interesting because the degree to which 
every other theory of ethnic war also has some relevance. For example, every responsible 
account of the Acehnese conflict emphasizes its economic dimensions- the economic 
competition argument about ethnic war. The factors here include the competition for land 
between minority ethnic group and the Javanese immigrants on the Aceh territory, the 
deep poverty of the Acehnese group and the pervasive discrimination against them in the 
provision of public services, and the general want of economic opportunity for both the 
Javanese immigrants and the Acehnese. 
Applying symbolic politics theory, I found a number of important points in the 
three cases. In three cases, I found strong myths in the majority group justifying hostility 
against the minority. I also found significant fears on the majority side—indeed, even 
stronger on the Javanese Indonesian side, where the fear was of extinction of the entire 
group. In three cases there was some degree of opportunity for the minority group to 
mobilize, and the minority group had a territorial base where their group was 
concentrated. In three cases there were powerful elites, especially on the majority side, 
who engaged in chauvinist mobilization and mobilizing their followers for violence 
against the minority group. Most significantly, this chauvinist mobilization in three cases 
included a big government crackdown against the minority group in response to initial 
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outbreaks of violence even though most of the violence seems to have been aimed against 
the minority group. The minority group thus had a reasonable basis for fearing for their 
situation. 
The “ancient hatreds” theory works for the Acehnese on a moderate level. The 
best existing history of the Acehnese - (neo) colonial relations was between the Acehnese 
and the Dutch colonial, and the Acehnese and the Javanese neocolonial government in 
Indonesia. Hasan di Tiro, the highest leader of the Acehnese claimed that there was 
indeed a long history of the Acehnese- (neo) colonial warfare there. Furthermore, cultural 
institutions like the “Hikayat Perang Sabil” epics served to keep the memories of that 
conflict alive among the Acehnese before the 1950s. The resulting stereotypes and 
prejudices were measurable among the Acehnese throughout the century. Thus, “ancient 
hatreds” actually did play an important role in the Acehnese conflicts. 
On the other hand, elite manipulation also played an essential role in promoting 
ethnic mobilization and communal war: there was no spontaneous outburst of popular 
hatreds. The Javanese Indonesian government like Soekarno and Soeharto played a 
pivotal role, as did fading the Acehnese aristocrats like Daud Bereueh and Hasan di Tiro 
who steered the Acehnese counter-mobilization. Soekarno and Soeharto’s manipulations 
worked in the background consistently to escalate the violence.  
The result of those manipulations, in turn created a situation in which a genuine 
security dilemma arose, as hypothesized by security dilemma theories of ethnic war.233 
                                                             
233   The security dilemma theory of ethnic war was first formulated in Barry R. Posen, “The Security 
Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” Survival 35, no. 1 (1993), 27-47. 
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The creation of Pancasila as secular state ideological foundation, the Soekarno’s 
command to include Aceh into the North Sumatra Province and continue by the 
Soeharto’s policy to make Pancasila as the sole ideology in Indonesia territory was a 
source of insecurity for the Acehnese. The Acehnese mobilization was almost entirely 
driven by fear among ordinary Acehnese; the conflict is not explicable without attention 
to this factor. 
Moreover, the Acehnese inclined to violent resistance had help from Libya under 
Qadafi leadership, who provided military and ideology training. This help combined with 
other opportunity factors-the Acehnese demographic concentration- to make the 
Acehnese resistance possible.  
 
b. Weaknesses of the symbolic politics theory 
Although the symbolist explanation is effective, factors overlooked by all of the 
competing political science explanations also proved important in this case. First, it is 
significant that the Darul Islam and Free Aceh Movement (GAM) self-consciously define 
themselves as warrior groups.  In symbolic politics theory context, their group myths 
justify any hostility and violence toward the out-groups.  
Second, the social structure of the Acehnese groups, though not precisely a cause 
of the conflict, is nevertheless a critical factor in explaining its dynamics of escalation 
and de-escalation.  As a developing state, patron-client system seems widely used to co-
opt the peripheral area like Aceh. The Javanese Indonesian government used a 
centralization system as a way to co-opt the peripheral Aceh by putting their client 
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such as the military and Aceh provincial government. However, it is the ulama (Islamic 
scholars) are considered as the leader of Aceh. These ulama had sources of power outside 
the state apparatus. The significant factor in enabling politicians like Daud Bereueh and 
Hasan di Tiro to mobilize, respectively, the Darul Islam and GAM hereditary aristocrats 
with social power to mobilize supporters.  It was this social stratum that helped the GAM 
to mobilize or to de-mobilize the Acehnese so quickly. In this case, the Acehnese under 
GAM organization of Hasan di Tiro leadership unite as one ethnic group.  
Another important weakness is that there is no specific path in explaining the 
ethnic conflict based on the symbolic politics theory, especially the elite-led process in 
Aceh. It seems that the symbolic politic approach tend to be more an elite-led process 
than the mass-led process. It is because the interactions between the elite and the mass, 
especially in developing countries, tended to be more elitist than the masses. The elites 
assumed as the true leader that should be obeyed by the followers because they have the 
sources of power such as the cultural attachment of aristocratic blood, wealth, or 
religiosity.  
On the case of Aceh conflicts, the interaction between the elites and the masses is 
based on the patron-client system where the aristocratic elites are extremely influencing 
the client (the masses). The elites play important roles in manipulating the myths and 
symbols of the ethnic group or in responding the politics of the myths and symbols of the 
ethnic group. For example, Hasan di Tiro is the descendant of aristocratic class of the 
Aceh Sultanate, the international entrepreneur, and at the same times, he also as the 
ulama (Islamic scholar). He is a prefect combination of the patron-client system on 
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traditional Aceh social structure. In sum, the elites is playing an utmost important role in 
influencing the ethnic conflict or the ethnic peace like in Aceh ethnic group conflict.  
D. Implications 
A major implication of this research is that ethnic conflict or war is very difficult 
to prevent. An analysis of hostile myths, fears, opportunity reasons, hostile feelings, and 
chauvinist mobilization shows why this is so. Myths, fears, opportunity reasons, hostile 
feelings, and chauvinist mobilization are all reasonable explanations of ethnic conflict or 
war. Based on the research, the elites from both sides more dominant to use these 
symbolic politics elements in triggering or preventing the ethnic conflicts. Thus, the 
symbolic politics theory argues that it is the elites who led the escalation or de-escalation 
of the ethnic conflicts. The elites utilize the traditional social structure of patron-client 
system to mobilize the masses to fight in the name of their nations. The implication of 
this argument is that the symbolic politics theory more focuses on the elite than the mass 
preferences in ethnic conflicts. In short, these theoretical limitations become a caution for 
the future research in analyzing the ethnic conflicts.  
The future research also should take a closer look at the roles of the masses in 
escalating or de-escalating ethnic conflicts. The Acehnese roles in Aceh conflicts and 
subsequent peace are also an important elements in determining the actors the involved in 
conflicts because these supporters are willing to die in the name of their nations and 
symbols of the groups. Furthermore, it is the masses that make the ethnic conflicts or war 
arise and continue even into the most bloodiest war like genocides.  
More over, the future research should observe deeper on the interactions between 
the elites and the masses in the ethnic conflicts. The interactions between the elites 
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and the masses will result wars or peace situations. Hence, the patterns of the interaction 
between the elites and the masses are also critical elements in utilizing the symbolic 
politics of myths, fears, opportunity, hostile feelings, and chauvinist mobilization in 
escalating or de-escalating conflicts with the other groups.  
The situation in Aceh has changed to a great extend, the implications from this 
analysis must be drawn with carefulness. The Acehnese under Hasan di Tiro leadership is 
strong as one Acehnese ethnic group. Hasan di Tiro unites all the Acehnese under his 
leadership. This bond, like later ones, was traceable in part to the myth of Hasan di Tiro 
as the Ulama (Muslim religious leaders) and the descendant of the Aceh Kingdom.  
Therefore, Hasan di Tiro as the Acehnese Muslim religious leader and the aristocrat is the 
main element of the disputes and the subsequent peace. 
The Indonesian central government strategy of international negotiation that 
strengthened the GAM position by accommodating GAM’s aspirations under Hasan di 
Tiro leadership with the Indonesian central government at the same time made a cohesive 
peace deal are very possible, because it meant that accommodation with the rebel group 
would come at a benefit to GAM’s elites and members, in the end as in the beginning, 
then, the solvency of achieving peace in Aceh stems from the bond of the Acehnese and 
strong leadership. That popular and unselfish leadership also remains a key successful 
implementation of Indonesian central government policies for economic development. 
Interestingly, the GAM under Hasan di Tiro has a strong common Aceh identity that 
allows the Acehnese ethnic conflicts resolved. Therefore, the future research should take 
a closer look in other countries that have similar ethnic conflicts and peace conditions 
like in Aceh, Indonesia.  
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